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I read an account the other day that said "Stoogebaker" bought Pierce Arrow a few years before Pierce went out of business during the depression.
Seems to be a connection here...Maybe there's another reason why Packard shutdown...end in the clowns?

The Great Depression killed Pierce-Arrow, not Studebaker. The GD also killed Duesenberg, Hupp, Jordan, Peerless (as an automaker - the company went on to distribute Carlings ale), along with many others.

Studebaker purchased P-A in 1928 when everyone was rich. It sold them around 1933.

Axioms of the auto industry:
1. NEW car sales are only as good as used car sales.
MEANING that if the car losesterriific value on trade in then the new car sales will suffer.

2. Popularity of ANY car (whether new or used or otherwise) depends on exactly and only a WIDE AND NUMEROUS delaer network.

If dealers are too far apart and sparcely located thru out the US then sales will suffer. It doesn't matter how great and grand any caris. If the dealers are too far away from each other and/or very sparce in any region thenn the car will lack sales volumn.

Let me put it this way:
If obtaining service (which means parts availability) is difficult then noone will want the car.

It's that simple and has proven many times over the years.

Nash, Hudson, ACD, PA etc.

GM, F C, Packard, and Studebaker survived well into the post war era due to their excellent dealer network. Altho Nash/AMC issomewhat of an exception. But Nash had some good dealer networks in REGINAL areas of the US. Altho, had it not been for AM-General (gov't contracts and Jeep) then AMC would have probably never survived past 1960.

Ferrari, Bentley, Rolls, Lamborghini all fail those criteria.
Their sales do n ot seem to suffer.

When AMC bought Kaiser-Jeep in 1970 they acquired the General Products Division of Jeep in South Bend, Indiana, which was renamed AM General in 1971.

So - AMC made it all on its own during the 1960s with automobiles.

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EC, there are many reasons to fail. The Great Depression (1929 - 1941) is one of them.

Wikipedia on Jordan: "...In 1927, the firm introduced its only significant misstep, the Little Custom, a luxury compact. Not only did consumers ignore the car, but its financial drain on the company was a leading factor in the takeover by bankers of JMC, leaving Ned Jordan as the company's titular head. Both Jordan and his wife began divesting their interests in the company in 1928..."

Wikipedia on Hupp: "...Sales and production began to fall even before the onset of the depression ..."

PackardV8 wrote:

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Perhaps requalify this position to say that if dealers are too far away from their target markets. Some manufacturers are only interested in skimming the cream from densely-populated metro areas.

...and then...

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Amen to that Brutha!

Also, the market segment has to be large enough to be profitable. Looking at the declining sales of Packard's Senior lines back in the '30s, it is no wonder they concentrated on the highly successful (and profitable) Junior line. Yet, this factor weighed heavily on the the company's future ability to develop completely new product vis-?-vis larger automakers. It would also catch up with AMC in the '60s and beyond.

Interesting too that the Pierce Arrow Silver Arrows were designed during Studebaker's ownership and the few prototypes were built in South Bend. The Silver Arrows were far ahead in their styling and were admired for their attractive appearance. They were displayed in the 1933 auto shows. Later, when PA was again on its own, the company built a model line based on these cars in Buffalo.

(o[]o)

"Seems to be a connection here..."

Yes, the connection is Hoffman and Vance, the guys who took over for Albert Erskine after Studebaker filed for bankruptcy in March 1933. Rather shady.

Ultimately though, it was the Buffalo businessmen that purchased Pierce-Arrow in August 1933 for $1M who caused the company's downfall, because they didn't insist on continued access to Studebaker body stampings, technology such as independent front suspension in 1935, and sales channels. Instead they accepted a go-it-alone deal that required Studebaker only to continue casting Pierce's engine blocks. As a result Pierce had to hurriedly tool all-new cars for 1934 that were retrograde in many respects, and more expensive when the market was demanding the opposite.

Pierce actually turned a small profit in the second quarter 1933 and its market share increased due to its excellent Studebaker-based 1933 line-up. The two companies had planned wonderful new long wheelbase Presidents and closely related Pierces for 1934 that would have done well in the market. Although the cars were never tooled you can see them in several 1934 Studebaker advertisements, the renderings most likely based on completed clay models and created prior to bankruptcy (advertising has its lead times just like new car designs).

Had the businessmen pursued even a scaled back version of the plan, adding the intended 10 inches to Studebaker's hood but otherwise using Studebaker bodies in whole or in case of 7 pass car, large part, sales increases would have tracked Studebaker's and Pierce would have quickly turned its affairs around just as Studebaker did by 1935 when it came out of bankruptcy.

This body sharing strategy between mainstream and luxury brand, which Studebaker and Pierce-Arrow arguably pioneered though Packard should be given credit for its 1924 Six/Eight sharing within same brand, was the secret to luxury car success from the mid-Thirties on into the 1970s and beyond. Cadillac worked it better than anyone else.

Pierce-Arrow did it first and came very close to succeeding.

Studebaker probably had little to say about selling Pierce as the creditors were baying for money. Erskine has also bought control of White Motor, which was sold off.