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203- good point about buying Studebaker with cash, would have been a major hurdle unless the selling price was rock bottom.

Thinking about the architects of the Grand Plan, seems to me that if these guys really had a burning desire to make a great car and had a vision for what that car needed to be and understood that teaming with another big car company would greatly help them afford it, overtures of a very direct and emphatic nature would have been made long before all that money was spent separately developing all those cars between 1950-55.

For example, Mason would have said to himself in 1949 the moment he caught wind of Packard's plan to redesign for 1951: "That's it! My big opportunity to get in sync with Packard. I don't care how I do it, just know the next Nash ABSOLUTELY WILL RIDE on the next Packard platform. And I'll see if Packard has any interest in Nash's making a little car to sell in Packard showrooms based on my Rambler."

Or Ferry after it was clear the day the 1950 Cadillacs were revealed, which may well have coincided with the day he found out that Nash was going to redesign for 1952: "Oh oh, the cars we have in clay don't come out for another year and already they look out of date compared to Cadillac. I need to convince Mason to either let Packard in on Nash's redesign or convince him to climb aboard on Packard's next redesign. And the cars need to be even better looking than the O-B-C C-bodies, which means I need to short cycle the '51s and go for major redesign in '53. And I need to throw Mason a bone by offering him our V8."

Or Nance in 1952 would have looked at both Packard and Nash's current product and realized that BOTH needed redesigned ASAP, and barged into Mason's office screaming: "I don't care how we do it, let's just make sure we do it right and do it big for '55. Lower, wider, faster, sexier. And I want you to make Packard a Depression-proof little car based on your Rambler!"

And Mason and Nance all through the early '50s would have towel-whipped Barit every time they saw him in the DAC steam room: "Listen Ed, you better get those crab cars and your little crab _ss in gear or there ain't gonna be no Hudson in a few years. You're either with us or against us!"

Steve,

I was actually saying the opposite. Make the Junior Packard, sold as the Packard Clipper, a Studebaker Clipper with the 289 in the Deluxe and Supers and the 320 in the Customs. Essentially turn the Clipper into a Studebaker not turn a Studebaker into a Packard like in '57-58.


So Packard would have the 400 line (senior body/352 engine)
They should have built a 300 for '55 (senior body/320 engine)
They should have built the Executive for '55 (junior body/320 engine)

John

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Moving the large Nash line to the Packard platform, built at E Grand would have worked about as well as doing the same with Hudson. The Ambassador and Hornet were about the same size and price as a Clipper.

That would leave the Statesman dangling though, unless they tried to truncate the Clipper platform to something close to the Statesman's 114" wheelbase.

What might have worked better would be a Nash/Studebaker hookup, with the President or Cruiser as an Ambassador, the Commander a V8 Statesman and the Champion a Statesman with the 196. When the new, larger Rambler came out in 56, it would replace the Statesman 6/Champion.

Close South Bend and Vernon CA assembly and consolidate in Kenosha and El Segundo. Close the Kenosha foundry, forge and engine plant, consolidating those ops with the larger Studebaker foundry and V8 plant in South Bend. With luck, that would clear enough footprint in Kenosha to build a body plant next to final assembly, so they would only be shipping stampings from Milwaukee, instead of semi-finished bodies.

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So sell a retrimmed Clipper as a Studebaker, rather than a tarted up Studebaker as a Clipper. The Clipper cost about $300 more than a top of the line President, which was about 15% in those days. First, would the Studebaker clientele accept a Studie that cost that much? Second, that would take more volume away from South Bend, which was already operating far below breakeven.

Studie's strength by then was the cheap cars: Champion and low trim Commanders. There just isn't as much synergy with Packard as Studie would have had with Nash or, to a lesser degree, Hudson, because the best selling Hudson was the top of the line Hornet, which competed with the Clipper.

Thanks for clarifying John, I didn't read your post carefully enough. Yes, a Clipper-based President with 289 makes perfect sense.

The scenario that I think would have been most realistic (and successful) because it would have taken into account the "need to lead" on both Nance and Romney's part, i.e. AMC and Packard would have remained independent, would have been where Packard made a Packard-based Ambassador or Hornet for AMC and AMC made a Rambler-based (long hood) entry Packard Clipper or, were Packard to have picked up Studebaker's name and dealers on the cheap, a Studebaker.

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Knowing where Romney's head was at, probably any large platform was doomed at AMC. In the Nash/Studebaker scenario I laid out, the 56 Rambler would have replaced the Statesman 6/Champion. Then the stretch version of the 56 Rambler would replace the V8 Statesman/Commander. That would leave AMC trying to amortize a new senior platform over just Ambassador and President sales, and trying to maintain the Nash and Studebaker names just for those two senior models. Nope. What Romney did, killing both Nash and Hudson in favor of Rambler would have happened by the same time in a Nash/Studebaker scenario.

What crossed my mind was a Packard/Hudson merger to cover mid and luxury markets, with a marketing agreement with Nash to carry the Rambler at Hudson dealers. Not the entire Nash line. Just the Rambler, as a replacement for the Jet. That way, Romney builds the small cars he likes. Nance builds the big cars he likes, and they are both big shots. Then they do the AMC/Packard merger after Romney is elected Governor in 62.

Regarding this thread's original question... the single factor that MOST contributed to the demise was IMHO that after 1932, major changes to the grill no longer required Board approval.

I use this historical fact both literally and as a metaphor for why Packard fell.

In literal terms, the amount of care and fussing that went into creating the 1932 grill and the level of approval required to bring it to production demonstrated both the single-minded focus and diligence that Packard poured into its cars and the knowledge and insights it had into why people bought them. The 1932 grill was both an architectural masterpiece and an appropriate evolution of the fabulous, longstanding grill that it replaced. Only Packard could have created it. It was a break from the past yet immediately familiar. It was a risk from a risk-taking company that took smart, calculated risks because it knew who it was and who its buyers were.

One can use the '32 grill to measure where Packard either lived up to or fell short from that point forward, or backward.

The 1921 Six's vehicle architecture and production line and the company's quick transition to a longer, more elegant Six in 1923 and even longer Eight in 1924 were of '32 grill caliber in their focus, quality of execution, understanding of the customer and level of risk. All in. One standard. Blinders blocking distractions. Detail-oriented. Confidence.

This is what should have happened with the One Twenty, the wonderful car and production line that represented the next appropriate evolution for Packard and a good entry Eight in the midst of the Depression, in need only of a companion above it within two years.

It was at this very point that Packard tried to serve two masters, and one can see how, for a small company, this was unhealthy. The '38 Seniors are but one example of the lack of focus that increasingly crept into everything Packard did. Yes, the suspension and hydraulics were modern but simple things like rake of windshield and body width forward of B-pillar were noticeably uncompetitive. And the cars were too heavy. And too expensive to produce. And should have been based on the One Twenty the year prior to complete the transition to the new line, with a 5 inch longer hood rather than the 115's 5 inch shorter hood.

With the '37 115, Packard took its eye off the ball, it lost its single-minded focus, its single standard. That's my big wrap on it. It didn't matter that the volumes were high because the company didn't make nearly as much on a per unit basis and the public became confused as to what Packard's standard really was. So did Packard. Gone was the fussing over details, the tailoring, the craftsmanship, the attention to proportion, to creating great architecture. The architects in the company were gone, replaced by developers.

Hi

"Thinking about the architects of the Grand Plan, seems to me that if these guys really had a burning desire to make a great car and had a vision for what that car needed to be and understood that teaming with another big car company would greatly help them afford it, overtures of a very direct and emphatic nature would have been made long before all that money was spent separately developing all those cars between 1950-55.

For example, Mason would have said to himself in 1949 the moment he caught wind of Packard's plan to redesign for 1951: "That's it! My big opportunity to get in sync with Packard. I don't care how I do it, just know the next Nash ABSOLUTELY WILL RIDE on the next Packard platform. And I'll see if Packard has any interest in Nash's making a little car to sell in Packard showrooms based on my Rambler."


Paul makes an excellent point with this scenario, comparing it to the reality reveals the mindset of Masons, Ferry, Barit, eventually Nance: being still locked into doing business in the pre-war model. Mason, no doubt when promoting the concept to the other companies, would have argued the synergies of a shared, common body shell; the efficiencies to be had by fully utilizing the best foundries, stamping plants, engineering resources etc for the mutual benefit of the participating companies. But, he could only conceive of doing so in the framework of merged companies.

The postwar situation demanded something more, a new approach. What would be called out-of-the-box thinking today; a collaboration between, in this case, Nash and Packard to develop a common shell useful to both, ideal. Or, if one was in development, sign on to assist. As long as the results yielded the same benefits as the shared body programs did for the Big Three, it should have been a no brainer. There was some precedence for such an operation: in the 1930's various small manufactures had shared bodies from makers such as Hayes to build their cars. Then it was out of necessity, it had become that situation again for the remaining independents by 1949-50.

Maybe be should be more respectful of the leading principals then... addressing them with Mr. Nitwits!

Steve

in this case, Nash and Packard to develop a common shell useful to both, ideal.

What kills that idea is that Nash had switched to unibody construction before WWII. Hudson went to unibody in 48.

Packard and Studebaker both used body on frame.

Any Studebaker/Nash or Packard/Nash or Hudson platform sharing means eather closing one plant and consolidating production, or investing millions to covert to the other construction system.

The main Nash plant in Kenosha was pretty decent. I toured it in 75. The lakefront plant was horrible. It had originally been built by Simmons to make mattresses and furniture. Mason bought the lakefront plant in 52 to expand capacity. The body plant was in Milwaukee, also old, and required rail shipping of semi finished bodies to Kenosha.

I read a piece on line about the Chinese fire drill that AMC did with the Alliance: partly build the body in the main plant, then truck to lakefront. Finish building the body, then elevator to the top floor, where the paint line was. Then truck the painted bodies back to the main plant for final assembly.