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When I said I've been told things at Hudson were really bad, that includes labor problems. Hudson apparently had tremendous morale problems.

Morale is always going to be an issue in a company that is struggling as Hudson was. Additionally Barit was known as a skinflint, which could have contributed to poor working conditions, which contributed to poor morale. I have seen Roy Chapin Jr quoted on the poor condition of the plant.

When Sherwood Egbert took over as President of Studebaker, one of the first things he did was a "clean up, paint up" program in the plant to improve morale.

The body plant was the big inducement, plus an established medium-priced make in Hudson

According to Ward, Nance was grousing about the body deal with Briggs almost from day one and had Walter Grant working up cost estimates to bring bodybuilding back in house, but the price was too high.

Then there was the cost and confusion of trying to establish Clipper as a stand alone brand.

Solving both the body plant and midmarket brand issues were bonuses had Packard picked up Hudson, on top of Hudson's 7,000 odd dealers and service parts business serving the large number of cars already on the road.

But, Packard's hubris killed the potential. Ward may have the timeline wrong when he says it was August 53 that Barit contacted Packard about a merger and the Packard board shrugged it off, but Packard management should have seen the potential, that is what they were paid for.

Hi
An excerpt from Richard M. Langworth's Studebaker: The Postwar Years, demonstates some of the difficulty S-P had trying to do business with AMC.

"Other ideas of Studebaker-Packard/AMC cooperation also came to naught, though it's worth listing them here. Early in 1954, for example, George Mason suggested assembling Packard body panels in Kenosha; this proved uneconomical due to handling and freight cost from Wisconsin and Detroit. Packard also considered the use of AMC air conditioning; but Bill Graves nixed that because both companies already bought their compressors, evaporators and condensers from the same supplier, and the controls had to look different regardless. In August 1954, Packard asked AMC to quote on engine blocks; the figure was $33.48 each against $30.70 from a local foundry, and AMC said it couldn't start delivering for up to nine months. Before Mason's death, Graves and Moore had worked out dimensions for a possible common inner body shell. Studies determined that the AMC integral frame and the Packard separate body-frame were not major stumbling blocks. But this project died with George Mason.


Then there was the body stamping fiasco. Studebaker-Packard had furnished drawing and requested bids from AMC for certain stampings and subassemblies. These were quoted by Hudson - and in nearly every case were way over other bidders:

Item...................................................Hudson.......................Other
Front end cowl top and windshield.......$7.56........................$4.59
Front fender splashers..........................$2.07........................$1.35
Radiator lower splasher........................$1.66........................$1.12
Splasher battery carrier.........................$0.86........................$0.15

"In many cases," wrote W.R. Grant, "we asked them to check their bids because of obvious errors. We did give them the oil pan for both Packard and AMC, together with reinforcements, even though Hudson was not the lowest bidder. It would appear that Studebaker-Packard has tried to keep a spirit of cooperation with AMC, and substantial progress was being made up until Mr.Mason's death, but since that time the progress of the program has been very uncertain." So much for the 'common market' among the remaining independents."

These examples illuminate some of the problems and missed opportunity between the two after the mergers.

Steve

These examples illuminate some of the problems and missed opportunity between the two after the mergers.

There were other cases. I have read that AMC approached S-P about buying Studebaker V8s to replace the ancient Nash 6 used in the intermediate models. Nance blew them off. Then Nance approached AMC about buying the 196 cube 6 to replace the even smaller Champion 6, and Romney replied that they would be selling so many Ramblers they would hot have any engines to spare.

Thing is, while Nance and Romney were busy throwing spitwads at eachother, both companies were going down. The Foster book about AMC reports that, in early 56, AMC was on the brink of bankruptcy. Romney met with the same people who had just turned down Nance's loan request. Romney didn't get all he wanted, but he got enough. After the meeting with the money people, where Romney was laying out his big plans, he confided to another AMC person that he was totally blowing smoke up the banker's butts, but he was desperate for the money.

Hi

The engine exchange was also written up by Richard M. Langworth's Studebaker: The Postwar Years. Here's the excerpt.

As synopsis to frame the discussions, the issue was how to update the Studebaker six cylinder engine by converting it to an F-head, Barney Roos who'd perform just such on the Willys four and six was consulted.

"Barney Roos himself had been called in for consultation with William H. Graves, Packard's engineering vice president. Roos doubtless discussed his old L-head/F-head conversion, and perhaps suggested that it was pretty old hat by 1955 standards. but Roos also had another idea: Why not trade the Studebaker 259 V8 for an American Motors 200 cid six? AMC was in the market for a small eight for the Hudson Wasp and Nash Statesman - and it was already buying a 320 cid V-8 from Studebaker-Packard for its larger Nashes and Hudsons.

Graves went to see AMC chief engineer Meade Moore, and a swap of these engines was arranged in February. But that was as far as the deal got. By April, Graves had learned that AMC would introduce its own 250cid V?-8 as a 1956-1/2 model, and would not be needing the small block Studebaker. But Studebaker had already cancelled its tooling order for a new F-head Champion! Would AMC still sell it the ohv six?

George Romney was polite, but unyielding. No, he said, AMC wouldn't. Just as politely - one can visualize him gritting his teeth - Nance thanked Romney for his consideration. On September 16 Romney felt moved to explain his actions: "...if we furnished the 30,000 to 40,000 six-cylinder engines to Studebaker, we would be short of sufficient engines for the expected Rambler sales volume in 1957. Expansion of present capacity would call for an expensive across-the-board investment in machinery, equipment and considerable plant rearrangement....Our difficulty was capacity, not a lack of willingness to produce engines for Studebaker if it were possible and practical to do so."

Romney was being sincere. The Rambler was on the brink of its historic climb to number three position in the industry. AMC had a capacity at Kenosha for 160,000 to 180,000 six-cylinder engines a year. In 1957 AMC built 114,000 cars, but for 1958 it would build 217,000, most of them Rambler sixes. Romney was just as sincere when he cancelled further orders for Packard-built V-8's in late 1956: With Rambler in the ascendancy, AMC was closing out its big Hudsons and Nashes."

While cooperation could have strengthened both companies to compete with the Big Three, egos had to be satisfied first. What a shame.

Steve

Romney was being sincere. The Rambler was on the brink of its historic climb to number three position in the industry. AMC had a capacity at Kenosha for 160,000 to 180,000 six-cylinder engines a year. In 1957 AMC built 114,000 cars, but for 1958 it would build 217,000, most of them Rambler sixes. Romney was just as sincere when he cancelled further orders for Packard-built V-8's in late 1956: With Rambler in the ascendancy, AMC was closing out its big Hudsons and Nashes."

Well...this sounds like a lot of hooey.

First, AMC was in severe financial trouble in 55-56 and there was no guarantee the company would even see 58, let alone sell that many Ramblers.

Second, the development of the AMC V8, a design pinched from Kaiser by hiring Kaiser's engine designer who had already done most of the engineering on Kaiser's dime, was a product of the "reciprocity" dispute and Nance and Romney throwing spitwads at eachother.

Third, Studebaker was desperate for a bigger 6. The Champion 6 was 170cuin. Though it was stroked to 186 in 55, it still lagged the big three's entry level 6s which ran around 230cuin. If The Champion had stayed small, it could have managed, but it had grown too much for the old engine.

If Nance and Romney really wanted to solve the 6 problem, there was an easy solution: The 55-56 Kenosha built Hudsons still used Hudson engines, rather than Nash, the 308 in the Hornet, and the 202 that Hudson had developed for the Jet, in the Wasp.

It would have simplified AMC production to use the 196 in the Wasp and make the 202 for Studebaker, or sell the 202 tooling to Studie.

Here is how the engines line up, according to classiccardatabase:

Studie 170(54) 85hp, 138ftlbs
Studie 186 (55) 101hp, 152ftlbs
Nash 196 as used in the 55 Statesman 100hp, 155ftlbs
Hudson 202 as used in the 55 Wasp 115hp 158ftlbs

When Studebaker truncated their platform to make the Lark, they took the 6 back to 170, so I suspect the 186 version had significant operational shortcomings.

And, consider that, while AMC was hemorrhaging money, Romney spent millions on tooling and machining line to make his own V8 so he could avoid buying from S-P.

Again, it's a matter of the conflict between Nance and Romney that trumped solutions to their problems that were literally laying at their feet.

Hi Steve203

Sincerity was the first casualty, disingenuous behavior ruled the day between the principals.

Studebaker was in sore need of a larger six-cylinder as their Champion models gained weight and performance expectations evolved. It was a corner they'd painted themselves into. Many have wondered yet why South Bend didn't follow-up their new '51 OHV V8 with a new OHV six cylinder for 1952. While they still had the old Commander 245 cid six in production for their trucks, for some reason, they didn't make it optional in place of the anemic 170 ci. For 1955, they stroked that 1939 engine to 185.6 ci in an effort to keep pace but whatever was gained wasn't nearly enough. Apparently, the block only had so much 'meat', couldn't be bored larger.

Operationally, the engine worked just fine as 185.6 ci but was kept only through 1958 as such. As a 30 years SDC member, I can't recall reading any complaints of specific failings it had in the Turning Wheels mechanical advice column. Ironically, in preparation for the '59 Lark, management allowed another major reworking. It was de-stroke and received a number of internal redesigns which expended a good deal of engineering talent and scarce funds only to end up with essentially what they'd had in 1954! Worst yet, even with the Lark's reduced weight, performance was just so-so but fuel economy, likely the reason the rework was undertaken, was very disappointing to buyers. It was such a problem that the factory ginned-up a contraption designed to feed the engine one gallon of gas which dealers could use to determine how poorly the customer's car was performing....or perhaps show them it wasn't as bad as it seemed. To further rub salt in the wound, a 259 ci V8 Lark got gas mileage, when equipped with stick and overdrive better than the six! Small wonder that many who bought a '59 Lark six for economy turned to other makes at trade-in time.

And, for all they spent creating an engine less up to the job of providing acceptable fuel economy and preformance, it was still an outmoded L-head! Which they then turned around and converted to an ohv, the 1961 Skybolt Six, which indeed did have field service problems from cracking valve seats through the remainder of its production ending with the 1964 model. If you see a late Lark for sale that's in nice shape but cheap.....check the cylinder count. If it's a ohv six and overheats, run away!

Sorry for getting ahead of the period being discussed but it seems to apply. To the questions at hand, even if Kenosha feared they couldn't produce all the six cylinder engines they needed for themselves as well as South Bend, the response ignores the fact that South Bend could have produced the AMC engine for themselves as part of the swap agreement. If Romney really did anticipate that major increase in Rambler sales, having a second production source as back-up engine supplier, it would have been ideal.

"If Nance and Romney really wanted to solve the 6 problem, there was an easy solution: The '55-56 Kenosha built Hudsons still used Hudson engines, rather than Nash, the 308 in the Hornet, and the 202 that Hudson had developed for the Jet, in the Wasp.
It would have simplified AMC production to use the 196 in the Wasp and make the 202 for Studebaker, or sell the 202 tooling to Studie."

Selling the Jet engine tooling to S-P would have been the ideal solution for everyone. For AMC, it would unloaded a newer but essentially outmoded tooling for which it would shortly have no use. For S-P, it would get a newer yet still outmoded tooling to enlarge and update to ohv.....about what it had except as a 1951-53 development instead of 1937-39. Hmm, maybe not that much of an advantage for S-P, but a stopgap solution just the same.

The missed opportunity represented by failing to sell Studebaker V8 engines to AMC has to be one of the major examples. Contrasting its first season, 1951, when V8 sales totaled 124,329; by 1954, only 30,504 Commanders sold. Although V8 sales rebounded for 1955 to 83,453, almost one-third of the South Bend V8 engine production capacity was underutilized. AMC certainly had use for those engines in Nash Statesman and Hudson Wasp for 1955-56 along with the Packard engines. If only S-P and AMC had both pushed the idea. Even as the Rambler began to take hold in the market, how preferable would it have been for S-P to run their engine production facility at capacity supplying Kenosha rather than getting nothing while carrying the costly excess overhead. Clearly, the benefits that could have accrued to both were completely lost in the long-distance battle of egos between Nance and Romney.

Steve

While they still had the old Commander 245 cid six in production for their trucks, for some reason, they didn't make it optional in place of the anemic 170 ci.

As I recall, the 245 was even more ancient that the 170, dating back to the Rockne. I may be remembering wrong, but sticks in my mind that when the V8 came out in 51, the Studies got their nose bobbed as they didn't need to accommodate the 245 anymore, so the 245 may have been too long to fit in the 53 platform. By some accounts, Studie kept trying to drop the 245, but truck operators wanted it because it had the bags of low end torque that the short stroke V8 lacked.

As a 30 years SDC member,

Maybe you have a tidbit of info in your archives that I have wondered about: how long is the 245? I wonder if the Hudson big sixs would fit in a Studebaker truck. I have measured the length of the 308's head: 30". The 232 and 262 were about the same size. The Hudson engines would have given Studie a line of simple, high torque engines, better suited to truck use than their V8s.

The greatest downside of the Jet engine was it was still smaller than the entry level 6s from the big three. An improvement over the 170, but still coming up short. The 202 was essentially the straight eight from the Commodore with two cylinders cut off. It had the same 3" bore as the 170/186, but a 4 3/4" stroke. None of the Jet road tests I have read from 53-54 noted ill effects. While there were plenty of complaints about the Jet's handling and build quality, the testers seemed to regard the engine as the best part of the Jet.

There is another thing Nance could have done regarding the Champion's engine problem. The Commander had had a significant price premium over the Champ, until around 55, when the Commander's price premium was cut, assuming classiccardatabase's numbers are accurate, to only $90 over the Champ. Looking at photos of low trim 56 Commanders and Champs, it looks like all the Commander amounted to was a Champ with the V8. My parents had a 56 Commander, which I well remember, and there was nothing premium about that car. I would read that change in pricing policy as a reaction to customer resistance to how underpowered the Champ was, by minimizing the additional cost of getting significant power under the hood.

So, why not just drop the 6 entirely? Put the 224 V8 in the Champ and have the advertising highlight "the only low priced car with the power of a modern OHV V8 standard", which would hit all the buzzwords buyers were looking for at the time. Then move the Commander back to a higher trim level, on the same 116.5 wheelbase, with the 259, and the President on the 120.5 wheelbase, with the 259. That would solve the engine power problem, at zero capital cost as they had already tooled up for the 224, and simplify manufacturing.

Studebaker 224 V8: 140hp, 202ftlbs

Plymouth 230 I6: 117hp, 194ftlbs

Ford 224 I6: 120hp, 195ftlbs

Chevy 236 I6: 123hp, 207ftlbs

Hi Steve203

For anyone wondering why we're discussing Studebaker in detail, this is the baggage that came dragging along when the buyout was inked in 1954. As if Packard didn't already have enough......!

Yes, the 245 ci six began in the Rockne, developed into a torquey, workhorse which negated the advantages touted for the new V8. The 232 ci V8 produced 190 lb/ft @2000 rpm whereas the 245 ci Six cranked 205 lb/ft @ 1200 rpm, small wonder truck customers loved them. Stude policy was the Champion six was the standard truck engine even in ton and ton-and-a-half and even larger trucks. Most operators didn't want to flog a heavily-loaded truck over hill and dale with an anemic 138 lb/ft @ 2400 rpm. If they did, they were either flatlanders or swore while the con rods exited the block.

As preface to what happened in 1951, they began a two-tier product program with the 1939 Champion introduction. Champions could be characterized as a 9/10 full-sized car, aimed directly at the low-priced three, promoted for its long-term ecomony of operation. As such, the Champion was a unique development that shared nothing with its line-mates. The Commanders Six were sized and priced to compete with the upper range low-priced three/low range medium priced cars. Presidents were an eight cylinder extensions of Commanders taking on that segment of medium-priced offerings.

All that changed after the war with the new 1947 body, Commanders became an extension of the Champion i.e. narrow and light albeit longer with frontal styling to differentiate. The President wasn't revived as it had accounted for an average of only 8% annual sales.

".............. it looks like all the Commander amounted to was a Champ with the V8."

Somehow management, for all their conservatism, recognized an ohv V8 was required to compete, whipped up the '51 which was about the last time they proactively met a market challenge. Since the main emphasis had been on the Champion's smaller, lighter approach and the new engine fit nicely in the same engine bay, Commanders got rationalized as a Champion with a V8. Trouble was, Commanders had been established as an upmarket offering, larger-sized and priced commensurately. The idea of paying $200 more for a "V8 Champion" when one could get a Ford V8 over a six for about $70 difference wasn't making their cars attractively priced. To say the Commander had a price premium problem in place by the time Nance held sway is an understatement.

"....... would read that change in pricing policy as a reaction to customer resistance to how underpowered the Champ was, by minimizing the additional cost of getting significant power under the hood.
So, why not just drop the 6 entirely? Put the 224 V8 in the Champ and have the advertising highlight "the only low priced car with the power of a modern OHV V8 standard""

An interesting solution, though one can bet the dealers would howl and customers exit in droves. Common knowledge in those days held that a six cylinder was always more economical than a V8. Over half of their sales were sixes, deleting it would have been playing with fire. Ford/Chevy/Plymouth dealers, all at last with a choice of six or V8, would have had a field day reminding the public that Studebaker, that 'champion' of economy, dropped the very engine synonymous with it. For 1955, Pontiac, DeSoto and Chrysler could get away with replacing their sixes with V8 engines. Stude was stuck with their "little engine than barely could" that they'd hung onto too long.... for which no appropriately sized and powered replacement was readily available.

Shortly, SDC Forum participants promise to supply the six dimensions. I ask for the overall from fan to bellhousing which is the length that would have to be accommodated.

Steve

For anyone wondering why we're discussing Studebaker in detail, this is the baggage that came dragging along when the buyout was inked in 1954. As if Packard didn't already have enough......!

Indeed. Nance was making the decisions in South Bend, and everything that went wrong in South Bend impacted E Grand.

Since the main emphasis had been on the Champion's smaller, lighter approach and the new engine fit nicely in the same engine bay, Commanders got rationalized as a Champion with a V8

This brings us back to the original excuse for the S-P merger in the first place. In his book about AMC, Foster says plainly what my own consideration of the issue has led me to conclude. From the book: "...merging Studebaker and Packard together would cause problems, because the two lines were so dissimilar, building them on one body shell and in one factory would be difficult" We have all seen that tidy matrix showing how Packards, Clippers and Studebakers would all be built off the same platform, but can you imagine a Champ 6 pulling anything remotely near the size of a Clipper? The entire idea that Packards and Studebakers could be built off the same platform was delusional.

It would have been possible to break Champion off as a stand alone low priced brand, with 6 and V8 options, then build the Commander and President as retrimmed Clippers, but then you're back to the cost of two separate platforms, with higher level model production diverted to E Grand, which puts South Bend even farther below it's break even production rate, and even fewer units over which to amortize the development and tooling costs for the low price platform.

An interesting solution, though one can bet the dealers would howl and customers exit in droves. Common knowledge in those days held that a six cylinder was always more economical than a V8.

It is counter-intuitive that an 8 would be more economical than a 6. In those days there were no independent fuel economy tests like we have now. The road tests of the time gave fuel consumption at steady state cruise, which would favor the smaller engine due to lower pumping losses. An early 55 Commander with the 224/automatic delivered 23mpg @ 30 and 17.6 @ 60 while a 54 Champ delivered 30.3 @ 30 and 24.9 in OD at 60.

But, a 224 Champ would not be competing in the market with a 186, but with Ford, Chevy and Plymouth models whose 6s displaced the same or slightly more than the Studie V8, and, in spite of the Studie V8's heft, a 56 Commander V8 weighed 3140lbs, while the entry level 6s from the big three weighed 3127 to 3195.

It would have been interesting to have an independent body, like AAA or NASCAR, run a trial of entry level big three sixes vs a 224 Champ, over a real world mix of city, suburban and freeway driving, over 200 miles or more, and compare fuel consumption. With the engines of similar displacement, pulling cars of similar weight, the result might enable Studebaker to advertise "V8 power, with the same fuel economy as other company's 6s" The 224's mileage would only need to be in the pack for that claim to be valid, and Plymouth was still using a flathead.

And, you have to wonder how many people still liked their Champ after they tried merging into heavy traffic on one of those spanky new freeways. A head to head test between a 224/auto 55 Commander and 186/stick 55 Champ had the Commander romping to 60 in 16.7sec vs the Champ taking 19.92. The 259 peeled about 3 seconds off of the 224's time.

Shortly, SDC Forum participants promise to supply the six dimensions.

Thanks for working that issue. I was going by head length as I figured the fan/accessory drives and bellhousing would be about the same, regardless of the length of the engine. No matter, as I measured the 308 in the Hudson museum in Ypsilanti both head only and from back of head to front of fan (fan and accessory drives added 6"). Add 4 or 5" for the bellhousing and I will be in the ballpark. By the way, I also measured the head of a 359 in a 54 Packard at a show last summer 32.25" vs 30" for the 308, so in a Packard/Hudson merger, the Reinhart body would easily accept a 308 as the basis for a next generation Hornet.

Funny you should mention the 55 Commander with the 224, I drove one in high school, it was darn near indestructible.