Packard Forum Index » General

Steve, yes I will, it's about a 12 page article.

[quote}
Let the ride decide wrote:
Not the answer, but interesting nonetheless
http://www.ebay.com/itm/1956-STUDEBAKER-PACKARD-Corp-BRASS-SIGN-/231455177799?pt=Motors_Manuals_Literature&hash=item35e3cdbc47&vxp=mtr[/quote]

There might be an answer embedded in that plaque. Notice the interesting hierarchy of brands in the text. Remember, these are Nance's official words, embossed in GOLD:

"...individuality of design and true pride of workmanship are not dead--but live today stronger than ever, in Studebakers, Clippers, and Packards."

Strange choice of product lineup there. Cheapest to most expensive, maybe? Does this give a clue to how it became the Studebaker-Packard company?

Anyhoo, back to the assembly line. As far as I have learned, there was never really a good reason given for leasing the Conner plant. Self-sabotage seems to describe it best.

Question on the Mill & Factory article (quite readable if you click on it and zoom in). It seems to imply that the "120 Plant" was entirely new, when, as I understand it, the 120 and the "seniors" were made in two different production buildings at E. Grand. It's kind of a gray area for me. We often speak of the E. Grand Blvd location as "the Packard plant" but it's more of what today would be called a "campus." (Not that I care for that co-opted term... I think a campus is where you go to work for a cap and gown, not for a company.)

<i>Anyhoo, back to the assembly line. As far as I have learned, there was never really a good reason given for leasing the Conner plant. Self-sabotage seems to describe it best.</i>

They needed a body plant. Nance had been looking at bringing bodybuilding in house, but they didn't have the capital to build or buy a body plant. Chrysler wanted $8.7M for Conner. Nance could only borrow $7.5M, so they ended up leasing it. Reportedly the day after Nance signed the lease on Conner, AMC announced they were closing Hudson operations in Detroit, and the shut down was effective in October 54. After sitting on the Hudson body plant for 2 years, waiting for stamping orders from Packard that never came, because AMC's prices were sky high, the Hudson body plant was sold to Cadillac for $2.1M, $6.6M less than Chrysler had wanted for Conner. What precipitated moving the final assembly line into Conner was Walter Grant's estimate that, while only using Conner for body building, and keeping the final line at E Grand would save $8M/yr, moving the final line into Conner would save $12M/yr.

<i>It seems to imply that the "120 Plant" was entirely new, when, as I understand it, the 120 and the "seniors" were made in two different production buildings at E. Grand.</i>

The drawing on the right page is of buildings 31-38, south of Palmer. I recognize the footprint.

The drawing on the left page is probably the complex north of E Grand, but I don't recognize the footprint. Even zooming in on the image I can't read the notes on the drawings.

Being in 1935, this is before the bridge over E Grand was built, and I don't see the bridge over Palmer either.

The typical plant numbers I hear today are around one car every 1.2 minutes or 50 cars per hour. That's 400 per shift, and 432,000 per year for a plant running full capacity. However, those goals aren't met given annual tooling and change over.

The only way Packard could sell cars at 2.4 minutes per car would be using dealer floor plans. The dealers would then have to figure out how to "move the iron."

Quote:

For a rough estimate, I figure an auto plant runs about 48 weeks a year, after deducting summer and winter shutdowns and holidays.

Studebaker could push the South Bend lines up to 66 cars/hr, but their cars were rather simple. When the Lincoln plant in Wayne first opened, it's rate was 320/shift/day, for a rate of 40/hr. Using the 48 week rule, that would be 76,800/year.

In comparison, Grant figured that, with the final assembly line added, Conner could turn out 25 cars/hr. Once the place was running, the plant manager said he could turn out 25/hr, "and not one of them will pass inspection". Given the overtime schedule and double shifts Conner worked in 55, that 55,000 produced works out to about 11 cars/hr, then add the shift premiums, overtime pay, then the rework time and material and warranty claims from the shoddy assembly. It's a miracle they managed to break even.

In my favorite alternate reality, where Packard buys Hudson in 53 and consolidates assembly at E Grand, rather than buying Studebaker in 54, adding 54 Packard, Clipper and Hudson Hornet and Wasp together, for a total of 67,727, puts E Grand not far off of a full single shift production schedule in the heart of the Ford/GM price war.

In 55, the market didn't like the Hash, so adding strong Packard and Clipper sales to weak Hornet and Wasp gives a total of 75,568, almost dead on a full single shift schedule for E Grand, without the overtime of the 9hr/2 shift/3 Saturdays per month schedule Conner was running. If the market liked the Clipper based Hudsons better, the company may be looking at a 100,000 unit year.

Why all this matters is Walter Grant figured if Packard ran a separate body plant with final assembly at E Grand, break even would be at 30,000/yr.

Quote:

Warning; Conspiracy Theories ahead!

My previous suggestion that the Conner plant deal was self-sabotage could be way off the mark. Packard might have been doing the best they could while other companies were trying to cut them off. The speculation on how well Packard could have done if things had worked out differently may not indicate Packard's ineptness as much as it shows that there were plenty of others who were working against their success.

Who knows the politics and back-room corporate dealings that went one? It certainly looks like AMC was asked to hold off on selling the Hudson body plant until after Packard had signed the deal on Chrysler's Conner plant. Then, wonder of wonders, Cadillac gets the Hudson plant at what looks to be a bargain price. AMC was evidently chosen by the Big Boys to play ball and survive... maybe because AMC didn't have the cars to compete against the larger GM and Chrysler cars, like Packard did. Come to think of it, AMC never made cars to compete in that segment... and neither did Studebaker.

Quote:

What's good for Packard may not be what's good for GM, eh?

Quote:

I love a good conspiracy theory, but I don't see a big anti-Packard conspiracy here. Neither Chrysler, or Briggs was doing Packard any favors. They were maximizing profits with a customer who had little alternative. That's just "sharp" business practices.

GM did do favors for the independents. GM quite often contracted with Kaiser for stampings as Kaiser had surplus capacity at both Willow Run and Shadyside Ohio. GM sold Hydramatics to Nash, Hudson, Kaiser and Lincoln. When Hydramatic production was resumed after the fire in 53, they resumed shipments to their non-GM customers first.

We all know about the talks between Packard and Ford about Packard acquiring obsolete Lincoln tooling. At that same time, S-P was negotiating for obsolete Ford tooling for the next generation Studebaker.

There has been talk that when Charlie Wilson became SecDef, he went out of his way to funnel defense contracts to GM, and away from all the other automakers, including Ford and Chrysler. That may be true, or not. Drew Pearson did a scathing attack on Wilson on that issue. On the other hand, the "second source" policy that DoD had, and had resulted in the contracts to Packard, Studebaker and Kaiser, which Wilson started getting rid of, were enormously costly and wasteful.

In "Master Motor Builders" there is a discussion of the mine sweeper engines that Packard built for the Navy. The head engineer of that program, Marsden Ware, wend to Curtiss-Wright with the Utica plant and the engine contract. He wrote a memo to C-W management about how horrendously inefficent Packard's production of those engines was, how Packard overloaded the engine program with overhead charges and how those engines were costing the Navy twice as much as they should have. I have the prices Packard charged the Air Force for the J-47s. I would love to see what GE was charging at the same time. Kaiser was charging the Air Force vastly more for the C-119s it built than what Fairchild was charging. Kaiser claimed it was due to Fairchild interference, but, after investigating, the A-F cancelled all contracts it had with Kaiser.

I don't see any big three conspiracy against Packard. What I do see is a President of the company out of his depth and more concerned about advancing his own career, and a BoD drowning in hubris. This is based on reading half a dozen or more accounts of the activities of all the independents during that period, from Langworth, Foster, Ward, Critchlow, Mueller and Neal.

Quote:

I don't think so. While the Nash/Hudson merger was formally announced in January 54, The deal didn't close until stockholders approved it. Now, I'm going from memory here, rather than look it up, but I think the merger closed around April, and the announcement that Hudson production would end in Detroit was on June 1. Six months later, AMC had built the tooling for the Kenosha build Hudsons, which looked significantly different from the Nashs, and started production. That's a pretty tight schedule. I don't think it was a matter of AMC being asked to hang on to the body plant as much as AMC realizing they probably would not get a lot for it, Packard already having committed to Connor before AMC was ready to announce the Detroit shut down, and waiting on Packard to give them some stamping orders. The Foster book also states that Romney, still waiting for those Packard orders, heard a rumor that Packard was negotiating for the Murray body plant as Murray was ready to exit the auto parts business in mid 55, and hit the roof. That was probably about the time AMC started shopping the body plant, finally selling it to Cadillac in 56.

Quote:

Steve203 wrote:
Quote:

55PackardGuy wrote:

Warning; Conspiracy Theories ahead!

I love a good conspiracy theory...

I don't think it was a matter of AMC being asked to hang on to the body plant as much as AMC realizing they probably would not get a lot for it, Packard already having committed to Connor before AMC was ready to announce the Detroit shut down, and waiting on Packard to give them some stamping orders. ...'55 ... was probably about the time AMC started shopping the body plant, finally selling it to Cadillac in 56.

I thought the timing was suspicious on the AMC sale, supposedly announced "the day after" Packard closed on the Conner plant -- it is Conner with an "er" (I looked it up ). But it might have just been prudent for AMC to see what Chrysler got for Conner from Packard before putting the Hudson body plant on the market. AMC didn't seem to have much luck bidding the price up that way, though, if that was their strategy.

Thanks for your thoughtful de-construction of that "conspiracy theory", Steve 203. You have great source material. One good reason for conspiracy theories to exist, I think, is that in answering the questions they raise a more complete explanation for what happened can be found. Ah, living history.

Now, if only someone can tell me what the heck was going on with that engraved plaque Nance signed, which listed the cars in the order of Studebaker, Clipper and Packard. That is just weird.

it is Conner with an "er" (I looked it up ).

Yes, it is. I also looked it up on Google maps.

But it might have just been prudent for AMC to see what Chrysler got for Conner from Packard before putting the Hudson body plant on the market.

With Packard being the only company in Detroit in severe need of a body plant, waiting for their best prospect to go with another facility doesn't sound like a good plan. This was happening when Mason, who Nance said he had a gentleman's agreement with, was in charge, not Romney. I'll add this data point, about a total lack of cooperation between Packard and Nash, to the evidence that the "grand plan" that Nance talked about years later was a lot of hooey.

Now, if only someone can tell me what the heck was going on with that engraved plaque Nance signed,

Studebaker holders had the majority of S-P shares? Studebaker had a bigger market share? Maybe Nance just threw all the names in a basket and pulled them out in that order?

Plant managers wish they could operate 92% of the year.

As for all this Hudson stuff, I don't understand why Nash would even want the thing. I know people whose relatives worked for Hudson and they said the situation at Hudson was absolutely dreadful. There are far fewer plants than in the old days of course, but nowadays if you are caught shooting Heroin, Speed, or whatever, or selling engines to your friends, or throwing parts in the garbage you are gone.

It's a wonder those cars even ran given what was going on at some of those plants.