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Add the Predictor grille to the Pacer and you've got it set!

The Ford takeover is an intriguing idea. Not many people remember that before 1955 or so, Lincoln was more comparable to Olds 98 in overall size, engine power and price. They did not see themselves as directly competing with Cadillac.

We know that Ford was weak in the medium and high priced lines, having only 3 lines compared to 5 for Chrysler and GM. That is why they brought out the Edsel, and moved the Lincoln up market.

What if they had taken over Packard?

This would have made them a very strong competitor across the board.

Ford - close second to Chevrolet in the low priced field. Actually outsold Chev in 1957. Well ahead of Plymouth and the independents. Doing fine as is.

Mercury - often seen as a super deluxe Ford, an attractive proposition compared to Dodge or Pontiac.

Lincoln - let it keep selling in the Olds, Hudson, DeSoto and small Chrysler price range

Clipper - competing with Buick and Chrysler New Yorker

Packard - full blown luxury competitor to Cadillac and Imperial.

This would have eliminated the need for the Edsel.

By 1958 they would have had Ford as we know it. A Mercury based on the Ford body and chassis, like the Edsel Ranger and Pacer. Lincoln and Clipper using the Mercury- Edsel Corsair- Citation body. And Packard using the 1958 Lincoln body.

Very interesting what if. They could have avoided the Edsel debacle and save $250 million. And gained Packard's plant and dealer network and other assets. Could they have bought Packard for $250 million? It might have made better sense than spending it on Edsel.

Mahoning your 58 Packard looks better than the Lincoln if you ask me.

For Clipper how about the Edsel Citation with a Predictor grille in place of the horse collar?

Ford - close second to Chevrolet in the low priced field. Actually outsold Chev in 1957. Well ahead of Plymouth and the independents. Doing fine as is.

Mercury - often seen as a super deluxe Ford, an attractive proposition compared to Dodge or Pontiac.

Lincoln - let it keep selling in the Olds, Hudson, DeSoto and small Chrysler price range

Clipper - competing with Buick and Chrysler New Yorker

Packard - full blown luxury competitor to Cadillac and Imperial.

This would have eliminated the need for the Edsel.

Why even bother with the Clipper? The Clipper brand had near zero equity. Remember how Nance had the Packard name removed from Clippers and dealers and customers had a hissy fit?

Keep Lincoln positioned above Merc, and Packard above Lincoln.

Except Nance would not accept being a divisional head at Ford any more than he would accept that level of position at AMC, not until after Packard's collapse made him swallow his pride. By then it was too late. Lincoln was breaking out of being a deluxe Merc and morphing into a land yacht in 56, before Nance was brought down a peg, so that door was closed.

A sort of Ford-based Mercury was the Canadian Meteor Rideau 500. Links for 1957 and 1958 models:

http://blog.hemmings.com/index.php/2014/09/07/hemmings-find-of-the-day-1957-meteor-rideau-500-victoria/

http://www.curbsideclassic.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/1958-Meteor-Rideau.jpg


And catching up with requests for Edsel with Predictor grill, here are a few not-so-great mods but hopefully will help you envision what they would have looked like. For the Citation-based version I redid the C-pillar into shape of Turnpike Cruiser to make it even more Predictor-like, the Citation's roof looking like it came from the TC stamping with a notch taken out of the C-pillar. Note the Citation's roof at windshield header... mercifully spared the TC's gobbledygook.

Still pondering the interesting Ford suggestions. Took quick look at GM pricing in 1958. Poniac starting price was similar to Edsel Ranger, Mercury similar to Buick. Olds entry oddly started above Buick but Buick topped out way above Olds, which would have made direct competition with GM brands difficult on Ford's part. Looking at Pontiac sales throughout the 50s, they really weren't that spectacular given their lower prices vs Olds and Buick, which should have been a red flag for Edsel. The volume call on Edsel was 200,000 which was far above the actual. The volume call was also way above Mercury. My question to Ford planners of the day is why they would have expected Edsel to sell more than Mercury if Pontiac never sold more than Olds and Buick. Perhaps their answer would have been that their research said distinctive styling would be the key. And maybe they were right... the '59 Pontiac shot past Olds and Buick for the first time and was way up over the '58 Pontiac. So maybe it was simply the Edsel's styling.

My only problem with the idea of trying to compete tit-for-tat with GM in these years is that GM (and Ford and Chrysler) thinking was part of what led America to being caught with its pants down when Sputnik went up. I tip my hat to those who bought ugly Ramblers, Ambassadors and Jets and daring Hornets. These folks sought out whole-vehicle innovation above all else. This is why I like the idea of an Edsel that wins not because of its size but because of its quality, craftsmanship, lasting style and innovation. Speaking of which, it would have needed Torsion-Level and maybe supportive bucket seats and center console ilo of bench seat to be pricable at twice Ford.

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Edsel what-went-wrong courtesy 1958 Edsel Page:

"After a massive promotional campaign, which included multi-page "teaser" ads in major national magazines, some 2.5 million Americans poured into Edsel dealerships on "E-Day", September 4, 1957. But it was quickly apparent that few cars were actually being sold. The public expectation was much higher than the car could live up to, and sales reflected the disappointment.

There was a combination of other factors that led to the name "Edsel" becoming synonymous with "failure" - By the time the first Edsel hit the showroom, the country was in a recession. (For comparison, 1958 DeSoto sales were down 54% from 1957. Buick was down 33%, Mercury 48%, Oldsmobile 18%, Dodge 47%, Pontiac 28%.. probably the worst year since World War II to unveil a new car line!) Car-buying habits had turned toward smaller and more fuel efficient cars. Edsel's styling was radical, and not to everyone's liking. On the assembly line, Edsel was run between Fords or Mercury's, causing the assembler to have to interrupt his routine and sometimes forget to install some parts. The Edsel also suffered from parts that wouldn't fit together correctly. Because of problems with suppliers, many of the early cars arrived at the dealerships with parts missing. Many dealers were poorly equipped to replace the parts or add on accessories. Ford Vice President Robert McNamara offered little support to the Edsel Division. The Edsel was more expensive than other comparable cars, and the price of the loaded, top-of-the-line models that were first on the showroom floor scared many buyers. There was no owner loyalty to count on. And, finally, it had a funny name.

The Edsel Division was in a death spiral. The more cars that failed to sell, the more dealers dropped their Edsel franchise. The more dealers that folded, the more the public was afraid to buy the car."

Had the cars been built exclusivly in Conner and only the Edsel-unique stampings stamped in that plant, at a production of around 50K per year and with a little help in cash and talent from Ford to fix the plant's shortcomings, the car's quality could have been near exemplary.

Sales of medium priced cars and deluxe versions of lower priced cars were very strong in the early fifties. This was quite a change, at one time the cheapest model would have been the sales leader but suddenly, the public taste changed and they had money to spend. For example, Buick overtook Plymouth to become the 3d best selling car after Ford and Chev.

Chrysler was very strong in the medium price brackets and actually outsold Ford in the forties even though Plymouth never sold half as many cars as Ford did. But Dodge DeSoto and Chrysler sixes were very popular.

GM of course had "a car for every purse and purpose".

Ford had the best selling Ford, and if you wanted something a little nicer they had Mercury. If you didn't happen to like the Mercury your only other choice was Lincoln which was a big step up in price.

Their new strategy was to put the Edsel solidly in the medium price bracket with 4 models covering a wide range in price and size. Move Mercury up to the upper medium price bracket and move Lincoln up from the upper medium price to the top of the luxury car range.

It was their bad luck that this strategy took effect as the country went into a recession and medium price car sales dropped like a rock. Olds, Buick, and DeSoto saw their sales drop by more than half. Rambler and Lark set new sales records. And newcomer Edsel was a resounding flop.

So, they dropped the Edsel and turned the Mercury back into a deluxe Ford. Even Lincoln shrank in size after 1960 although not in price.

Edsel was run between Fords or Mercury's, causing the assembler to have to interrupt his routine and sometimes forget to install some parts. The Edsel also suffered from parts that wouldn't fit together correctly. Because of problems with suppliers, many of the early cars arrived at the dealerships with parts missing. Many dealers were poorly equipped to replace the parts or add on accessories.

Sounds a lot like the disaster when Packard moved into Conner....and who was running Edsel? James J Nance.

"....and who was running Edsel? James J Nance." Wrong!

James J. Nance went to Ford in November 1956 as V-P of Marketing. In September 1957 he became VP-General Manager of the Lincoln & Mercury Division. (Richard E. Krafve was the VP-General Manager of the Edsel Division, and had been since the division started.) Nance was ordered to merge the Edsel Division into the L & M Division in January 1958. So, during the time the Edsel was born and during its first four months of production "who was running Edsel?" Richard E. Krafve.

The recent Predictor post got me thinking about the would-be high end Edsel and how to have gotten folks to pay way up for its Ford body. How about hidden headlights for distinctiveness and mystery? In the work-up they would be behind the horizontal slats. Ditto the Lincoln-based Packard discussed earlier, making the new P-E Division 100% hidden for market differentiation.

Also pondered Ford buying not only Packard but the whole S-P mess in mid-56 and using the cheapest '58 Ford as the new '58 Studebaker, with rework to Ford's front and rear 6 inches. This would have led to 3 brands built on one basic body, giving the company tremendous efficiency. For Mercury, Lincoln and Packard the same 3 brand - 1 body strategy could have been used, the Turnpike Cruiser being the common body shell.

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