Re: What would a traditional Packard "Senior" have looked like in 1951?
Posted by Packard5687 On 2017/8/1 16:54:02
<i>"That is a very interesting comment about Packard wanting to be the next Buick."</i>
Christopher had come to Packard from GM, having worked both at Pontiac and Buick. His genius lay in bringing the then most up-to-date production techniques to Packard to launch the 120, a task he performed brilliantly.
His downfall - and ultimately Packard's - lay in Christopher's hatred of Packard's luxury cars. Buick in the GM hierarchy of the time was slotted into what we now call the "near luxury" class. Christopher set out to take Packard downmarket.
Packard never should have brought out the Six. Yes, they sold a lot of them, but in doing so, they drove their traditional customers to Cadillac. It has often been said, correctly in my view, that Christopher handed Cadillac the luxury car business on a silver platter. Christopher even allowed "business coupes" to be built. Cadillac NEVER went that far downmarket. You could still get a Packard Business Coupe in the 24th Series cars launched in 1951.
Christopher was dead set on making Packard the next Buick. It was as if he had an unfathomable personal animosity toward his former employer. This is why I feel he stuck with the straight eight yet had the Ultramatic developed. Buick stuck with their straight eight later than Oldsmobile or Cadillac, but Buick developed Dynaflow whereas Cadillac, Oldsmobile and Pontiac used the Hydra-Matic.
You are quite right that Nance is often unfairly blamed for many of the things that went wrong - but what executive other than Nance has ever walked into such a perfect storm of events?
Nance was forced into a decision about Conner that was arguably the correct decision ON PAPER. In practice, trying to build complete cars at Conner was a disaster - though by '56 they had the kinks mostly worked out. But by then, the damage had been done.
The plan was to extend the assembly line at Conner to alleviate the bottlenecks. They had hoped to be able to do this in conjunction with the launch of the '57s. With the roof crashing in around Packard, this never happened.
Conner was never designed to be a complete assembly plant. It was built to be a stamping plant and to assemble "bodies in white." Packard had to move the upholstery shop, the paint shop, everything from East Grand and shoe horn it into Conner. In my view, despite controller Walter Grant's number crunching showing it more cost effective to build complete cars at Conner, they should have continued building "bodies in white" at Conner and continuing with final assembly at East Grand. The move of all assembly operations to Conner sowed the seeds for East Grand becoming the sad symbol of Detroit's decline that we so often see in photographs of Detroit today.
The Studebaker fiasco <i>might</i> not have been so bad had George Mason not died and the final merger into American Motors completed. Romney was not interested in Studebaker becoming the low price line in the American Motors lineup. Romney was focused on the Rambler, and it proved to be the right strategy for American Motors so long as Romney was at the helm there.
Romney in short order killed off Hudson, the Nash-Healey sports car, the Hudson Italia and the full-size Nashes. In killing off Hudson, he killed off the next generation Hudson, the replacement for the "Step Downs." Hudson's Frank Spring had been behind the development of that car. Spring "retired" from Hudson thanks to Romney and drove the one running prototype of that car from Detroit to his retirement home in California.
The friction between Romney and Nance put an end to the component sharing plans Nance and Mason had worked out. There was no way that George Romney was ever going to complete that merger. I'm a fan of Nance, but one of his flaws was that he should have put his ego on the shelf when trying to work with Romney. One reason the merger between the Nash-Hudson half and the Studebaker-Packard half of American Motors never happened was the ego clash between Romney and Nance. Nance didn't have that problem with Mason.
A major scandal of the Eisenhower administration that has never gotten the attention it deserves was what ex-GM Chairman Charles Wilson did as Secretary of Defense to insure that Packard wouldn't be able to fund the '57s: the re-writing of Pentagon procurement rules to favor GM and the way he killed Packard and Studebaker's Defense work in the wake of that. The J-47 jet engine contract made the business case for Nance to build Utica. Utica wasn't so much intended as a facility to build V-8s and Ultramatic Drives - that was a fringe benefit. The justification for Utica came in Packard's Defense work and Wilson knew that if he killed Packard's Defense work, he would drive a stake through Nance's plans to restore Packard's luxury car business at Cadillac's expense. Wilson saw to it that GM kept the silver platter on which Christopher had handed GM the luxury car crown.
Your figures on Buick and Packard production show the hill Packard had to climb - Sisyphus dragged down by Studebaker! On that 55,000 unit volume, Packard actually made money in 1955 - only to be lost by the hemorrhaging at Studebaker. As further evidence of the challenge Packard faced, search the photos at Hemmings in their Location photo series each day for Packards or Studebakers in the images. Rarely will you find one.
Nance faced a daunting task. I believe he gave it his all and that he was an inspiring leader that, had even just one of the events that hit him turned out differently, he and his team would have prevailed and the Packard story would have had a happier ending.
Attach file:
(28.20 KB)
Christopher had come to Packard from GM, having worked both at Pontiac and Buick. His genius lay in bringing the then most up-to-date production techniques to Packard to launch the 120, a task he performed brilliantly.
His downfall - and ultimately Packard's - lay in Christopher's hatred of Packard's luxury cars. Buick in the GM hierarchy of the time was slotted into what we now call the "near luxury" class. Christopher set out to take Packard downmarket.
Packard never should have brought out the Six. Yes, they sold a lot of them, but in doing so, they drove their traditional customers to Cadillac. It has often been said, correctly in my view, that Christopher handed Cadillac the luxury car business on a silver platter. Christopher even allowed "business coupes" to be built. Cadillac NEVER went that far downmarket. You could still get a Packard Business Coupe in the 24th Series cars launched in 1951.
Christopher was dead set on making Packard the next Buick. It was as if he had an unfathomable personal animosity toward his former employer. This is why I feel he stuck with the straight eight yet had the Ultramatic developed. Buick stuck with their straight eight later than Oldsmobile or Cadillac, but Buick developed Dynaflow whereas Cadillac, Oldsmobile and Pontiac used the Hydra-Matic.
You are quite right that Nance is often unfairly blamed for many of the things that went wrong - but what executive other than Nance has ever walked into such a perfect storm of events?
Nance was forced into a decision about Conner that was arguably the correct decision ON PAPER. In practice, trying to build complete cars at Conner was a disaster - though by '56 they had the kinks mostly worked out. But by then, the damage had been done.
The plan was to extend the assembly line at Conner to alleviate the bottlenecks. They had hoped to be able to do this in conjunction with the launch of the '57s. With the roof crashing in around Packard, this never happened.
Conner was never designed to be a complete assembly plant. It was built to be a stamping plant and to assemble "bodies in white." Packard had to move the upholstery shop, the paint shop, everything from East Grand and shoe horn it into Conner. In my view, despite controller Walter Grant's number crunching showing it more cost effective to build complete cars at Conner, they should have continued building "bodies in white" at Conner and continuing with final assembly at East Grand. The move of all assembly operations to Conner sowed the seeds for East Grand becoming the sad symbol of Detroit's decline that we so often see in photographs of Detroit today.
The Studebaker fiasco <i>might</i> not have been so bad had George Mason not died and the final merger into American Motors completed. Romney was not interested in Studebaker becoming the low price line in the American Motors lineup. Romney was focused on the Rambler, and it proved to be the right strategy for American Motors so long as Romney was at the helm there.
Romney in short order killed off Hudson, the Nash-Healey sports car, the Hudson Italia and the full-size Nashes. In killing off Hudson, he killed off the next generation Hudson, the replacement for the "Step Downs." Hudson's Frank Spring had been behind the development of that car. Spring "retired" from Hudson thanks to Romney and drove the one running prototype of that car from Detroit to his retirement home in California.
The friction between Romney and Nance put an end to the component sharing plans Nance and Mason had worked out. There was no way that George Romney was ever going to complete that merger. I'm a fan of Nance, but one of his flaws was that he should have put his ego on the shelf when trying to work with Romney. One reason the merger between the Nash-Hudson half and the Studebaker-Packard half of American Motors never happened was the ego clash between Romney and Nance. Nance didn't have that problem with Mason.
A major scandal of the Eisenhower administration that has never gotten the attention it deserves was what ex-GM Chairman Charles Wilson did as Secretary of Defense to insure that Packard wouldn't be able to fund the '57s: the re-writing of Pentagon procurement rules to favor GM and the way he killed Packard and Studebaker's Defense work in the wake of that. The J-47 jet engine contract made the business case for Nance to build Utica. Utica wasn't so much intended as a facility to build V-8s and Ultramatic Drives - that was a fringe benefit. The justification for Utica came in Packard's Defense work and Wilson knew that if he killed Packard's Defense work, he would drive a stake through Nance's plans to restore Packard's luxury car business at Cadillac's expense. Wilson saw to it that GM kept the silver platter on which Christopher had handed GM the luxury car crown.
Your figures on Buick and Packard production show the hill Packard had to climb - Sisyphus dragged down by Studebaker! On that 55,000 unit volume, Packard actually made money in 1955 - only to be lost by the hemorrhaging at Studebaker. As further evidence of the challenge Packard faced, search the photos at Hemmings in their Location photo series each day for Packards or Studebakers in the images. Rarely will you find one.
Nance faced a daunting task. I believe he gave it his all and that he was an inspiring leader that, had even just one of the events that hit him turned out differently, he and his team would have prevailed and the Packard story would have had a happier ending.
Attach file:
(28.20 KB)
This Post was from: https://packardinfo.com/xoops/html/modules/newbb/viewtopic.php?post_id=194560