Re: Continuing the Packard

Posted by Mahoning63 On 2012/9/1 8:45:24

Just re-read Ward's book, pgs 169-173 covering Studebaker manufacturing cost problems in late '54 and throughout '55. A complete mess and Nance even threatened to liquidate early in '55. Prompted me to rethink my proposed timeline. Nance may have needed to bail on Studebaker at first whiff of Studebaker's impossible breakeven number, which he learned of in November/December '54.

Although the alternative would have been badge engineering in its most egregious form, Nance could have asked Romney if AMC would be willing to let S-P sell the '55 Nash Rambler as a Studebaker (which, as we know, is what Hudson dealers got as a replacement for the Jet). Perhaps Studebaker's V8 could have been made an option if the Rambler were able to package and handle the engine's size and weight.

Such a deal, while likely hurting Studebaker dealers because sales would have dropped, would have helped both S-P's and AMC's bottom line tremendously and at a time they both needed it most. The Rambler assembly line would have been humming all through 1955 and Romney would have likely been satisfied that S-P was reciprocating and therefore would likely not have invested money developing its own V8.

To extend this cold-blooded thought process even further, AMC's large car sales were starting to diminish by the end of 1955. Rather than wait for S-P to make AMC a brand new Hudson for '57, AMC might have considered badge-engineering the Clipper for '56 as a Hudson. With it would have again come more cost savings for both companies and needed volume on Packard's assembly line.

I think the bottom line here is that AMC and S-P, whether they merged or simply shared, needed to reduce the collective number of platforms and assembly lines from 4 to 2, needed to do so as quickly as possible and needed to target South Bend and Kenosha's large car lines for closure.