Re: Packard & Hudson proximity

Posted by 58L8134 On 2013/2/18 13:28:27

Hi

Good points all around! What an interesting discussion this became. Here's a scenario to consider.

1954 was too late to affect an integrated, well-functioning merger of Packard and Hudson by '55-
'56 given their diminished financial conditions and market percentages but a few years earlier could have yielded a different story. Their proximity would have been an advantage since there was sufficient square footage between their plants to layout the optimum operations for body, engine, chassis, sub-assemblies, etc. Among the mistakes to be rectified would have been body making operations brought back from Briggs as soon as an adequate facility could be outfitted for it. Hudson bodies were still an in-house effort though I seem to recall Murray Corporation had some involvement with the Stepdowns as well.

When could all this possibly been executed successfully? 1948-50. It was in those years their combined production was over 240,000 cars for the '48-'49, among their strongest postwar years with new products, Hudson being volume dominant. From '50 on, the slide picked up speed rapidly. With George Christopher out of the way, Hugh Ferry and A.E. Barit would have set in motion an integration program for 1951 or 1952 introduction with shared bodies the major component, a new V8 engines then or within a year. Hudson models would cover the complete medium-priced segment from Pontiac/Dodge/Mercury through Buick Roadmaster/Chrysler New Yorker/non-Cosmopolitan Lincoln. Packard would return exclusively to the luxury market, going model-for-model opposite all Cadillacs/Lincoln Cosmopolitan/Imperials (which weren't a real factor but would be shortly). The body architecture would be that of the '51 Packards with engineering elements from Hudson such as step-down floor pans and semi-unibody construction, as much as practical without limiting body selection or further restyles. Each would have it's own defined styling theme.

If Ultramatic transmission was already in production, it would be offered throughout. If not, development of an automatic transmission in conjunction with Borg-Warner would be engaged, much as Ford and Studebaker did. Automatic transmission development and manufacture was a massively expensive proposition for a company as small as Packard was. While they definitely needed the automatic to affectively compete, they were unlikely to ever have the volume to make it's manufacture cost-affective without shopping to other makers to gain more.
The biggest issue would an ohv V8 engine family to supplant all the L-head in-lines, although a flathead six could be retained as long as it was offered by the competition. Both the new V8 and even the six would be shopped to trucker makers to help amortized the development and production costs as well as create an ongoing revenue stream.

In reorganizing their plants and operations, the major objective would have been to reduce their overhead and break-even points to minimize losses and/or allow small profits even the leanest years. This would also be done with the idea that while competing with the Big Three makes, planned volumes would generally remain a smaller percentage of their totals. In this way, overbuilding for production numbers that were unrealistic against the market saturation of the majors wouldn't snatch major losses from the mouth of satisfactory profits. Along with integrating all the administrative and support functions, the R & D and styling departments would have to be developed to a highly dynamic states rarely in affect before at either company. Given the styling regimen of the three-year cycle becoming the norm, bucking that trend would have been futile in the '50's, even into the '60's. American was in an optimistic, give-'em-hell/can-do-anything mindset; frequent changes and even flamboyant styling were perceived as consistent with this dynamic outlook. Automakers such as Rolls-Royce and Mercedes-Benz were exempt from this idea being 'foreign' and perhaps a bit suspect, regardless of their quality.

What of the other independents? Nash-Kelvinator was the better managed, odd-styling notwithstanding, had seized upon an avenue that would come to be it's salvation as market emphasis drastically changed in the latter part of the decade. The addition of it's Rambler would have been ideal once the Hudson and Packard integration had been fully consummated and stabilized. A small car that did not take on the low-priced-three head-on was the only way a smaller volume producer was going to compete in that most cut-throat of segments. As long as Chevy/Ford/Plymouth moved upward in size and performance and away from modest basic transportation qualities, they affectively created a void even their most stripped-down full-sized cars could not fulfill. Nash and it's Rambler, once included, could remain anchored in Kenosha building fully unibody compacts and sharing it the advanced engineering and styling developed in Detroit.

Other questions of whether Studebaker had potential place in a merger, whether a Chrysler acquisition of Packard held any advantage for either, views on Messrs Ford damaged relationship and Lincoln will be posted later.

Steve