Re: Packard & Hudson proximity

Posted by 58L8134 On 2013/2/24 14:12:37

Hi

Not to divert from the current discussion, just to further enlighten on Studebaker as the merger was about to take place, the following:

"........Looking deeper into the sales it is pretty clear that without the Loewy coupes (46% of Studebaker's total volume in '53, 34% in '54), Studebaker would have had a rather poor 1953 despite a brand new design. Was suprised by this. The strong showing of the coupes, which Nance would have known by summer of 1953 when Barit came to visit, also suggests that Hudson had an opportunity with the Jet platform for a 2+2 version of a cleaned up Italia, priced around $2100."

Enlarging on Paul's interesting sales charts and comments on the 1953 coupe vs. sedan percentages, those lopsided numbers for the coupes are indicative of a couple of significant management mistakes in planning for the '53 model year. Richard M. Langworth in Studebaker: The Postwar Years tells it better than I can:

".............In model year 1952, the company built about 134,000 two- and four-door sedans, against some 49,000 hardtops and coupes - nearly a three-to-one proportion. In model year 1953 the proportions ended up at nine sedans to eight coupes. But Studebaker had originally based production planning on the 1952 ratio, not taking into account the tremendous appeal of the coupes. It was unprepared for the coupe demand. To this extent, the coupes were too good. Their percentage of overall production was far higher than normal for the industry, and well in excess of 1952. As the Loewy people had warned, previously designed sedans, using coupe styling details that were applied at the last moment before tooling, were just ghastly mistakes.
The success of the Loewy coupes often distracts enthusiast from the really abysmal failure of the 1953 sedans - models on which every major company depends for its survival."

"ghastly mistakes" Ouch! But so apropos! He also relates there were delays caused by major productions snafus from engineering tooling mistakes and the decision to schedule coupe production later after the sedans were going. Further from Mr Langworth:

"As a small independent, Studebaker lacked the time or resources for much experimentation in setting up a production line. Assembly had to be right the first time. The 1953 chassis was engineered to fit three different body styles: sedans, coupes, Land Cruisers. It was modified from earlier chassis by patchwork, since brand-new tooling would have cost over $1 million, which the company couldn't afford. The different body styles dictated separate sets of parts for each. Not only were there more sets of parts, but more individual pieces for each body - the large, one-piece stampings of earlier years had been cut into smaller stampings for easier handling."........"Studebaker also had traffic problems in its old plant, getting the wide variety of new parts from various production sources to the assembly line. For years these had been carted around on crude trailers, but the 1953's were so relatively complex that there was a bottleneck at nearly every plant intersection. Finally, engineering put up overhead conveyors throughout the seven plant buildings. They totaled 5,310 feet in length and cost $625,000. This greatly simplified the component transfer process, but it was late and dreadfully expensive."

Its not inaccurate to say that Bob Bourke created for Studebaker a far more sophisticated design than they had the ability to understand and never capitalized on completely. It developed originally as simply a blue-sky design exercise to get the creative juices flowing. He was familiar with engineering and production and had a good working relationship with those department, took that into account while creating the concept clay. When managers became interested in the design's progress, Loewy pushed them to put it into production. A design evolution of prior themes that had been approved for the sedans parallel to this were then modified to accept coupe-style details which were not a good aesthetic fit.

All this confusion, vacillation and late decisions as to what design to build left the body style selection one of the poorest. Most anyone with a pulse and an interest in cars can look at the Loewy coupes and hardtops and instantly want a convertible one. The management reason given for deleting this high-image style from the line was low sales potential.........huh? For most of the six prior years, convertibles had accounted for an average of 3.5% of their annual sales. What they didn't take into account was the only things that a '53 Commander convertible would have had in common with the '52 was they were both Studebakers! Like a sweet, juicy peach versus a blacken, overripe banana! Worst of all, even after the Loewy coupes proved their major appeal, they never broadened the line with a convertible or four door sport sedan. Instead, the dumpy sedans eventually received a two door wagon for '54, a wrap-around windshield in mid-'55, a major restyle for '56, a four door wagon for '57 and a two door hardtop, dual headlight pods and ungainly fins for '58.

This brings us to the other late participation in another major emergent market: station wagons. The introduction of the all-steel station wagons by Jeep and Plymouth sparked a revolution in broadening the appeal and utility of a body style that had previous been limited by high initial price and constant need for wood maintenance. By '51-'52 the transition to all-steel was nearly complete with Buick the only holdout for one more year. The numbers tell it best, from Station Wagon: A Tribute to America's Workaholic on Wheels by Ron Kowalke:

Model Year...Market Percentage
1951...............3.3
1952...............3.9
1953...............4.9
1954...............6.5
1955...............8.2
1956.............11.3
1957.............13.6
1958.............15.2
1959.............16.9

From '51 to '54 it nearly doubled and did double again from '54 to '57. Packard quit the segment with the station sedans too soon. Either Henney or Ionia could have been contracted to convert 200/Clippers to get a part of it. Studebaker dallied until '54 then only offered a two door wagon just as four door wagons began coming on as the strong preference. Then, in the turmoil of the '56-'57 debacle, finally had the four door wagon was ready, by which time most folks had written S-P off as a soon-to-be orphan.

Indictments of poor management decisions are absolutely deserved when understanding the downward spiral that ended their carmaking.

Your comments sought.
Steve