Quote:
MrBumble wrote:
...Packard did not have the money for R&D, a decent advertising campaign, or much of anything else. The time for a good advertising campaign should long have preceded the "Let the Ride Decide" slogan. By that time dealers were shuttering the doors and the public moving on down the street to look at the Cadillacs and Buicks. Nance himself complained bitterly in 1954 that Packard's print ads and television/radio ads were lousy and unattractive. Compare ads for Cadillacs in 1955 vs. Packards and you'll see what I mean.
Agreed that Packard had little money for major R&D, but the point I was trying to make was that R&D seemed to be going on full-blast on the new '57 model, with all new chassis and even a second generation torsion level suspension. These were major engineering investments that needed to be amortized over many years-- years that Packard didn't have partly because they were feverishly intent upon a brand new '57, which wouldn't have made much difference in the public mind anyway, IMO.
What would have made a difference was better, but not necessarily more expensive, advertising and marketing. Nance was absolutely on the mark about the lackluster advertising, and I believe Packard changed ad agencies in the midst of all this, but obviously the marketing department in charge of selecting agencies and getting the best work out of them was not hitting on all cylinders. It really is the job of the Big Boss to raise hell with the marketing end of corporate management, and evidently Nance did not raise an effective amount of hell, or maybe did it too late.
The first objective of marketing was probably not to be found in consumer advertising, which had a minimal budget compared to the big 3, and could not possibly cover all the media costs that it needed to in order to sway the minds of the general public. The first objective of marketing, IMO, should have been to reach and serve the dealers. That's where the flagging confidence in Packard was hurting the most in actual sales, I think, and providing more dealer contact, good point of purchase sales tools and perks could have gained more orders and more showroom space at multiple brand dealerships.
The sour experience of walking into a failing store was mentioned, and is a very good point. However, Packard was sold with other makes so showrooms might not have had to be a downer for customers. Packard needed to give dealers more incentives to point shoppers toward these cars, which had remarkable, demonstrable features, particularly the load leveling, and striking looks that set them apart. Sales will follow when dealers are provided with product and promotional items that make it easier for them to sell.
Of course, delivery problems in '56, following close on the quality problems in '55, which had required dealers to do a lot of tweaking just to get the cars out the door, had both shaken confidence. Packard had to provide ample evidence that they had product for '57-- which in no way could be assured for an all-new '57 model, IMO.
The only way I can see that Packard could have, in good faith, assured dealers (and investors) of an adequate volume of '57 cars was if they produced a re-worked '55-'56 model. Packard did not have the money or the time for the tooling and modification of the assembly line that would obviously have been needed to move to production of a "Black Bess" based car. In fact, I'm beginning to think think that "Black Bess" herself was perhaps one of the biggest pipe-dreams and boondoggles of Packard's last days. A failed marketing campaign herself, she was so unbeloved that her prototype was cut up for scrap.
Just thinkin'
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