Re: Packard & Hudson proximity

Posted by Mahoning63 On 2013/2/25 14:24:06

Thanks Steve, your comments were very educational. '53 Studebaker standard model sales weren't much better than Packard and were lower than Nash's large. Should this have raised a flag with Nance and the Packard Board especially given South Bend's notorious labor costs?

'53 Studebaker (excl Loewy coupes) - 91,000
'53 Packard - 80,371
'53 Nash (excl Rambler) - 93,500
'53 Hudson (excl Jet) - 56,000

The station wagon growth you lay out is incredible, never knew. There was another gentleman on this forum who had advocated a '51 and later Packard wagon in a previous thread, now I understand why. Have seen two conversions including this:http://www.velocityjournal.com/images/full/2005/186/pk1952stationwagon1867818.jpg

Persoanlly I think the '48-50 Station Sedan was the best looking Packard of that series because it did away with the droopy decklid and made the plump styling make sense. Wish Packard would have made in on the 127 inch wheelbase.

Regarding volumes for a Packard-Hudson tie-up and viability of such a merger, did a comparison of several brands within GM, Ford and Chrysler and found that for each, sales for 1955 ranged from 20 - 300% more than 1948 and 1949 levels. We know Packard and Hudson collectively sold almost 250,000 cars in 1948 and again in 1949. Had they gotten their heads together and put out a couple hot '55s, really hot, they could certainly have matched at least the lowest end of that Big 3 performance; i.e., 20% over '48/49 or 300,000 units. The only thing that would have held them back was capacity. Not sure what Utica was capable of but Hudson proved in 1949 that it had 144,000 in it, which earned $12M in profits. Not sure if Jet's final assembly was done on the big Hudson line or by Murray or on some other line. If separate from the big Hudson would have been perhaps 100,000 or more.

Packard's 68,694 sales in 1955 seem, on the face of it, to have been healthy and there may have been 15,000 more sales available had the factory been able to produce and the quality been better. Packard may have even turned a profit. But even these best case sales and profits would have been nowhere near what the industry as a whole was experiencing or what the company was really capable of.

My conclusion is that the argument that neither Nance nor Barit were capable of envisioning a merger that would leverage each company's full potential is valid. As to the broader argument that the Independents were doomed for reasons beyond their control no matter who was in charge or which strategy was pursued, I submit that both the sales data and the many examples of success stories soon to come suggest otherwise. As late as 1953 the futures of these companies were still viable. Under Romney, Nash found one path. Packard-Hudson had another. With the right scout leader there were probably a half dozen clear paths out of the woods.