Re: SP merger

Posted by 58L8134 On 2015/4/5 15:02:35

Hi Paul

"Wonder if it was also a case of the engineers not being given clear direction early enough on what size the engine needed to be."

From what Mr. Neal wrote, considerable indecision persisted with the engine sizes and production timing. The first references to the V8 were in August 1950 on the progress made, that both 269 and 309 ci units were under development. By November 1950, Graves recommended that a single 327 ci V8 could fulfill all their requirements, variation for model applications to be by axle ratios (perhaps compression and carburetion as well). Discussions continued as to whether the engine could be ready for 1953 production in the 26th Series. Estimated tooling and manufacture costs of $18M ($4-5M was included for body changes) versus sales for the remaining 1951 model run and projected 1952 25th Series, curtailed because of Korean War Government quotas, caused them to delay until profits could better absorb the cost. Quite a conundrum: more sales were needed to finance the V8 but present sales were being hamped by external restrictions and the very lack of a V8 in the first place.

Your projections for what should have been their 1955 sales results seem plausible if P-H had been able to collaborate and produce compelling all-new cars. The secret word is 'compelling' (You Bet Your Life). That could easily describe the 1948 Step-Down Hudson; long, sleek and best of all, nearly eight inches lower yet with the interior room expected. Hudson really took the lead in packaging heights for sedans, only the Studebaker came close, then Kaiser a few years later. By the advent of the Jet, how management thinking had changed, the opposite of what one would think would have been, perhaps 54"-56" high. Frank Spring should have fought Barit tooth and nail to prevent the design that happened. Goes to show.....never show your worst work hoping it will snap management back to its senses.

The trend toward lower cars began in the 1930's with the Cord's dramatic demonstration what was possible. Cadillac picked it up with the '38 60 Special showing it could be done albeit with rear wheel drive. Harley Earl's Y-Job and the Chrysler Thunderbolt teased the pre-war public but in each case were convertibles and not considered 'mainstream'. Oddly enough, though lowered sedans weren't thought appropriate for the general public, for 1940-41 a series of 60 Special Executive Customs were built by Fleetwood for top GM brass, many of which had tops lowered 2"-3" inches. Earl and GM should have been the natural leaders to create cars in the 58"-60" tall range by 1948, not the 63.5" of the new C-Bodies that appeared. Postwar customizers were leading the way, using sectioning to achieve the proportions that should have been a clue for any savvy management to emulate.

The only way for any carmaker to consistently clear its break-even point and stay profitable is to consistently present desirable, compelling cars of consistently high quality for their price segment. At lot of 'consistency', isn't it. Production levels, however much internal planning required, still ultimately have to be adjusted to customer demand. Reading Mr. Neal's 1948-1950 text, one is struck by how focused Christopher was on series production at levels projected to be profitable regardless of whether the cars were desirable and compelling enough to create demand that would support his assumptions. The massively costly clean-up of leftover 22nd Series cars discounted heavily showed that even the production wizard couldn't overcome customer resistance to cars founding wanting by the public. Old George left Packard never recognizing that the 120's he shepherded to high production were desirable, compelling cars and the public responded....but his last production push wasn't for cars perceived as well as the erstwhile 120. Nor did his successors grasp that the intangible 'compelling' factors that make or break a car needed far more attention than it was receiving.

As Paul has developed arguments for, Hudson was a better prospect for sharing new car development efforts for 1955. Their need was long overdue and coming into alignment with Packard's as well. Nash was a segment too far below, their new 1952 Airflyles not due for renewal on Packard's schedule. Studebaker was worse and beset with myriad self-inflicted troubles no other carmaker could hope to rectify. Hudson had the magic ace-in-the-hole in their Step-Down lowered configuration. The new cars would require internal structures to facilitate frequent restyles to keep up. With this in place, both makes could have presented compelling cars that drove high demand; the production/break-even/profitability picture would have taken care of itself.

Steve