Re: Clippers at the Motor Muster.

Posted by Mahoning63 On 2015/7/25 8:11:15

The Packard work-ups are interesting, have seen this gentleman's impressive work before. The proportions suggest major changes to the body that S-P might not have been able to afford. Anyone's guess at what the volumes would have been. Better than '56? Maybe, maybe not.

I didn't realize the details behind Utica engine and the defense contracts, thanks for providing. Absent a big fish like Ford throwing money at S-P in 1956, Packard as Master Engine Builder was done. Nance himself scribbled the handwriting on the wall when he said "ours will be just another V8." American engines had become a commodity. And the '58 FoMoCo Marauder engine had 430 CID and up to 400 HP, so unless the Packard V8 could have given similar power and better reliability (Ford did leave the door open here), what would have been the point of continuing it?

Macro industry forces were too strong in these years. Consolidation and investment efficiency on one hand, more unique products on the other. Packard found itself caught in a situation larger than itself. The market was not yet rich or global enough as it was pre-Depression to support a stand alone luxury model, this arguably didn't happen until the 1973 S-Class. But this does not mean that Packard needed to go away in 1956. "Unique product" justified its continued existence. The big change was that the people who would need to control Packard needed to come from a bigger slice of the industry pie.

In 1958 there were 5 low-priced and 3 luxury brands but a whopping 9 mid and mid-upper brands including Ambassador, and within some of these brands there was incredible size and content differentiation and price bandwidth. GM didn't care, its mid-priced brands captured most of the volume although Buick went too far with the Limited, a one-year only sales flop. Chrysler had more brands than volume to support and DeSoto would soon be gone. And there probably wasn't any industry room for Clipper as Nance had conceived it.

This left Ford, a company that needed capable executives to help Henry Ford II reconcile the opposing macro forces and make headway in all segments above entry level. McNamara was excellent at "efficiency and consolidation" and so-so with "unique product" in that he nailed the '57 Fords (except for reliability), successfully grew T-Bird, went after Rambler with the Falcon and eventually redefined Lincoln, but ruined Mercury and didn't really win in either the mid-priced or luxury market. The other VPs stunk at everything:

'57 Turnpike Cruiser - failure
'58 Park Lane - failure
'58 Edsel Ranger/Pacer - failure
'58 Edsel Corsair/Citation, which shared almost no parts with Ranger/Pacer - failure
'58 Lincoln - failure

Better had they built Packard back up working from its existing dealers, customer base and proposed design theme and folded it and Lincoln into Mercury's body program.

EDIT: Yes, the '58 recession helped cause the failure but it was not the only reason. The execs got the 4 P's of Marketing wrong... product, price, position, place.