Re: Clippers at the Motor Muster.

Posted by 58L8134 On 2015/7/27 11:50:34

Hi Paul

"Macro industry forces were too strong in these years. Consolidation and investment efficiency on one hand, more unique products on the other. Packard found itself caught in a situation larger than itself."

Much of the motivation for the realignments came from within the Big Three themselves. For decades, medium-priced cars were defined in terms of everything to be had in the basic transportation plus much more: larger size and engines, more horsepower, better trim and flashier designs. Ultimately, not everything to be had in a luxury car but further on the scale toward that ideal.

Then, by the mid-'50's to take advantage of the rising postwar affluence, the Big Three did to the low-priced three what would have been unthinkable prewar: they added significantly upmarket series to their base lines. Simple comparisons of the 1950 versus 1958 low-priced three offering opens the question: who needed to buy a medium-priced car anymore when everything that used to be their province was now available elsewhere for less. Fairlane 500's negated Montereys, Impalas eclipsed Chieftains, Furys obsoleted Coronets. The upscale version of the low-priced cars became just as accepted and 'prestigious' as would be the entry-level of the medium-priced make. Cannibalizing from within. Even those carmakers in the upper end of the medium-priced spectrum weren't immune. The trend stabilized in the '60's after the shakeout.

At the opening of decade, of the four independent, three derived all their income from the medium-priced segment. Packard supplemented theirs with a minimal luxury sales. Studebaker gather a third to half through Commander sales, only their Champion competitive with the low-priced three. By decade's end, three makes were gone, the remnants of the merged companies mainly competing in a segment that was only nascent in 1950. True, AMC had a minor presence with the lower-medium-priced Ambassador; Studebaker too only if the Hawk still counted, but none in the volume sedan segment. As noted, Edsel and upmarket Mercurys failed and redundant DeSoto was wound down.

"But this does not mean that Packard needed to go away in 1956. "Unique product" justified its continued existence. The big change was that the people who would need to control Packard needed to come from a bigger slice of the industry pie."

Under Ford control, Packard and Clipper would have had at least a better chance of survival and development into the future. It would have taken vision and commitment on the part of Ford top management to bring that about, which many will argue was in short supply at the time. "Unique products" would have not only had elegant, tailor styling with high build quality but also technical innovations such as pioneering introductions of fuel injection, disk brakes, independent rear suspension, rack-and-pinion steering, perfected torsion bars with reliable leveling, electronic ignition, perhaps even computer engine management. Leadership in quality craftsmanship and technical innovation was Packard's great role to play, as it had been in prior decades.

Steve