Re: Romney's selective memory

Posted by 58L8134 On 2015/8/23 13:38:24

Hi Steve203

That's the luxury of decades distance, selective perception and memory, plus a healthy dollop of sanitizing by the interviewee of his roll and responsibilities for various outcomes. Interesting that well removed from the events, Romney still felt compelled to justify some of his actions. He conspicuously mentions Nance's intemperate, boastful remarks, slights which apparently still stung. One can't blame him for his animosity toward Nance. After all, Romney had been mentored in automobile business by Mason for six years; Nance was still doing his on-the-job training, receiving little sage advice from a board as confused about the evolving market as he was. Difficult to dismiss the disparagement from a neophyte.

However Mason's grand plan evolved, the moment he was gone so too was it. Romney's only charge was to somehow lead AMC back to profitability from its rapidly deteriorating position. His outlook and background told him there was still a segment who valued what he molded the Rambler to target. Market research for it was no more complicated than his interviewing fellow parishioners as to their automotive preferences. His hunches about smaller, compact cars turned out to be very prescient for the times. Even as much as he lamented the breaking of the 'gentleman's agreement' for reciprocity purchasing, co-operation with S-P might have been helpful but it was a very minor issue. He pressed the point to show how dishonorable Nance was to deal with.

"Did Mason's "grand plan" evolve the way it did over years, or was Mason's plan a cynical dealer grab from day one?"

No doubt that initially Mason was sincere in bringing about a merger of his company and all the independents when that could be done from a position of combined strength, possible until 1950 when they held nearly 13% of the total market. We know that he approached the boards of each with the proposal and was rebuffed. Given those heady, optimistic postwar years with their plants cranking out cars full tilt and profits rolling in (except at Packard) none of the other principles were prescient enough to understand that what George was telling them would soon come to pass. Or, they simply chose to hope it would last forever.

By 1953, when the situation became critical, his outlook may well have become a bit jaded, willing to use mergers to salvage whatever resources the others held to bolster Nash and Rambler sales including dealer networks. The Packard dealer network was a shambles by then, little inducement. Each management still saw their company as that which should survive and prosper, none would willingly have merged if demise was the likely result. Barit even tried to extract assurances that Hudson would continue, though given its reduced state, it was a vain hope.

An asset strip essentially was what it became for both; Romney acted as such immediately on Hudson, motivated to end the financial drain continued operation there would extract. We've seen how well the lack of action in that direction turned out for S-P. Ultimately C-W affected their version, helping themselves to what was useful to them, not to the benefit of Packard, barely to even Studebaker though yielding enough funds to allow it to survive, albeit fatally damaged.

The eventual outcome for AMC should have been satisfaction enough for Romney, leading the remnants of two medium-priced makers onto major successes in an emergent segment which theretofore was certain failure for all who tried. Subsequent AMC troubles were after his tenure; he left them with solid finances and an updated product line which if simply built upon could have lead to further successes.

"If I was sitting on the Packard board at the time, I would instinctively know that the Packard clientele would not buy a tarted up Nash,......."

In spite of the ultimate loss of Packard, something to be thankfully that never came to pass, the very idea of Packard as 'tarted-up Nash" just curdles my stomach!

Steve