Re: Romney's selective memory

Posted by Steve203 On 2015/8/28 16:12:28

So, there you have it, the likely scenario that lead to what looked initially like an advantageous situation for all involved that then turned into an immense trap which was never fully resolved. By the time Nance investigated re-instituting their own bodymaking operation, it had become cost prohibitive for their finances. One of the many factors that little by little lead to Packard's demise.


And by the end of 53, all the parties to that "gentlemen's agreement" were gone. Briggs and Macauley dead. Gilman and Christopher fired. The Briggs heirs already violated it by selling out to Chrysler.

I found a 1949 Hudson annual report on line. Projecting it's numbers ahead to 53 with the earnings posted for those years, less the dividends Hudson paid out, I get a book value of a little under $62M vs Packard's book of just under $83M

Using the cash price offered to Hudson holders that did not want AMC shares, I get a market cap of a bit over $16M, vs a market cap of over $50M for Packard.

In today's world of leveraged buyouts, activist shareholders and greenmail, Packard could have gobbled up Hudson, including their body plant, easily, and at far less cost than building a greenfield body plant. The 7,000 dealers, legacy service parts business and an established midmarket brand to fill the niche Nance was trying to slot the Clipper into, all would have been bonuses.

I have added Neal's last book about Packard to my winter reading list, along with a book about Nash that I found on Pat Foster's publishing web site.