Re: 1935 - Turning Point and What-Ifs

Posted by 58L8134 On 2015/9/6 13:13:17

Hi Paul, Steve203 et al

That's a nice, broadly, integrated line-up, takes complete advantage of the 120's 'good bones' to build both new entry and full-luxury series on. In the interest of competitively matching their major competitors Chrysler, Buick and Cadillac, perhaps consider the following refinements, mostly wheelbase lengths to reduce the number of frame lengths from eight to six as well as ancillary components required, and engines stepped in size.

The Eight: the engine size and price specs place it squarely opposite the Buick Special, 118" wb; and Chrysler Airstream Eight, 121" wb. Just a gut feeling they'd have had trouble selling without at least matching those. That additional four inches never goes amiss in passenger space. Buick Specials shortly received 122" wb for 1937. Price, size and features parity with Special for the Eight should have influenced specifications for their volume medium-priced line.

The Deluxe Eight, Twelve and Custom Twelve: 122" replaces than 120" and 121" wbs for all series using those, retain the 127" wb. Next, increase all those on 130" to 133" wb.; Roadmaster and Cadillac 70 had 131" wb. quite imposing cars shortly to be 133". Retain the 138" wb 145 wb as defined. For 1935-1937, 118", 122", 127", 133", 138" & 145" wbs; shortly 118" could be deleted as the medium-priced opposition settled around 121"-122" wb as standard.

Engines:
Eights: The 256 ci was a good match for the Special 248 ci, should have continued as it was rather than the 115 six they built. Rather than a 4-1/4" stroke 282 ci, jump to 4-1/2" stroke for a 298 ci. while not a 320-323 ci to match Buick and Chrysler, still a significant engine size increase to yield more horsepower and torque. Performance modification, perhaps even supercharging, to create a series to challenge the hot Buick Centurys, LaSalle V8's and Cadillac 60's was a must.

Twelves: utilizing the 3-1/4 bore shared with the eights, employing a 3-5/8 stroke yields 361 ci. near enough to the Cadillac 346 ci V8 to be considered a reasonable choice for mainstream luxury sedans plus it should outperform the Cadillac easily. While this may seem small for a twelve, the 1931-37 OHV Cadillac V-12 was 368 ci and found the best take-rate of all multi-cylinder cars. The 385 ci would remain an optional engine for 127" and 133" wb sedan, standard in the longer, non-Custom Twelves. The 423 ci Twelve would be optionally available in non-Customs. Limited-production Speedsters on 122" and 127" wb would all have the largest Twelve, given additional performance modification to make it the unchallenged king-of-the-road, succeeding Supercharged Auburns and Duesenbergs for that title.

See, I can never leave a well-developed program alone.

Further, this was drafted before the above, all but Paul's most recent post, sheds light on the general market direction the longer wheelbase models that followed.

"Looking at it broadly, when one adds the capital Packard spent on the '35 One Twenty, 12th Series Seniors, '37 CD-138, 15th Series Seniors, 16th Series Seniors and '38 One Twenty and measures this against where they came out at decades end versus Cadillac,..."........."Packard's problem wasn't lack of capital. Or scale. It was how the company spent its money."

Well capsulized! Capital spent on the Juniors ensured company survival but their potential as springboard to further their luxury segment dominance was wasted. As magnificent as the 12th though 17th Seniors were, they lead directly down the same road traveled by two of their most similar contemporaries, Pierce-Arrow and Lincoln K. Each was the finest and last expression of the design ethic that framed luxury cars up through that point: large, grandiose, imposing, expensive. Considering the sales results for each, none of the styling or engineering updates after 1934 made any real, long-term difference in the way the market responded; (Only series/models priced above $2,000, excludes '39 Super 8, 120/Eight & 115/Six and Zephyr)

Year......Packard.........Pierce-Arrow.........Lincoln K
1935........6,961..............875.................1,411.
1936........5,985..............787.................1,515.
1937........7,093..............167...................977.
1938........3,044...............26...................416.
1939..........446...............---....................133.

Cadillacs for comparison, excluded are those priced below $2,000: Series 60 and 61, and LaSalle:

1935: 10, 20, 30, 40, 60: 2,559 (1935 models were a 1934 continuation, 8,468 two year total)
1936: 70, 75, 80, 85 & 90: 6,201
1937: 65, 70, 75, 85 & 90: 7,161
1938: 65, 75 & 90: 3,702; --- plus 60 Special: 3,704, total: 7,406
1939: 75 & 90: 2,207; ------- plus 60 Special: 5,513, total: 7,720
1940: 72, 75 & 90: 2,542; --- plus 60 Special: 4,600, total: 7,142
1941: 67 & 75: 3,026; ------- plus 60 Special: 4,101, total: 7,127

Invisible in these figures is the long-wheelbase body style selections diminshing from a full range to sedan-only variations. Once a stylish alternative in the 60 Special became available, only its inclusion maintained the volume above the $2,000 level.

For further comparison, sales of the volume, entry-level sweet-spot-priced models (approximately $1,550-$1,900) shows where the tipping point happened: 1939. Here are the sales for 1936-38 Series 60, 1939 Series 61, 1940-41 Series 62 (the LaSalle-replacing 1941 Series 61 excluded) and comparable 1939 Super 8, 1940-41 Super Eight 160.

Year...Cadillac.........................Packard
1936: Series 60: 6,712.................none.
1937: Series 60: 7,003.................none.
1938: Series 60: 2,052.................none.
1939: Series 61: 5,913.......1939: Super 8: 3,962
1940: Series 62: 5,903.......1940: Super Eight 160: 5,662
1940: Series 62: 24,734......1941: Super Eight 160: 3,525

" It seems GM voluntarily put itself through a lot of pain in the Thirties, pushing itself to the point of major discomfort as it tried to re-imagine the automobile. Edsel Ford and Chrysler both showed up to play this game too. And yes, so did Packard with its FWD experiment, '32 Light Eight and '32-34 styling exercises. Then for some reason, it took its helmet off and headed for the locker room. Seems from 1935 on it didn't make the connection between saving itself and re-imagining the automobile. GM did, and let Cadillac lead the way."

Viewing their overall response to the challenging economy, Macauley and Gilman, once they'd set Packard on the new medium-priced course, settled back and simply let Cadillac re-define what the volume entry-level luxury car would be. Was it Macauley's exhaustion from grappling with the process of such a sea change from their former emphasis? Complacent satisfacton at deftly bridging a difficult situation? The influence of Gilman and Christopher who were openly hostile to the drag they saw the Senior models extracted? Indeference to, what at the time, was a relative small volume when compared to what was being achieved by the 120? GM and Cadillac clearly took the long-range view that a re-imagined luxury automobile could, with persistence, become the dominant player, although might take most of a decade to happen. As it happened, it took less time than that, abetted by a worthy competitor conceding the contest without much of a fight.

Steve