Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost

Posted by 58L8134 On 2008/12/23 14:04:08

Hi

Some further comments in response to your fine insights and questions.

First, the situation at Cadillac: It's true Cadillac became a financial liability for GM as the Depression deepened and there were discussions whether to drop the make IF it could not be made a profitably viable contributor again. For GM to drop Cadillac would have violated Sloan's policy of "A Car for Every Purse and Purpose" Certainly, GM management recognized the Depression would abate, demand for luxury cars would revive, and dismissing their established Standard of the World would be a long term mistake.

Toward this objective of profitable viability for Cadillac, Nicholas Dreystadt replaced Lawrence Fisher as General Manager in June 1934. His charge was to reduce to one basic engine and rationalize the body & chassis shared with volume makes from the multiplicity of engines, bodies and chassis then built by Cadillac. He also brought unit cost discipline to a division that had never really had to consider it before. His job was much like that of the production people Packard brought in to make the 120 a reality.
Dreystad's first contribution was the '36 Series 60. He relentlessly rationalized the products all across the lines, as proof; compare the 1933 Cadillac & LaSalle lines to that of 1941. As the results show, their program was one of slow steady development of the 60 Series into a position of dominance in the price segment. He and other Cadillac managers were no doubt heartened in their efforts as they watched Packard ignore the $1,700 to $2,100 price segment in pursue of the Pontiac segment volume with the 115 Six.

The ability of luxury car buyers to use GMAC to finance their purchases was a brilliant move as well. The whole idea of limiting new car ownership to "persons of substance" might have assured only those truly financially able would have such a car, but that world was fading away quickly by the mid-'30's. Call it the democratization of the luxury car market, the old exclusive world of the rich was in disrepute by much of the population for having caused of the economic woes, no longer to be trusted as before. Any prosperous person should be able to enjoy a luxury car, regardless of whether he was "a person of substance".

On Buick 90: Harlow Curtice had revived Buick in general from its 1932-33 low, sought to make Roadmasters and Limiteds as desirable a luxury car as comparable Cadillacs. However fine the resultant cars were, this action violated Sloan's step structure for price and class, would not be allowed long term. GM management understood they needed only one luxury car at the top, not two.
Of those few Brunn customs, fine cars as they were, were still semi-custom modifications of the factory Limited bodies, itself shared with the Cadillac Series 67. The customs added luster to all Buicks, their primary purpose. In truth, a low production custom convertible in the style of the Lincoln Continental or Packard Darrin Victoria would have had more affect.

Motivation to build the Clipper might have come from the analyzing their market position after 1937. Selling 115,000 cars that year, realistic projections for unit sales by 1940 would be in the 150-200K unit range. With '37 as the benchmark, '38 sold at 48%, '39 at 36%, '40 would shape up to be 78%, '41, even after the Clipper introduction, just 59%. Management should have been scrambling to figure why their position in the market was so flat. Compared to major competitors, Buick and Chrysler, their results were just plain dismal.

The Clipper was Packard's hurried response to the GM Torpedo C body that became available with the 1940 models. It was offered from Pontiac through Cadillac, became among their best selling models. The body architecture is based on the Cadillac 60 Special. The C body is basically a four-window club sedan, it greenhouse separated from the lower body mass, with an integrated coupe style trunk with softer, sportier lines.

It was a highly influential style at that time. For 1941, Packard, Hudson and Nash integrated coupe style trunks into their existing six window sedans. Studebaker's new bodies for Commander and President are designed in the Torpedo C body idiom, even included the Land Cruiser four window club sedan, a handsome ringer for the GM C bodies on which it's clearly based. Chrysler added the Town Sedan to Dodge, DeSoto, and Chrysler. Only Ford shows no production response, though a Lincoln Zephyr club sedan would have been a welcome addition to that line.

Pricing the '41 Clipper between the Buick Roadmaster/ Cadillac 61 and the Cadillac 62 reveals where Packard hoped to conquest sales. Trying to do so with the 120 chassis against 320 and 346 cu. in. eights has to be viewed as a real mistake. Why the Clipper didn't arrive with the model 160 mechanicals is a complete mystery.

Of Chrysler: the Imperial, after a strong start as the L-80, CG & CL Custom Imperial, submerged into the Airflow episode, emerged to became just the nicest Chrysler offered, a name to exploit for sales purposes. The Custom and Crown Imperials were their only pretense toward the luxury market from the mid-'30's until 1942. Looking at the miniscule volume, it seems a car created so Walter P. and other Chrysler executives wouldn't have to ride in another make luxury car on their rounds. Examining how it was built, one can see it was rationalized totally with lower volume lines, its major components all shared with lesser models.

Once Packard entered the upper medium price segment, their concern was more with the eight cylinder Chrysler models that competed directly with the 120. In quest of this market, Chrysler too did very well in the late '30's, adding eight cylinder sales for every year from '36 to '42 except '38 and '39. Imperial was a concern only in so far as it competed directly with the 120, the Custom Imperials nothing to worry about.

I look forward to reading your comments and insights. Thanks as well for keeping on the topic.

Steve