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Hello, Yes. It you look at the photo in my posting on page 6 of this posting you will see that the Packard Plant at the very corner of EGB and Concord had an extension on top that made it 5 stories tall (actually 5.5 stories). This very last section once had a massive skylight with a glass roof.

And no... the TV reporter isn't going to find anyone who is going to take responsibility for the chunk of the building out in the street-and what ought to be an embarrassment of the fact that things have degenerated this far.

Just like no one is going to take the responsibility for answering the question of WHO is buying all of these stolen materials and WHY are they not being held responsible? Nobody in charge wants to know. AND... just like in the dope business... funds are changing hands, so? The ones who can...won't. They're all too busy with their jobs and business cards and offices and important titles ("executive director of the blah-blah-blah" etc.)... and meanwhile the beat (or the crumbling) goes on. I know... it's getting better... they built a new stadium... (hmmmm... by the way... what ever happened to Briggs/Tiger stadium? OR-dare I say it? The Silverdome???? Seen THAT lately???

And before someone attempts damage control over the Silverdome (while Detroit's management breathes a sigh of relief and points a finger north.).. I already know that the Silverdome is outside of Detroit city limits. Uh... but then that didn't save it from the same cancer, did it?

Uh-ohhhhhhh... I think I hear the sound of wind and crickets...

<i>by the way... what ever happened to Briggs/Tiger stadium?</i>

After sitting abandoned for about 10 years, Tiger Stadium was finally torn down. From time to time, people propose redevelopment plans for the site.

35 year old Joe Louis Arena has been declared obsolete, not enough luxury suites. A new arena and entertainment district has been proposed on Woodward, just north of I-75.

What happens to the Joe? To be torn down presumably. River front location quite valuable. Cobo Arena sat unused for years, before being rennovated into additional convention space as Cobo Hall has needed expansion for years.

re Belle Isle, the city has been too broke to properly maintain it for years. To improve the island's facilities, and relieve the city of the operating cost, the state has leased the island and added it to the state park system. Of course, the prospect of having to buy a state park pass to drive onto the island, access by foot or bicycle is free, had some screaming like their first born was being taken.

My best memories of Belle Isle are watching the hydroplane races from there in the 60s.

A new Belle Isle era begins under control of Michigan DNR, state police

The state is leasing Belle Isle for 30 years, a deal designed to save the city $4 million to $6 million annually.

What is now Michigan's 102nd state park will undergo numerous improvements -- as much as $20 million worth.

freep.com/article/20140211/NEWS/302110030/Belle-Isle-DNR-102-State-Park

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Hello... yesssss, already know about Briggs/Tiger stadium's fate... and even latest developments on Belle Isle.

However, the point here is that Detroit and the area typically lets things go to seed... then after many years of inaction and ruin... the best decision that can ever seem to be made is "...Hey! How about let's tear it all down!" Sadly, this happens over...and over...and over...and over...and (as evidenced in the Pontiac Silverdome and Detroit Joe Louis Arena. Neither of these facilities is very old, yet look what's happened to them?). And people are all shocked about the Packard plant?

And yes, I also enjoyed watching Gold Cup hydroplane races from Belle Isle, but I liked watching the races even better from either the pits at the foot of Burns Avenue where my grandfather kept his boat (and where my cousin worked on unlimiteds) OR from the Roostertail night club!

Fortunately I do not live in Detroit, but only a mile or two outside of it. In a little enclave that somehow is hanging onto to a level of decency.

I hear about the city trying to give real estate away, and how once snotty neighborhoods are now being foreclosed like crazy.

I flatly wouldn't take any of that stuff because the city and state government are so crooked it is a rotten investment.

Finally bought the Ward book and added it's information to what I already knew.

In July of 53:

-Kaiser at Willow Run was obviously cooked. The Air Force canceled it's contracts with Kaiser in late June, auto sales had crashed, the Willys plant in Toledo, acquired in April, rendered Willow Run redundant, and the Willow Run autoworkers were on strike.

-Ray Powers, head of manufacturing, started at Packard on July 1, 53. Powers had come from Ford. In the 50s, Ford was building state of the art auto plants at a rapid rate: Wayne stamping and assembly opened in 52, Wixom and Michigan Truck opened in 57, so he was up to speed in the latest, most efficient, manufacturing technology.

-Rumors of the Briggs sale were on the street in "midsummer 53" according to Ward.

Nance had everything to make a move on Willow Run, opportunity to acquire a plant for far less that the cost to build new, the knowledge to organize a new plant, and the recognition that he would soon be in urgent need of a body plant. He lacked one thing: money.

Kaiser would probably have considered an offer to lease the plant, as Hydramatic had initially leased it. Scaling from what Packard paid for Conner, with Willow Run being more than 4 times as large, the lease would have been $3-4M/yr

Packard CFO Grant estimated the savings from having both stamping and assembly under one roof would save Packard $12M/yr, based on producing 80,000 cars/yr. Or $1.3M based on 30,000/yr.

Taking over Conner from Briggs and continuing assembly at EGB would save $8M/yr for an 80,000 production rate.

So the cost of leasing Willow Run would make running costs of consolidation there a wash vs buying Conner and continuing assembly at EGB, and trail the $12M/yr savings of consolidation at Conner, at 80,000 cars/yr. At the production rate of 54, Packard would have been worse off than if they stayed at EGB, due to the lease cost.

But Packard didn't have the money to buy Conner either. Nance could only obtain a loan commitment for $7.5M, a million short of what Chrysler wanted, so they ended up leasing for slightly under $800K/yr, consolidating at Conner to maximize savings, and we know how that worked out.

To make the numbers work, Packard would need to buy Willow Run to eliminate the fixed cost of the lease payments. To raise the money, Utica would have to go, and leave powertrain production at EGB.

A quirk of the J-47 contracts was that the contractors had to provide their own facilities, though the government provided the equipment. Studebaker also had a J-47 contract, but played it wisely, leasing a plant in Chicago and using the South Bend Chippewa Ave plant it already owned, so when their contract was canceled a the end of 53, they were not out a large amount of capital. Packard had built Utica, and bought a plant on Mt Elliott to make forgings, for, accounts vary, $15-$17M. Nance was uneasy about defense contracts, recognizing the procurement decisions were political, but Hugh Ferry had made the commitments before Nance came on the scene.

How much would Willow Run have cost? Hydramatic bought the plant for $26M, "free and clear" meaning after Kaiser had, at it's expense, removed all it's equipment. Some of that equipment was moved to Toledo, eventually to make it's way to Argentina when the IKA deal was closed a year later, the rest went to scrap. Chrysler paid $35M for Briggs, as a going concern, with 8 equipped plants. Chrysler no doubt also assumed Briggs' liabilities. I would expect Packard could have bought Willow Run, with all the equipment: presses, body shop, paint shop, assembly lines, in place, for $30M

Curtiss-Wright might have been induced to buy Utica in 53. Hurley had turned CW around and was making a tidy profit in 53. According to Ward, by 56 C-W needed more factory space and was on the prowl for more defense contracts. While Packard's J-47 contract had been cut to 250 engines/month in early 53, it was not officially cut to the pilot line until the end of September. It might be interesting to speculate if the contract would have been cut at all if the contractor was anyone other than an automaker not named GM. So what would C-W have paid for Utica, Mt Elliott and assumption of the J-47 contract? $20M? In 56, C-W paid $25M for Utica and Chippewa Ave and another $10M for the defense contracts they had in hand, but the price paid was heavily influenced by additional defense contracts promised for their help in bailing out S-P.

To fill the shortfall between what C-W, or anyone else, would pay for Utica, Nance would have to take the $7.5M loan that was offered for Conner. Still short. McFarland would have a cow, but, if Packard stopped development of the Ultramatic and outsourced, it would have saved $4.5M in tooling costs for the Twin-Ultramatic.

Then move into Willow Run in phases: first moving the trim and assembly operations from EGB as soon as Kaiser vacated, late 53/early54. Then move the jigs for the senior bodies to W-R, aggressively recruit experienced former Kaiser body and paint people to assemble stampings shipped from Conner. When the senior bodies are being produced with acceptable quality at an acceptable rate, do the same with the Clipper bodies. Then move the dies to W-R and reactivate the stamping plant when the dies are replaced or modified for the 55 models. This is similar to the plan Nance had in mind to phase body production back into EGB.

Then take over Studebaker. Immediately close all South Bend operations. Consolidate production at W-R. Consolidate Studebaker parts distribution with Packard's. Consolidate dealer networks. Drop the Clipper name. Replace the top trim Clipper with the Executive. Replace the lower Clipper trims with Studebaker Commander and President: built on the Clipper platform with differentiated grill, taillights and dash, the low compression engine as provided to Nash and conventional spring suspension. Drop the Champion entirely. Approach George Romney about distributing the Rambler through Studebaker dealers to fill the low priced void created by abandonment of the Champion.

Hi Steve203

Thanks for the in depth analysis of a conjectured Willow Run procurement, interesting reading. The small window of opportunity becomes obvious, only June to September '53. It would have required very swift action on the part of Nance. As much as he was still groping his way to an understanding of multiple problems and sorting out the management inertia, acting on W-R was probably more than he could ever have accomplished, even if the finances were available.

Since W-R was a bridge too far, I wonder if EGB could have been organized in such a way to emulate a single story plant in the interim until a new assembly plant could have been built at Utica? Once the J-47 contract was gone, that must have freed up space but was it all at Utica?

Christopher touted the duel assembly lines instituted for 200K units; were those still in place, one line could have been converted for complete body assembly and trim, phasing out Connor over a couple of years. Unfortunate as the timing for acquisition of a body operation was, leasing Connor was the only solution....but only as a body plant

Where I'm going with this was to keep operations at Connor and EGB stable and trouble-free while the V8s' were finding buyer acceptance. As relatively unfamiliar, changed and complicated as the 1955 models were, assembly operational stability was key to putting highly satisfactory cars into customer hands in the critical early sales season. One would think that Nance, who emphasized marketing and sales wouldn't have allowed anything to disrupt the 1955 introduction.

Steve

PS: I'll have more comments later on the Studebaker off the Packard Clipper platform....like the idea!

The small window of opportunity becomes obvious, only June to September '53.

The window was even shorter than that, it slammed shut the day the Hydramatic plant in Livonia burned, August 12th. Edgar Kaiser called up GM the next day and asked if they would like to lease part of W-R as they had 1,000,000 sqft free and clear, the space the Air Force C-119 program had occupied.

I wonder if EGB could have been organized in such a way to emulate a single story plant in the interim

Yes, partly. The complex was long enough that a chassis line could be on the ground floor, with the body line on the second floor so when the body is complete, it's dropped through a hole in the floor to mate with the chassis below. iirc at one time EGB was set up that way. The Ford Highland Park plant was set up that way as well.

Getting components and supplies to the upper floors would still be a problem, because the multi-floor design does not lend itself well to the conveyors and fork-lift trucks that were used for material handling post WWII.

Once the J-47 contract was gone, that must have freed up space but was it all at Utica?


Utica as built, was about 780,000 sqft, about the same as Connor. Packard also bought an existing building on Mt Elliott in Detroit to make forgings for the J-47s, some 325,000 sqft. The thing about defense contracts is the products need to be made in secure locations, not integrated with civilian production. When Kaiser was building C-119s, they had to build a wall inside W-R to keep the C-119 area seperate and secure. I doubt the end of the J-47 program freed up any space at EGB.

Christopher touted the duel assembly lines instituted for 200K units; were those still in place, one line could have been converted for complete body assembly and trim, phasing out Connor over a couple of years.

When Nance first started at Packard, he asked about bringing bodybuilding in house. The CFO, Grant, said that obtaining the equipment, probably primarily the presses, and installing it in EGB would only make economic sense with a production rate of 200,000 cars/year, more than double what Packard was selling.

Besides doing the body building at Conner, Briggs was leasing space at EGB to do additional work on the bodies before handing them over to Packard.

Packard was building the front clips, seats, instrument panels and trim and adding them to the bodies before they were dropped on the chassis. This was all going on in the section of the plant south of East Grand.

<i>..assembly operational stability was key to putting highly satisfactory cars into customer hands in the critical early sales season.</i>

Agreed. Nance was a salesman, not a cost accountant or manufacturing engineer. He was swayed by Grant's estimate that continuing with Conner and EGB as they had would save $8M/yr, while adding final assembly at Conner would save $12M/yr. Ray Powers should have gotten on top of the conference room table and jumped up and down saying that the space at Conner was not adequate and the disruption of workflow would create inefficiencies.

There is an Executive at the Gilmore Museum near Kalamazoo. It looks like a survivor, rather than a restoration. The hood doesn't fit, there is a 1/4" gap in the trim by the driver's side headlight, there are huge gaps in the trim at the top of the door windows. And the 56s were supposed to be put together better than the 55s? It's a beautiful car, until you get a close look at it.

PS: I'll have more comments later on the Studebaker off the Packard Clipper platform....like the idea!


Here are some clays that Packard did for the 56 Clipper, the intent being to establish the Clipper as a stand alone brand, which was resisted by dealers and customers. The front does not have the Packard grill shape, like the production 56 Clipper had. I think it has a bit of a Mercury look to it. The rear view, especially the driver's side taillight has a very strong 56 Chrysler look to it. The dash looks like it was proposed for the Patrician, but it looks a lot cheaper than the dash the Patrician, and Clipper received for 55/56, so I'd say that qualifies it for a Studebaker.

The only thing I'm not sure about would be the timing of the Studebaker buyout. I'm after three things from Studie: the parts inventory as that would produce immediate cash flow from supporting Studies already on the road, the brands and trademarks, and the dealers.

If I bought Studie as a going concern, I could do it with stock, which is how Packard did it. Downside, I'd also aquire Studie's debt, $7.5M, which isn't really that bad compared to what AMC had, and Studie's unfunded pension liability.

If I waited until Studie went bankrupt, which, the way they were going, could have been 55, I could duck the debt and pension liability. But then, I would have to pay cash for the parts, brands and trademarks. And buying these assets in liquidation would probably take a year. Could the dealers hang on that long?

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Restating the obvious, from the couch of the Monday Morning Quarterback, the failures of both the PMCC and S-P have been well documented by both Ward and Kimes. Blame cannot rest on one human but is better spread onto a series of circumstances within and outside of Packard's control. With the slow ending of Defense contracts, the deaths of two key players (George Mason and Walter Briggs), and the lack of a solid audit of Studebaker as a partner, bad things kept on coming. More universally, the auto industry was over-producing and dealers were flooded with cars that the public was bored with. Interest rates and mandated high down payments kept more sales stillborn. You had to pay more for a Packard than a competitive Lincoln, Chrysler or Cadillac and buyers did not see the value in it the way they did before 1953.

Having a Big Four competitor in a company that sold Packards, Hudsons, Nashes and Studebaker (cars and trucks) might have been a wonderful thing. But having a former GM President as Secretary of Defense only ended up making General Motors a stronger company while Ford and Chrysler had to scramble for the leftover customers. Perhaps the brightest spot in these sad series of developments was the resurgence of the compact Rambler that made the one year 1958s of GM look extravagant while making George Romney look prophetic.

From what I gather, my 1956 sat unsold on a Virginia dealer's lot for almost six months, even after a massive price reduction from $6204 to $4200. A third off and the orphan probably needed another discount to find a home! Fifty eight years later, I like to think she has one.

Hi Steve203

Thanks for your enlightening responses to each of my curiosities about plant configurations so quickly. The timeframe for Nance to act was so brief it probably passed before he even considered it as an option.

Configuring EGB as nearly as possible to a single story or partial bi-story operation to gain whatever efficiencies would have been a good plan. Some modifications to EGB would have been required for material handling; ramps and conveyors, even running to the outside if necessary.

From CFO Grants analysis that the cost of presses, etc. re-installation could only be warranted on a 200K/unit production, perhaps retaining stamping operations at Connor for the time being but phasing in complete body jigging, welding through final trim to EGB on a second floor body line above the chassis line would have been the solution. It's something of a work-around but still utilizes the main plant more fully, rather than creates more unused space.

If instituting such a plan produced better quality 1955 models for immediate delivery at introduction time, I wish Powers would have championed it as an alternative to total assembly Connor move. It seems as if internal costs savings were the focus of their decisions, not how potentially disastrous such a disruptive move could be on the cars the customer received.

On the Studebaker buyout: Studebaker had been losing market segment ground every year since 1950 but still had some assets worth savaging. It's dealer network was broader but populated with many small, weak dealers, though could have given Packard better coverage when dualed.

The inefficiencies and labor problems at South Bend were nearly insurmountable without a bankruptcy. That course presented many dangers as the mid-'50's buyer was very wary of purchasing any make that might become an orphan.

If Packard had decided to get tangled-up with South Bend, they'd have had to do something of a quick acquisition then speedily integrated production at Detroit. Retaining the Chippewa plant to build trucks and Hawks for '56 on would have keep the dealers happy while giving them new larger Commanders and Presidents, more acceptable cars than the "flaccid anatomy sedans" they had been pushing.

Though its hard to imagine how they might have come to the idea without market distress, the '53 sedan tooling eventually was the basis for the Lark series. If management had decided to pursue the compact car course earlier as an adjunct to the full-sized offerings , perhaps a Lark style crash program for '56-'57 might have been mounted.

At any rate, Studebaker and its South Bend operations presented a situation that would have had to be approached with extreme caution......like handling a poisonous snake!

Steve