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Ran into an interesting quote from the following website/article -http://ateupwithmotor.com/family-cars/196-studebaker-lark-super-lark.html -

"Packard's fate was sealed as soon as Nance departed. In retrospect, it probably would have been the easier of the two brands to salvage, but Hurley and the board were counting on Studebaker's ostensibly greater volume, and Packard had lost its engine and transmission plant in the Curtiss-Wright deal. Packard endured two final, ignominious model years as an over-decorated Studebaker, and then disappeared for good."

I wonder if that's true, and given the business climate of the time, even possible?

Hi

Given the financial condition of the combined company, to say nothing of the logistical challenges and problems in place, I'd say the fact that anything survived was something of a miracle, however unfortunate.

This one needs a more indepth response.

Steve

I agree with Steve and would have to say Studebaker was probably the easier to salvage. The Lark was done very quickly and cheaply and hit the market at the perfect time. That product maneuver is what saved the company.

Packard played in an entirely different segment, one that demanded up-to-date styling and engineering. Even assuming the new management contract could have left Utica and Conner in place, Packard still would have needed a complete redesign for 1958 with lowered bodies and probably a new step-down frame. Very expensive.

Maybe there was an outside chance the Clipper could have been quickly refashioned as a Studebaker for 1957 to give Utica and Conner needed volume. Maybe South Bend could have been closed at the same time to stem the losses. If this "new" '57 Studebaker delivered decent sales, perhaps the profits could have helped pay for a complete redesign of Packard and Studebaker for 1958. Big if, and not realistic. Plus it would have moved Studebaker in the opposite direction that the Lark did, which in retrospect might not have been a good situation given the recession.

In 1956 Packard sold about 20,000 cars. It would have taken assistance from alien creatures with a large printing press to update the body, chassis etc and do it quickly.

Packard was sadly dead only some people didn't know it.

Said it before, say it again:
Any company that sat out the big mergers of the 1920s was not poised to survive the 50s-70s. Hudson and Nash were the only exceptions, due to AMC's emulation of GM, Ford and Chrysler in multi-segment production/marketing and even that did not last, foregin competition was eating a lot of their lunch by the time Chrysler bought them, to get Jeep.
Had someone combined Packard into a conglomerate that included other market-segement brands, bolstered by a volume-leader (low price) brand they might have stood a chance. The conversion of the industry from wood-structed bodies to all-steel bodies, coupled with the large conglomerates ability to amortize rapid body shell redesign/tooling spelled the death knoll for the independant auto maker here in the US. Packard fared well during the post WWII auto famine, as did the other independents, but once that demand was met it was trouble.

Besides platform sharing across multiple brands, the biggest benefit of a large auto conglomerate is that it allows an exec to make a product gaff while not bringing the house down. There are also many drawbacks to bigness.

Packard should have gotten its own house in order before merging with anyone. Had Nance blown off Studebaker and nailed the '55s he could have circled back to AMC for merger and a common Packard/Hudson platform for '58. It wouldn't have mattered if Romney were against the idea, Nance's only task would have been to win over the AMC Board.

I think there have been many versions of what was supposed to happen but I believe most agree George Mason of Nash was the big mover in getting all the independents together. Unfortunately he died suddenly, Romney took his place, and for whatever reasons the 4 way fell apart half way thru.

In order to play the game further (after '56) Packard needed capital. The banks said no. Game over. No matter how great the 1958 designs were or the economies of scale they hoped to get with a Studebaker merger they needed to have the capital to retool.

If you looked at their balance sheet and cash flow statement. would you lend them any money??

Hi

Given their lousy earning record over the prior decade, the lenders would have had to have a LOT of faith in the management's ability to turn things around.

Mason had the situation figured out in 1946-48, what a shame none of the other executives could understand the validity of his analysis.

Had the structural integration and shared body programs come to be in 1950-52, with volume lines amortizing major costs, Packard would have been able to return to purely luxury cars where it belonged.

Had they only listened to Mason.

Steve

Look at what the competition was offering by 1957 or even in 1952.

Packard stood pat in styling and engine design from 1951 to 54. This is when they fell behind. A strong effort in 1955 and 56 was not enough to save them.

Look at the reality of the marketplace. Car sales fell off generally in 1956 and there was a recession in 1957 and 58. All car makes suffered loss of sales. When the market revived the demand was all for compact cars, the medium price field was moribund. Remember this is the period when DeSoto Nash Hudson and Edsel went out of business while Rambler set new records, and the Lark Falcon Valiant and Corvair were the exciting new cars.

Packard should have had an OHV engine no later than 1952 and major facelifts of the 1951 body for 53 and 54, and an all new body for 1955. They might have made some hay when the medium price and high price cars were selling, in the early 50s.

The Studebaker merger was the last mistake in a series of mistakes going back years. But it's hard to find fault when the right course was far from obvious at the time.