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No prob, does raise the question of how well the proposed '57s would have actually done.

Stumbled upon this link today. Some comments about how the investors liked the Packard plan but held back because of concerns over Studebaker. Also some nice images.

modelcarsmag.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=24297&st=0

Gotta question as we continue to explore this time period. What was S-P actually going to do with South Bend operations for '57? The plan appears to have called for Packard-based cars selling as Packard, Clipper and Studebaker, all sharing the same body shell. Clipper had a 5 inch longer hood than the Stude. Packard had this plus rear alxe moved back 5 inches. This means these were big, wide cars. Wasn't there a problem with big wide cars rolling down the SB line?

Was Studebaker going to sell two cars, big and medium? Were the big ones to be made in Conner? Wasn't that line capacity constrained? Something doesn't add up unless Nance was planning a major upgrade of SB as part of the deal so he could make all Studes there, or drop the former Studes and just make this big new car there.

Had a couple thoughts about Mason's Feb '54 offer to Nance to merge and have Statesman/Clipper assembled in Kenosha and Ambassador/Packard in EGB.

First were sales. The combined Packard/Studebaker post-war annual sales mostly exceeded combined Nash/Hudson sales and for 1953 Nance helped push Packard sales proportionally even higher vis-a-vis the others. By early '54 he was probably feeling pretty good about himself and what he could accomplish and might have seen Hudson and Nash, to a certain extent, as laggards. Also, Studebaker volumes had been much higher than Nash and Hudson and way higher than Rambler in particular.

Second is an extension of the first and had to do with Mason. Notice how he always wanted to end up in charge of any grand merger he proposed even when his company wasn't necessarily in the strongest position going in. Historians may be accommodating of his plans but at the time could Nance or the Packard board really have been blamed for dismissing his proposal? What exactly would Packard have received in return for stamping and body assembly and loss of control of their company? They would have been stuck with Nash's large car platform that was going nowhere and carrying styling quirkiness completely out of the industry mainstream. Nance in particular seems to have made as a priority steering Packard and Studebaker toward design conventionality. One can only speculate but given Nance's disdain even for the 1953 Studebaker's atypical styling despite its being arguably pretty good, he couldn't have looked upon the big Nash, or any Nash, favorably. A merger with Nash would have meant accepting a large car design and platform that was going nowhere, a loss of Packard's autonomy in creating its own platforms, a loss of corporate control and the handing over of power to a guy and company with questionable design sense, questionable sales success and the nerve to ask for the world.

ADDITION: am assuming Mason's EGB Ambassador/Packard proposal would been Nash-based. Does anyone have any details on this? Is there a possibility that Ambassador would have actually picked up the Packard platform? Given Mason's proclivity towards consolidation this seems unlikely.

I tend to agree that Mason appears to have been a "take charge" type of guy, and while this is certainly an admirable trait in an auto executive it can be a liability when you're talking merger. Nance would have none of it - as you've pointed out (correctly, I believe) Nance was not overly enamored with "quirky" styling, and letting someone else call the shots at Packard - especially someone from a company whose cars Nance probably didn't care for all that much - just wasn't going to happen. As it turned out, Studebaker was no better a fit, especially when the true state of their finances became apparent. of course, Mason was gone by then and as for Hudson, they were already dead, they just hadn't been given a decent burial yet. Tough sledding for the independents in the mid-1950's, especially as the Big Three heated up their sales race. Too bad, some really interesting cars might have come out of any combination of them. After all, the few cars we DID end up getting from S-P were, at the very least, something a bit different. As for AMC, they did pretty well for what they had. What might a four-make merger have wrought?

What might a four-make merger have wrought?

The answer needs to acknowledge that Mason's 2/54 offer was one-sided and unacceptable but let's assume that instead of Nance dismissing it he countered with a plan that kept Packard's autonomy, kept the new Board equally split so no one division got the upper hand, and kept Packard in charge of the largest car platform. Perhaps he might have also called for Frazer to be the new CEO (per Steve's great suggestion), with lots of independence given to Nance and Mason and, in Nance's mind, a clear path to CEO in due course. Regarding product lets assume that Nance proposed that Nash would design and build the Statesman, Wasp and Clipper while Packard handled the Ambassador, Hornet and Patrician.

OK, so it is now mid-1954, legal due diligence is in full swing, Nash and Hudson studios have begun working up modifications to Packard's '55 Clipper to turn it into an Ambassador and Hornet, Nance has redirected his planning, studio, tooling and supplier teams to drop the Packard-based Clipper and instead work-up a modification of the now former Nash-based '55 Ambassador to make it look like the Clipper (to the extent that this was possible). The former Ambassador's 7 inch longer hood would distinquish the new Clipper from the Statesman and Wasp. The new Packard-based Ambassador and Hornet would use Packard's long sedan body for its sedans to set them apart from the Statesman and Wasp. Packard would set itself apart from the new Packard-based Ambassador and Hornet by using the Four Hundred's extended decklid for the sedan too, bumping the sedan wheelbase up to 132 inches. Under such a crazy scenario the timing might have looked like this:

10/54 - 1955 Nash Statesman (114" wb) introduced
12/54 - 1955 Packard Four Hundred/Caribbean (127" wb), Patrician (132" wb) introduced
2/55 - 1955 Hudson Wasp (114" wb) introduced
3/55 - 1955 Packard Clipper (121" wb) introduced
3/55 - 1955 Nash Ambassador (122" wb 2-dr, 127" 4-dr) introduced
3/55 - 1955 Hudson Hornet (122" wb 2-dr, 127" 4-dr) introduced

Phew, what a mess. And Conner Ave is scaring everybody but at least the lower volumes of the initial Packard-only lineup has given the plant a few months to get it together. None of the Nash, Hudson and Packard dealers are happy as they wait.. and wait.. and wait for product. But by mid-55 all is humming along as planned.

Question #1 - is anything selling? The extra dealers are helping keep the factories fairly busy but the compromised designs are limiting sales somewhat. Overall the new conglomerate is losing money but not much. Also, Mason has passed on, Romney has taken his place and Nance wants to take over everything. The new Board likes Frazer so tries to appease Nance while keeping him in his place. They give him Hudson and he pipes down. For now.

Question #2 - for months Studebaker has been hounding AMC to join. What should AMC do? Nance likes the added volume potential and more saleable car than Rambler. Romney likes the Rambler and, having watched how careful Mason was in dealing with Hudson, persuades the Board to take a good look at Studebaker's books first. They agree. They investigate. They are aghast at what they find. Nance is no longer hungry for Studebaker either, happy with his career track and positioning to take over AMC. AMC offers to take Studebaker but only if the company basically liquidates itself. The '56 Rambler, which Romney is able to convince the Board to pull ahead from its original '57 redesign, becomes the new platform for the '56 Studebaker too. The only thing left of the old Studebaker are the dealers and possibly the truck line. Thousands lose their jobs in South Bend.

Nance pushes for and gets his new platform for '57. Romney allows the '57 Statesman, Wasp and Clipper to be based on the new Packard platform and even lets Nance build them in Detroit rather than Kenosha, which frees up capacity to meet Rambler and Studebaker combined demand. Romney is intent on showing the Board that he will do more with the small cars than Nance will do with the large. AMC somehow finds investors to not only pay for the redesigned large '57s but pay for a new assembly plant in Utica.

Mission complete? Miller time? Oh oh, wait. Full stop. Nance isn't happy again... :)

Yep. I like your thinking.

Under the scenario you describe, I can see a potential showdown developing between Nance and Frazer. One mitigating factor may be Joe looking towards retirement. In any case, I would love to see some drawings of those Packard-based Ambassadors and Hornets. Picking up styling cues from their respective predecessors, they might have turned out to be pretty damned fine-looking cars.

Would add one additional wrinkle to this fantasy. In handing all large cars to Nance, Romney would ask for and get approval from Frazer to drop the slow-selling Statesman and modest-selling Ambassador for 1957. Nance in turn would drop the Rambler from Hudson's line-up. Thus the lines would be drawn. Romney would have his Nash and Studebaker dealers selling small cars only, Nance would have his Hudson and Packard dealers focused exclusively on the large cars. Each man would control his design and production, both would compete for every dime of investment they could get from Frazer to further their goals. Frazer would referee and channel the competitiveness constructively, to the benefit of the entire company.

Perhaps the Nance-Frazer showdown might have been averted eventually. Romney would run for Governor of Michigan in 1962, Frazer would retire and Nance would take charge of AMC, experienced and ready to lead. His next challenges would be to face Thunderbird/Riviera, Mustang, Mercedes, VW and the Japanese imports.

First of all, Mahoning63, thanks for the link to the Predictor model build!

Second of all, I like your scenario. I just have one question.

Does it presume that enough customers will be BUYING their product to keep the creditors happy, as the 4-part organization competes against the big 3 with their aggressive marketing campaigns and cost-no-object styling departments?

Someone at that Predictor model site mentioned that it was Studebaker's presence that kept the investors from loaning Nance the money for the 57s. If true it would not be unreasonable to speculate that under the scenario above, where Studebaker was present but completely neutered, AMC would have gotten the money. If they had, the next hurdle would have been to survive 1956. Because of the late introductions maybe the 1955 Hudson and Nash cars coming out of Conner might have been able to avoid the poor quality that hurt Packard. If so, maybe that would have helped sales in 1956 and kept Conner losses to a minimum.

If what you are really asking is the question that has long been on the table, namely could any company have competed with GM and Ford during the 50s through 70s given the economies of scale and marketing strategies involved, that's different. For me the question cannot be answered with objective data from that time period because there isn't enough data available. There were only a handful of companies involved and the losers committed quite a few unforced errors. Chrysler was able to up their market share from a dismal 11% in the early 50s to a much higher number by decade's end, so a certain level of success was theoretically possible. Rambler also made it through by creating its own market. People get bored and tired of the same thing, they like fresh ideas from fresh faces if the final result is done right.

My concern with this new AMC that we have concocted would have centered on the planned 1957 Packard/Hudson showroom. We know from history that the 4-square '58 Lincolns flopped. The new Packard would have also been 4-square which raises a flag, but then again the Lincoln is only one data point and perhaps flopped due to detailed execution. We also know that the 1958 mid-priced market took a beating and the luxury market less so but still some pain. The hot 1958-60 Rambler/Studebaker line might have carried a strong 1958-60 Packard/Hudson showroom that just happened to find itself under assault from recessionary forces, but perhaps not a weak showroom. The other challenge would have been the Rambler/Studebaker showroom in the 60s. Maybe under Nance, AMC's small car styling department would have been made stronger.

Every car company has its own financial set-up. Some make money on comparatively few sales while others can't seem to clear a dime no matter how many they sell. Constant re-styling also cuts both ways if the studio gets it wrong. I never felt that bigness was the issue with the Independents in the 50s but rather product strategy and execution. A strategic merger could have helped them all, increasing market and dealer coverage, reducing costs and cross-pollinating the internal cultures for the better even if the combine never really got "big".

Other thoughts?

Am wondering if the Lincon had it's issues because of the sheer size or the weak unibody or styling on 58's. The styling was an acquired taste and quite the departure so maybe had a hand. I'm not sure Packard/Hudson even by following the Predictor styling would have been quite as extreme on any of those fronts.