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Moving sideways, but just a bit, on the subject of fuel economy of sixes and V-8s, our family witnessed a real world comparison when my father turned in his 1955 Chevy six (235 c.i.) three speed manual for a 1957 Chevy with the family's first V-8, a 283 with two speed PowerGlide (another family first). Both were Bel Airs. Pop was pleasantly surprised to see that the V-8 got better gas mileage than the six, no matter the slippage of the automatic. Plus, it was a whole lot more fun for him to drive, he held back on the 1957s performance, probably accounting for him pushing the 1955 six too hard to keep up with traffic.

A year later we added one of Romney's 1958 Ramblers to the family garage. It had the 127 hp overhead valve six, and Pop still maintained that his 57 Bel Air got better mileage than the Rambler did. Three years later, the whole theory blew up when he traded the 57 Bel Air for a Buick LeSabre. With that car he was lucky to get 10 mpg. Mom kept the 58 Rambler, making it the family economy champ. Had my loyal Packard-buying grandmother still been around she'd have made no bones about her theories that "Buying Quality is still the best economy." My father never forgave himself for letting the 57 Bel Air get away. He might have been among the earliest Americans to declare his as a true classic.

Finally, the original 265 Chevy V8 engine weighed eighty pounds less than the 235 six in the 1955s. It would stay that way until the 194 c.i. six was introduced in the Chevy II.

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Yours must have been an early production 55 because they apparently switched the Commander to the 259 during the year. Odd that that engine was used in trucks for 2 years, but only for a few months in a passenger car.

The 224's stroke was only 2 13/16", so even when it's screaming, the piston speed isn't that high. Then there's the matter of Studie designing the V8 for a compression ratio something like 14:1, because they thought the 115/145 octane avgas would become available for road use.

surprised to see that the V-8 got better gas mileage than the six,

You can see the same thing now. Up through 2013, you could get a VW Jetta sedan with either a 2L 4, or a 2.5L 5.

The 2 litre is an ancient 2 valve/cylinder design and woefully underpowered for the car...I know, I drove one one day.

The 2.5 is a more modern 4 valve/cylinder design and reasonably brisk on the road.

Neither is turbocharged. Both run on regular grade gas.

With a 6 speed automatic, the EPA rates the smaller engine at 23/29mpg, and the significanly more powerful 5 at 24/31mpg.

Studie machined it's V8s on a state of the art, for the 50s, automatic machining line. I wonder what the machining line for the 6 looked like as they were probably still using the original 1939 line. Yes, the V8 used about 300lbs more iron, and had more parts, but I wonder how much of that was made up for by more efficient production equipment. The cost difference may not have been as great as you would think.

You are correct, my car was a flat windshield versus the
"wraparound", that little engine could run flat out for
long periods and be little worse for wear. Don't ask how I know.

Hi Steve203

Without a doubt, pairing Packard with Studebaker was likely the worst combination possible. The dissimilarities in size, market segment and price were guaranteed to make a one body sharing program a poor compromise for both ends of the spectrum. If nothing else could have kept them from making that terrible mistake, simply analyzing GM's A-B-C body program would have made it clear. Laid out in steps based on wheelbase lengths, interior and overall dimensions, engines sizes, weights, units costs and retail price ranges, if GM couldn't do it all off one shell, no one else could. Actually, they did just once, 1959-60, but quickly followed-up with modified and evolved body series more appropriate to each segments.

Studebaker, in order to continue to compete against the low-priced three, couldn't fit on its wheelbase a central shell appropriate for a mid-price Clipper and large enough to satisfy Packard customers. Perhaps a President as a de-contented Clipper, but Champions and Commanders had to match the competition closely in most metrics. Champions should have been broken out as a separate compacted line years before the 1953 body was morphed into the Lark.

Promoting a 224 ci V8-equiped Champion versus Big Three sixes might have been a good gambit for 1955. Performance and ecomony might have sold it. As long as they could adjust the prices to align with Ford Mainline, Chevy 150 and Plymouth Plaza, and still have some unit profit left. Nance was still fighting to get South Bend labor costs back in line with general industry standards, rendering that a difficult job.

"By the way, I also measured the head of a 359 in a 54 Packard at a show last summer 32.25" vs 30" for the 308, so in a Packard/Hudson merger, the Reinhart body would easily accept a 308 as the basis for a next generation Hornet."

At least in the short term, a '55 Hudson Hornet off the former Clipper platform, added to a V8 models, would have been a possibility. It's surprising how well the "Hash" sixes sold through '56. In general, the day of the full-sized, six-cylinder, medium-priced cars seemed to have been on the wane. As mentioned, Pontiac, DeSoto and Chrysler abandoned it for 1955. Dodge still offered the Coronet flathead six through '59 as a last holdout. For 1960, the new Dart took it up but at $20-30 over a Plymouth, another low-priced contender from within the corporation, with management's blessing, began the slow demise of Plymouth.

Steve

If nothing else could have kept them from making that terrible mistake, simply analyzing GM's A-B-C body program would have made it clear.

Another case of total failure of leadership and inexperience by one James Nance. He was sucked along by the investment bankers who were telling him these tall tales about the synergies of merging with Studebaker, just as he was swayed by Walter Grant's tall tales of savings by moving final assembly into Conner.

There are rumors that Packard considered, or did, make an offer to George Romney, and speculation what a difference Romney would have made. Looking in Romney's background though, prior to joining Nash in 48, his only experience was a lobbiest for the auto industry during WWII. I would suggest that what made him the executive he was, was the years working with George Mason.

Champions should have been broken out as a separate compacted line years before the 1953 body was morphed into the Lark.

Setting up a compact line would have looked like a bad bet in the early 50s. The Henry J failed and died in the fall of 53. The Jet failed and died in late 54. The Aero died in mid 55. The only way Studie could have had a chance at making a viable case for truncating the 53 platform earlier would be the low development cost, compared to the failed models, which were clean sheet designs. Probably the only thing that made Harold Churchill think the Lark would fly was the continued success of the Rambler after it's redesign in 56.

Promoting a 224 ci V8-equiped Champion versus Big Three sixes might have been a good gambit for 1955.

As the 224 had debuted in the Commander for 55, I would be inclined to rework the Champion at the same time as the restyle in 56. So the Champ would advertise "great new power", while moving the Commander up market a bit, ("great new style"), now that it would no longer be the "V8 Champion", and the President would be what it was on the long wheelbase. One other change I think I would make: instead of establishing the Hawk in so many trim lines, carry on with the President Speedster from 55, just the one 2 door hardtop, high end finish, with the 289, firmly establishing it's position as a personal luxury sport model without the cheapie 6 cylinder coupes to confuse the image.

Moving the President to the Clipper platform would make the 120.5"wb Studie chassis an oddball, so that would probably spell the end of the Lowey coupe as cost for such a low production model might be prohibitive. Better to use the existing 122"wb 54 Packard tooling to provide a President convertible.

As for the cost factor, reducing the powertrain choices could reduce production costs, so the cost difference might not be as great as it would seem at first glance. Recall in 1968 AMC made air conditioning standard on the Ambassador. They apparently thought it worked for them as a/c was standard until the Ambassador was dropped in 74.

It's surprising how well the "Hash" sixes sold through '56.

I suspect the take rate of the 308 in the Hash was more a factor of the lower cost vs the Packard 320, and diehard Hudson fans. I would have only used the 308 for a couple years to transition the clientele to the V8. Start the V8 as standard on the convertible, explaining the convert needed the extra power because it's heavier, then build the performance aspects of the V8 to nudge the sedan buyers to check the option box.

Dodge still offered the Coronet flathead six through '59 as a last holdout.

My Grandfather's 59 Plymouth Savoy also had a flattie.

As for the Studie truck line, not sure what I would have done with it. By the mid 50s, 15-20,000 trucks was a really big year for them. That isn't nearly enough to keep a line going full time. Probably not enough to keep a dedicated truck engine, like the 245, in production at an efficient rate either.

Maybe just shut the truck line down?

Hi Steve203

Ultimately, it came down to a failure of leadership by Nance who, because he had no prior auto industry experience, was essentially doing on-the-job training as he directed the corporation. Ferry and the board incorrectly assumed that success in the appliance business would automatically transfer to automobiles. It didn't because automobiles are a very different game. Packard management, as auto industry insiders, should have recognized that during the interviews. If they couldn't tell, maybe they should have asked others in the industry for their perspective as to whether an outsider could manage an auto company. Guesses are they'd have gotten looks of incredulity just for asking.

Patrick Foster has posed the question in his columns before whether Packard would have been turned around by Romney if he'd come aboard in 1948. As you point out, his auto executive acumen didn't really exist at that point but was mentored by George Mason over seven years when events then thrust him into the lead role. We can't know whether Nance, given the same tutoring by Packard management over four-five years, might not have turned out to be just as affective as Romney.

Vision and prescience were two qualities badly needed in any auto company leadership, still are. Emergent markets such as compacts and personal luxury sport models were opportunities only those with a good 'read' on the future figured out.....or come to by accident. In the case of the compact, the experience of the Henry J, Jet and Aero notwithstanding, overall the trend of small import car sales was continually upward. Rambler volumes tracted generally with those, proved that if the size and content were right enough, a company could cash in on the trend.

Somewhat harder to see was the personal luxury sport but the trend was also there for those who thought to look. Jaguar XK gave the best indication but interest in Corvette, Nash-Healey, Muntz, Skylark, Eldorado and Caribbean revealed two door, four seat, well-equipped, luxury models were finding a market in an increasingly affluent postwar America.

Taking the S-P merger as framework, how to integrate and revise 1956 to have taken full advantage of the platforms each brought to the combine? Here's my rough outline.

Champion: return to it's 9/10 roots by reworking it to a 110"wb compact with six and 224 ci V8. Benchmarked on the 1954 Rambler 108" wb sedan and wagon, think of it as a "Champion-Lark" developed on the cheap. Turn the Stude's narrow width into a virtue. Push them as well-equipped for the base price, institute deleting of standard equipment for those wanting cheaper prices.

Commander: change to 120.5 wb for all four door sedans, add a four door wagon on that Y-body platform; 259 ci standard, 289 ci optional. Drop the two door sedans and wagons. Add two door hardtop and convertible for 1957 or 1958 if warranted.

President Speedster/Hawk: As suggested, develop only the full-luxury performance hardtop versions, no six-cylinder coupes to detract from the image. Chassis to be shared with the Commander 120.5 sedan and wagon.

Trucks: quit production at the Chippewa plant, negotiate with IH or REO to integrate Studebaker truck production into their assembly plants. Decide whether to exit the truck market by 1960 if demand continued to wane.

South Bend plants: reduce the footprint of old plants as much as possible, utilize Chippewa for all Commander and Hawk production, integrate the Champion-Lark compact with expansion.

Studebaker President: kick it over to the 122"wb Packard platform for EGB production. Essentially what was built as the Clipper Deluxe and Super becomes the President with 320ci V8.

Packard Executive: elevate and rename the Clipper Custom to a higher-content 127" wb sedan and hardtop, essentially what had been the '55 Patrician and 400.

Packard Patrician and 400: lengthened to 133"wb, add 3" to the front clip, 3" to the rear passenger area, add a Dietrich Brougham, and a four door hardtop. Designed to challenge Cadillac 60 Special and Eldorado, Imperial LeBaron as fully-equipped and finely-crafted luxury motorcars of impressive length.

Notice this plan takes Packard completely out of medium-priced cars.......sound good?

Steve

Notice this plan takes Packard completely out of medium-priced cars.......sound good?

Considered that, but from a different approch.

Fist problem is the timeline. iirc, Packard committed to Conner in April or May of 54, then merged with Studebaker in October. Hence, assembly at EGB was not an option. By the time of the merger, Packard had spent millions moving to Conner.

Adding President to the Clipper platform presents two problems:

-we all know what a fiasco it was trying to pull 50,000 cars/year out of Conner. It would be impossible to pull 15,000 Presidents out of there, in addition to existing Packard production.

-would the market accept a Studebaker with a $2,600 to $3,000 price tag, having been used to the top of the line Studie stickering for $2,100?

Additionally, the lowest priced entry in a product line usually has the lowest gross profit margin, while a top of the line model has the fattest gross margin.

Conner had no extra capacity. South Bend had lots of extra capacity. Walter Grant assured Nance that the break even point at Conner was 30,000 cars/year.

The route I would consider would be to introduce the Executive, as they did for 56, trimmed and priced like a Packard. Drop the Clipper line entirely. Based on 55 production for senior models plus the top trim Clipper as a proxy for the Executive, this would put them over 30,000/yr, but would slow production compared to 55 to allow for decent build quality. Packard would become a boutique brand, with volume comperable to Lincoln and Imperial.

The Packard dealers would have a cow over losing the Clipper voume. I would suggest to the complaining Packard dealers they pick up Studebaker. Looking at the 57 Packardbaker, and forgetting for a moment that it's pretending to be a Packard, it's actually quite attractive. I would move the 120.5"wb President sedan and Speedster up to the Packardbaker level of trim, with the 289, filling the price gap opened by eliminating the Clipper, and probably increasing gross margins over that of the loss leader Clippers.

Move the Commander trim up market as well, while staying on the 116.5"wb and 259.

Cut the Champion down to 108"wb, so the Champ 6 would have a chance of providing acceptable performance, with the 224 as an option and create the "Champion divison" to seperate it from the Studebaker move to midmarket.

How this would go wrong:

-Packard dealers, rather than picking up Studebaker, would defect to other high end brands.

-the market refuses to pay $3,000 for a tarted up Studebaker, the company having devalued it's brand for 10 years. It's always easier for a high line brand to succeed with a cheaper product, than it is for a cheap brand to move upmarket.

Chippewa is too small for any kind of volume production. I have the exact square footage in my notes somewhere, but iirc it's on the order of 360,000. I'd sell it.

I don't see a buyer for the truck business. REO went bankrupt in 54 and in 55 was controlled by a brass company in Detroit. REO was bought by White in 57. IH already had it's own line of pickups. I'd say shut it down and enjoy the profitable service parts business as long as it lasts.

Of course, the missing element in all this is money. There was no money to truncate the Studebaker platform to make the "new" Champion in 56. There was no money to give the impression the company would survive so people would continue to buy. Money could not recover the reputation lost by the underdeveloped and haphazardly assembled 55 Packards.

Even if they had enough money to implement this plan, and the market accepted Studebaker's move to midmarket, with the existing cheap Studie platform, they would have had the new common platform in production in 57/58, with Studebaker moved to midmarket, just in time to be kneecapped by the recession. And they would still have the expense of developing two different platforms, one for Studie and Packard, and one for Champion, so still no synergies.

By Jan 1, 55, the company was doomed, and Nance had made the decisons that sealed it's fate. It's almost a wonder he didn't put a bullet in his head, the way Albert Erskine did.

I Keep coming back to selling Utica with the AF contract, for cash in 52, before the J47 contract was cut to nothing. If C-W didn't bite, try Continental AEC or Lycoming. If neither of them bit before the J47 work imploded, try to get Kelsey-Hayes to buy. K-H was thinking of moving, because they did, to a former jet engine plant in Romulus, in 59.

Then merge with Hudson in 53, consolidate ops as described before, Hudson replaces Clipper.

Then watch the mess unfold as Nash is stuck with the South Bend booby prize: Mason thinks it's a cheap way to get the Studie V8, complete with existing foundry, forge and state of the art machining line, and an armload of dealers with profitable service parts business, while shutting everything else, like he did with Hudson, so goes the stock swap route, like Packard did. He discovers that Studebaker holders have control of the combined company and refuse to accept any curtailment of South Bend operations. Nash is sucked down the drain.

Random thought: if Packard had merged with Studebaker 1 year earlier:

Packard sold it's foundry and forge in 54. Annual report only said it was "surplus". The main buildings were far enough back from Harper that the freeway being cut through would not disrupt it, so probably either the facility needed a major investment that the company did not want to make, or production volume was so low the facility was not economic to operate. They contracted with Lakey in Muskegon for castings.

Packard contracted with A O Smith for frames.

Packard installed it's new V8 line in Utica, moved Ultramatic and rear axle machining and assembly to Utica.

if they merged with Studebaker one year earlier:

-they could have sourced castings and forgings from Studebaker's facilities.

-they could have installed the new V8 line in Studebaker's engine plant.

-they could have standardized Studebaker on the Ultramatic and moved transmission assembly to South Bend.

-they could have standardized on the Dana 44 axle that Studebaker used and avoided the cost of moving their old axle line to Utica.

These moves would render the Utica plant redundant and available for sale.

-they could have their frames built in the Studebaker frame shop.

-with powertrain production moved to South Bend, it would make sense to consolidate powertrain engineering in SB and use the Studebaker proving grounds, which were larger and more elaborate than PPG. This would render PPG redundant and available for sale.

But, by October 54 it was too late. Like assembly at Conner, Packard was committed to having powertrain at Utica.

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