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Hi Paul

Hidden headlights on a production car then would have definitely rendered a unique look for Packards. Whether it would have tipped the market response in their favor..... well, couldn't hurt!

As background to how the Edsel came to be, read Make Them Shout Hooray! by Richard Stout. Prior to his interlude at Packard, he was in product planning at Lincoln-Mercury. He relates how L-M planners analyzed the price spread of FoMoCo competitors verus their cars, discovering the $500 price gap between Mercury's priciest and the basic Lincoln, this was 1950. A nicely integrated program was modeled on the GM A, B & C Body program; to have Ford and Mercury share the smaller shell, Lincoln and a newly-developed nameplate share the larger; think Chevrolet-Pontiac A-bodies, B-C bodied Olds-Buick-Cadillac. There were to be only four makes but more thoroughly cover the step-up price spreads.

The meeting at which the plan was presented went well until Ernie Breech showed up, blew up at the L-M people for being so presumptuous to develop an audacious plan without 'official' Ford approval and/or input. The L-M folks returned to their offices rebuffed and contrite, tails-between-their-legs, put the plan quietly aside after that unpleasant encounter.

Sometime during 1952, another study for a potential new upper-middle-priced nameplate was initiated again, this time from the Ford front office. By then, the Mercury to Lincoln price gap had grown to $1,000. In typical autocratic corporate practice, a good idea was only good if it comes from the right source. Over the following year or so, it was studied ad-infinitum then simply tapered off to no action....until.

Again, late 1954, now that demographic studies had indeed ascertained the rising affluence of the middle-class and a real price gap between Mercury and Lincoln (surprise). A partial response arrived with the 1955 Mercury Montclair, the success of which in comparison to Clipper irritated Nance. A more targeted effort was Special Products Division charged with developing a new upper middle-price nameplate to be introduced for 1958. Somehow, between initiation and introduction, the defined price spreads for Mercury, the E-car and even top-line Fords became muddled, with considerable overlap. And still left a $1,000 gap for 1958 between Mercury Park Lane and Lincoln Capri, so much for the original objective. Millions spent to create simply another mid-market competitor, this time from in-house.

Ironically, the E-Car program initiated in 1950 for 1952 introduction could have established itself in the generally rising market through 1955. Perhaps even well enough to withstand the late decade mid-market stake-out that claimed Edsel, DeSoto, et al; seriously wounding others.

If Ford had acquired Packard earlier in the decade, say by 1951-1953, what might have become of it? Taking 98, Roadmaster and New Yorkers as opposition, Clipper Deluxe and Cavalier could have filled out $1,000 gap. Packard itself was more problematic. While Lincoln Capri undersold Patrician it was still perceived as a luxury car, promoted as such, plus it had influential champions. Ford (the company) might have benefitted from premium luxury cars to oppose Cadillac 60 Special and 75 but first would have to overcome the objections of Fords (the family). Whatever else Lincoln was, it was still regarded by the family as their late husband and father's cherished make, the only place where he exercised control and was allowed expressions for his refined taste. To elevate another nameplate above Lincoln, even one storied as Packard, would have been a bitter pill for the family. And they still held the purse strings and considerable power.

One can be sure that if Ford had acquired Packard, the essential character of the cars would have submerged into general corporate ethic and become simply variations of their line-mates. Unlikely under their auspices would have been any drive to create a finely-engineered, high-quality, bespoke "American Mercedes". Well, other than that mounted for the Continental Mark II, the ultimate Ford family vanity project.

Steve

Thanks Steve, excellent synopsis and critique. That might be the same book I've been reading every Saturday morning in the library while my daughter is taking music lessons. Excellent account of what happened.

I checked the Standard Catalogue for 1950 FoMoCo pricing. Ford sedans were priced around $1500-$1600, Mercury was $2000, Lincoln Capri was $2500 and Lincoln Cosmo was $3200. So yes, there was a $500 spread throughout the line-up. Looking at the annual volumes for each company one can see how Ford left much opportunity on the table in the middle and upper end of the market, they simply were not competitive with GM. Maybe the Ford brand name had been so strong for so many years that people couldn't dissociate Mercury and Lincoln from it. Or maybe the product simply wasn't good enough.

Noted how Mercury was originally supposed to fall below E-car but somehow they got switched. Could it have been a case of existing fiefdoms being protected and promoted?

The company might have benefited from Packard and Hudson both, the Packard at the top and Hudson between Mercury and Lincoln. But thinking about your comments, had either joined Ford they would have lost their uniqueness as you said. Maybe not initially but over time.

The Continental Mk II was an interesting play on Ford's part, an attempt to one-up Cadillac. That they failed points to the difficult nut the upper end of the market was to crack. They made a great car and it would have made for a great series including sedan and convertible but the business case simply was not there. Nor was there a business case for the wonderful Eldorado Brougham of 1957. I think the lesson was that, besides the need to be a bit shrewd with content and craftsmanship even in this rarefied segment, the bodies and manufacturing needed to be based on a somewhat lower priced / higher volume product to amortize costs.

Hi Paul

"...Mercury was $2000, Lincoln Capri was $2500 and Lincoln Cosmo was $3200. So yes, there was a $500 spread throughout the line-up."

Non-Cosmopolitan 1949-51 Lincolns affectively sold against Roadmaster, New Yorker and Super Eight until the 1952 Lincolns were pushed upmarket in price, if not size and horsepower. The one positive of the later $1,000 price gap was that those disinclined to GM or Chrysler, could resort to Commodore-Hornet or Clipper-Cavalier for their next carmake step-up.

"Looking at the annual volumes for each company one can see how Ford left much opportunity on the table in the middle and upper end of the market,....."

Especially in that immediate postwar decade, Ford Motor Company was all about "FORD......and our couple other minor makes....". Some of that was from trying to rebuild from the damaged mess left by Old Henry's late chaotic years; some about a young, inexperienced management team feeling their way through the process without tanking an industrial giant. They understood the Ford nameplate was their bread-'n-butter and its success was their very survival, the others makes were only peripheral entities.

"Noted how Mercury was originally supposed to fall below E-car but somehow they got switched. Could it have been a case of existing fiefdoms being protected and promoted?"

"Fiefdoms?", absolutely! Not only did the miss-reading of demographic trends but also the intramural political machinations and intrigues of giant-sized egos derail any chances for the Edsel's success. After years of Mercury management playing second fiddle to Ford directives, now it was going stand by and watch a new division created from whole cloth get all the expensive new tooling, development and promotion for a higher prestige line. Resentment must have fairly seethed throughout the Division even at the mention of the Edsel usurping what should have been Mercury's birthright as a junior Lincoln.

Pile on top of that how Ford dealers viewed trying to sell against the usual competition, now had a new Edsel dealer muscling in with his Ranger versus the Fairlane 500 V8. Anecdotes told of the many a Ford or L-M dealer who, when 'generously' granted an Edsel franchise for 1959 after the local upstart bailed to sell Ramblers, promptly parked his Edsel demonstrator on the back line, left the promotional materials boxed.

"The Continental Mk II was an interesting play on Ford's part, an attempt to one-up Cadillac. That they failed points to the difficult nut the upper end of the market was to crack."

The Continental demonstrated that Ford was truly back as a market competitor, that it could to build the very finest. Problem was most of the upper end segment wasn't interested in such rarified specialties or could even afford such cars then, at least in profitable volumes.

"I think the lesson was that, besides the need to be a bit shrewd with content and craftsmanship even in this rarefied segment, the bodies and manufacturing needed to be based on a somewhat lower priced / higher volume product to amortize costs."

The profitable upper end of the volume luxury segment in 1956 began near $6,000-tapered off $7,000. Building those as extensions of standard models such as 60 Special, Eldorado Seville and Biarritz was the prefect approach to fill the coffers with cash....and generate cache. The average twenty percent price premium of the 60 Special over the 62 sedan was smart marketing for minimal addtional tooling cost. Packard was on the right path with the Caribbeans but no premium sedan missed so much potential business. Chrysler noticed, added the LeBaron to Imperial for 1957, developed it into what Packard could well have done beforehand to create more profits and prestige.

Would Hudson and/or Packard been treated any better than Edsel or enjoyed exclusive models had they become part of the FoMoCo empire? "The Ford Family of Fine Cars" : Ford, Mercury, Hudson, Lincoln, Packard,.......maybe Continental, too. The next product cycle would have brought the 'interlopers' in line with the rest of the 'family', their independent content vanished for certain.

Steve

Just came across this film made by Ford in lead up to Edsel intro.

youtube.com/watch?v=89Z9F-svFAk

Am a bit suspicious of the accuracy of the company's recounting of the 10 years leading up to the Edsel intro but this historical revisionism aside, the data shown starting around 6 minutes into the film appears to be a good description of the market realities of the day. One thing pointed out is that GM's brand pricing resulted in much overlap, which is why Edsel pricing was so expansive.

It occurs to me that what GM was successfully doing in the medium priced field by offering different brands to give the market styling choice, could have been used by FoMoCo in the luxury field to beat GM at its own game. Lincoln and Packard on same body shell but with different styling. Including Torsion-Level would have prevented Chrysler from making such a big deal of its '58 cars shown in these films.

youtube.com/watch?v=YBNWBHYp41w

youtube.com/watch?v=zrKAVfS3Ui0

Here's a blue version of earlier red Packard and now with door outer panels unique from Lincoln, and a backlight. FoMoCo in mid-1956 could have bought the Packard portion of Studebaker-Packard for very little money and made a '58 Packard out of the '58 Lincoln for $10-15 million. The Packard dealers could have sold the new Edsel too, reducing the $250M start-up cost of that brand. True, Packard would have become a corporate contrivance and I shutter to think what a 1980 Packard on shared platform with Lincoln, Grand Marquis and Crown Victoria would have looked and performed like. Nor would Packard be in good shape today, if current Lincoln is any guide. But we would have enjoyed a close approximation of the planned Predictor styling and a good run of cars through the Sixties and maybe the Seventies.

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