Packard Forum Index » General

Mahoning:

Your last dialog between Nance and Mason is what I think Mason had in mind prior to his death. Keep in mind that Nance was not a car man; he basically knew how to run other corporations of the time. Whether Nance would have possessed the vision that you stated about Hudson producing bodies and Packard the powertrains and Nash producing the small-car lineup is debatable. After all, Nance was the one pushing to separate Clipper from Packard for God knows what reason. The dealers went totally balistic over that idea. By the mid 1950s, it would have made no sense. Besides, after the Light Eight and 110/120 models, Packard was too far committed to a lower cost model than to try and separate from what made them money in the first place. Not only that, the Clipper in 1941 was certainly not a low-priced model: it cost almost as much as a 160 and was similarly equipped. Clipper represented the future of Packard design.

So here we are: It is 1954 and all of the independents are suffering. Willys will soon drop its Aero and put all of its fortunes and future in its Jeep; Kaiser is on the verge of shuttering its plants; Hudson, Studebaker, Packard and Nash are simply stumbling along. Despite all of the interesting scenarios that you and the others have presented, it still gets down to the fact that it was too late to change the course. In 10 years American Motors would be doing OK selling Ramblers, while Studebaker would be slowly heading toward its grave. All the while, Ford, Chrysler and GM would continue to dominate the market and continue to bring out new models like the Thunderbird, 300, Falcon, Edsel (gag), Corvair, etc. Even when DeSoto and Edsel disappeared their losses didn't make a dent in the overall market supremacy of the Big 3.

Even if Packard, Hudson, Nash and Studebaker had merged in 1954, I don't think American Motors would have had the capital and resources to substantively compete againt the Big 3.

Nance supposedly thought that the 200 and 250 models were "bleeding the Packard name white" which is a repetition of more of the same old carraige trade theory stuff. Well, if the V-16 didn't help Cadillac in 1940 how could building super expensive cars help Packard? Maybe Nance was just feeling desperate at that point.

I think the Ford and Chevy numbers tell the story. They pushed sales higher with the same tired products due to the implementation of floor plans. And the first OHV V-8 from Ford was rather troublesome to boot.

Granted Studebaker's "European Look" advertsing was a disaster (and downright dumb), but so was stuff like "For twenty years Mrs. Atwater Kent has owned Packards." So what? Can you imagine a campaign like "For twenty years Mr. Donald Trump has ridden in Lincolns"? More deterrent than stimulus.

Here's one attempt at an Italia-inspired '55 Hudson on a common body shell with the Packard. The Hudson sits on Hornet's 124 inch wheelbase, 3 inches less than the Packard owing to a shorter hood. Rear overhang is brought in 3 inches too. Both cars share common front door outers just like Olds/Cadillac. Roof is also same stamping, the Hudson only having a different backlight cutout. Front design would have been a challenge, maybe the '53 Corvette's headlights without the mesh might have looked good or perhaps hidden lights, anything but Spring's gorpy Italia design.

OK, what would the '55 sales picture have looked like for these two cars assuming sedan, coupe and convertible? 200,000 total would be my volume call, 4/5ths of which would have been Hudson and translating to $20-30 million in profits. I make this volume call based on what the Commodore and Patrician proved themselves capable of when first introduced versus the industry, then scaled to the industry's incredible 1955 sales results. The Packard also got an additional bump because it didn't have less expensive Packards cannibalizing its sales. Hudson needed to nail its design... to quote Ed Sullivan, something "reelly Big."

UPDATED 2/23: clean-up of flanks and addition of Frank Spring's front brake vents on fender tops. Headlights would need to be mounted inboard, possibly within the grill, exposed or hidden.

Attach file:

---

  (15.25 KB)

Hi

That's an intriguing melding of Pan American-Panther architecture built on the stepdown floorpan structures, would have resulted in a real attention-getter in '55. Height could have been as low as the '57 Forward Look Chryslers, in the 54" range.

For the front, a version of the '55 Hudson eggcrate with simple parking lights flanking. For the rear, the Italia flanking fender ends, slimmed a bit, vertical tailight/reverse light units like those on the '56-'57 Ramblers in the ends.

If Packard and Hudson had mergered in '52 and got right to work on this concept, the 1955 sales season could have been a real blockbuster.

Paul, Keep the concepts flowing!

Steve

Thanks Steve and great design suggestions. Amazing the number of possibilities that keep popping up. Here's an alternative line-up that may have saved money while still delivering good sales. Rather than Hudson tooling unique panels for its version of the large step-down, walk away from that market and divert the tooling money to a Jet GT, letting Packard sell in both the Patrician and Cavalier price ranges. To save even more money perhaps the Packard could have been offered exclusively as a 4 door and in three versions: sedan, hardtop and convertible. The last two would be created with a saw just as Hudson did its hardtop and convertible. For the Jet, offer in 2dr sedan, 2dr hardtop and 2dr convertible, again compliments of the saw. Volumes still pushing 200,000 total. All Packard and Hudson dealers would be dualed and have a very full and appealing showroom. Former Hudson Hornet owners would be instructed by sales that the step-down unibody is underneith the Packard so feel free to buy! One thing Nance always wanted was an overhead cam engine. Perfect, tool two OHC Six engines at Utica to replace Hudson's old engines and let Packard shoppers looking for a 2 door know that a Packard engine is inside the Jet, as is Torsion Level for the Jet Custom.

1955 prices:

Hudson Jet 232 Six $2100
Hudson Jet Custom 262 Six $2600 w/Torsion-Level
Packard Panther 320 Eight $3300
Packard Panther Custom 352 Eight $4200 w/Torsion-Level

Packard could have eventually offered a 2dr Panther once the financials improved.

Attach file:

---

  (84.87 KB)

Hi

What an amazing change that would have been for both makes! Three configurations of four door luxury Packards or two grand touring two door Hudsons, quite a shocker for that '50's market. The merged company would have had to been structured to thrive on much smaller volume than prior. If they could have pulled it off, it would have been quite a coup.

Would have been a great move toward positioning both to field models largely unavailable from other domestic makers. Loaded with advanced engineering and bespoke build quality, they would have been totally different from anything else available.

Steve

An important element of the merger would have been to fully integrate not only operations but dealers and each brand's customer base. It would have been critical that Hudson owners be made to feel comfortable purchasing a Packard-badged car and vice versa. Contrast this to AMC where Nash and Hudson dealers initially remained separate and competed with each other, and only began to merge in earnest once the big cars went away in 1958.

Regarding a Packard in 4dr style only, did some checking of what the intro of a 4dr HT had on Buick, Olds and Cadillac sales. Looks like no difference in take rates for 2d HT vs all 4dr models for Buick or the lower priced Olds but a measurable difference for Olds 98 and Cadillac. For example in 1955, Cadillac sold 45,000 4dr sedans vs 61,000 2HTs while in 1956 they sold 68,000 4dr sedans+HTs vs 52,000 2HTs. Packard would have lost some 2dr HT sales but not all. In Packard-Hudson's favor would have been Jet 2d HTs in the same showroom, albeit much smaller than a full-sized 2d HT. The Jet would have basically been a Mustang sold 10 years earlier and we know how popular that formula proved to be. Would Nance have known it then? He would have needed to work-up a prototype and get it in front of people to test their reaction, the success of the '53 Studebaker coupes being the driver.

After thinking about all these promising product alternatives and comparing to what Nance and Barit eventually chose or were forced into, am left wondering if during the July '53 meeting between these two car CEOs the subject of cars ever came up.

Hi

Not to divert from the current discussion, just to further enlighten on Studebaker as the merger was about to take place, the following:

"........Looking deeper into the sales it is pretty clear that without the Loewy coupes (46% of Studebaker's total volume in '53, 34% in '54), Studebaker would have had a rather poor 1953 despite a brand new design. Was suprised by this. The strong showing of the coupes, which Nance would have known by summer of 1953 when Barit came to visit, also suggests that Hudson had an opportunity with the Jet platform for a 2+2 version of a cleaned up Italia, priced around $2100."

Enlarging on Paul's interesting sales charts and comments on the 1953 coupe vs. sedan percentages, those lopsided numbers for the coupes are indicative of a couple of significant management mistakes in planning for the '53 model year. Richard M. Langworth in Studebaker: The Postwar Years tells it better than I can:

".............In model year 1952, the company built about 134,000 two- and four-door sedans, against some 49,000 hardtops and coupes - nearly a three-to-one proportion. In model year 1953 the proportions ended up at nine sedans to eight coupes. But Studebaker had originally based production planning on the 1952 ratio, not taking into account the tremendous appeal of the coupes. It was unprepared for the coupe demand. To this extent, the coupes were too good. Their percentage of overall production was far higher than normal for the industry, and well in excess of 1952. As the Loewy people had warned, previously designed sedans, using coupe styling details that were applied at the last moment before tooling, were just ghastly mistakes.
The success of the Loewy coupes often distracts enthusiast from the really abysmal failure of the 1953 sedans - models on which every major company depends for its survival."

"ghastly mistakes" Ouch! But so apropos! He also relates there were delays caused by major productions snafus from engineering tooling mistakes and the decision to schedule coupe production later after the sedans were going. Further from Mr Langworth:

"As a small independent, Studebaker lacked the time or resources for much experimentation in setting up a production line. Assembly had to be right the first time. The 1953 chassis was engineered to fit three different body styles: sedans, coupes, Land Cruisers. It was modified from earlier chassis by patchwork, since brand-new tooling would have cost over $1 million, which the company couldn't afford. The different body styles dictated separate sets of parts for each. Not only were there more sets of parts, but more individual pieces for each body - the large, one-piece stampings of earlier years had been cut into smaller stampings for easier handling."........"Studebaker also had traffic problems in its old plant, getting the wide variety of new parts from various production sources to the assembly line. For years these had been carted around on crude trailers, but the 1953's were so relatively complex that there was a bottleneck at nearly every plant intersection. Finally, engineering put up overhead conveyors throughout the seven plant buildings. They totaled 5,310 feet in length and cost $625,000. This greatly simplified the component transfer process, but it was late and dreadfully expensive."

Its not inaccurate to say that Bob Bourke created for Studebaker a far more sophisticated design than they had the ability to understand and never capitalized on completely. It developed originally as simply a blue-sky design exercise to get the creative juices flowing. He was familiar with engineering and production and had a good working relationship with those department, took that into account while creating the concept clay. When managers became interested in the design's progress, Loewy pushed them to put it into production. A design evolution of prior themes that had been approved for the sedans parallel to this were then modified to accept coupe-style details which were not a good aesthetic fit.

All this confusion, vacillation and late decisions as to what design to build left the body style selection one of the poorest. Most anyone with a pulse and an interest in cars can look at the Loewy coupes and hardtops and instantly want a convertible one. The management reason given for deleting this high-image style from the line was low sales potential.........huh? For most of the six prior years, convertibles had accounted for an average of 3.5% of their annual sales. What they didn't take into account was the only things that a '53 Commander convertible would have had in common with the '52 was they were both Studebakers! Like a sweet, juicy peach versus a blacken, overripe banana! Worst of all, even after the Loewy coupes proved their major appeal, they never broadened the line with a convertible or four door sport sedan. Instead, the dumpy sedans eventually received a two door wagon for '54, a wrap-around windshield in mid-'55, a major restyle for '56, a four door wagon for '57 and a two door hardtop, dual headlight pods and ungainly fins for '58.

This brings us to the other late participation in another major emergent market: station wagons. The introduction of the all-steel station wagons by Jeep and Plymouth sparked a revolution in broadening the appeal and utility of a body style that had previous been limited by high initial price and constant need for wood maintenance. By '51-'52 the transition to all-steel was nearly complete with Buick the only holdout for one more year. The numbers tell it best, from Station Wagon: A Tribute to America's Workaholic on Wheels by Ron Kowalke:

Model Year...Market Percentage
1951...............3.3
1952...............3.9
1953...............4.9
1954...............6.5
1955...............8.2
1956.............11.3
1957.............13.6
1958.............15.2
1959.............16.9

From '51 to '54 it nearly doubled and did double again from '54 to '57. Packard quit the segment with the station sedans too soon. Either Henney or Ionia could have been contracted to convert 200/Clippers to get a part of it. Studebaker dallied until '54 then only offered a two door wagon just as four door wagons began coming on as the strong preference. Then, in the turmoil of the '56-'57 debacle, finally had the four door wagon was ready, by which time most folks had written S-P off as a soon-to-be orphan.

Indictments of poor management decisions are absolutely deserved when understanding the downward spiral that ended their carmaking.

Your comments sought.
Steve

Steve:

Your notes about Studebaker are spot on. I think the company came out with a clean, appealing line in 1946 which resulted in public acclaim and high sales. Its problem came in the aftermath of 1951 when it should have produced similar modern, low unibody designs that would have made the GM and Ford cars appear studgy or bland. Instead it continued with an awkward transition to a studgy, unappealing sedan in the Landcruiser and President, while trying to maintain its earlier Loewy styling in its Hawks, which by the late 1950s appeared dated and a bit odd. Sadly, these cars had no chance against the incoming pony and muscle cars hitting the scene in 1964. Even worse, Studebaker chose to emulate the AMC Rambler instead of the Ford Falcon when it brought out the Lark. The remarkable Avanti was beautiful swan song to what had turned into a rather ugly duckling. Even though Packard was clearly not compatible with Studebaker, I still do not see how a merger with decomposing Hudson would have done anymore than move up Packard's expiration date.

Your comments regarding station wagons is also interesting. When I was a teenager in Southern California in the 1960s, the top of the line station wagon was also a company's top of the line model (with the exceptions of the Toronado, Riviera, and Thunderbird, which marketed separately). I recall my mother's 1967 Ford Country Squire as a very luxurious car, equipped with AC, power steering, power brakes, automatic, electric seat and windows, front disc brakes, and a two-way rear gate. This car was just about as well equipped as my father's Lincoln Continental. Check out the '67 Country Squire ... it had very nice lines and styling.

Then look at Packard's abysmal Station Sedan. Packard styling for its 1948-50 line was challenging in the first place, especially when compared to the lines offered by Studebaker. The Station Sedan, with its humped back end and pointless inset wooden implants accentuates the worst of the car's general design. It took the manufacturers a while to figure out that using real wood on the exteriors of cars was a bad idea, since car owners are not as inclined as motor boat owners to properly maintain the wood. The key to the dramatic rise of the station wagon was due to its urban utility and its all-steel bodies. But station wagons, like convertibles, could only arrive when a company could afford to produce them in volume, which neither Packard nor Hudson was capable of doing by the early 1950s.

Thanks Steve, your comments were very educational. '53 Studebaker standard model sales weren't much better than Packard and were lower than Nash's large. Should this have raised a flag with Nance and the Packard Board especially given South Bend's notorious labor costs?

'53 Studebaker (excl Loewy coupes) - 91,000
'53 Packard - 80,371
'53 Nash (excl Rambler) - 93,500
'53 Hudson (excl Jet) - 56,000

The station wagon growth you lay out is incredible, never knew. There was another gentleman on this forum who had advocated a '51 and later Packard wagon in a previous thread, now I understand why. Have seen two conversions including this:

http://www.velocityjournal.com/images/full/2005/186/pk1952stationwagon1867818.jpg

Persoanlly I think the '48-50 Station Sedan was the best looking Packard of that series because it did away with the droopy decklid and made the plump styling make sense. Wish Packard would have made in on the 127 inch wheelbase.

Regarding volumes for a Packard-Hudson tie-up and viability of such a merger, did a comparison of several brands within GM, Ford and Chrysler and found that for each, sales for 1955 ranged from 20 - 300% more than 1948 and 1949 levels. We know Packard and Hudson collectively sold almost 250,000 cars in 1948 and again in 1949. Had they gotten their heads together and put out a couple hot '55s, really hot, they could certainly have matched at least the lowest end of that Big 3 performance; i.e., 20% over '48/49 or 300,000 units. The only thing that would have held them back was capacity. Not sure what Utica was capable of but Hudson proved in 1949 that it had 144,000 in it, which earned $12M in profits. Not sure if Jet's final assembly was done on the big Hudson line or by Murray or on some other line. If separate from the big Hudson would have been perhaps 100,000 or more.

Packard's 68,694 sales in 1955 seem, on the face of it, to have been healthy and there may have been 15,000 more sales available had the factory been able to produce and the quality been better. Packard may have even turned a profit. But even these best case sales and profits would have been nowhere near what the industry as a whole was experiencing or what the company was really capable of.

My conclusion is that the argument that neither Nance nor Barit were capable of envisioning a merger that would leverage each company's full potential is valid. As to the broader argument that the Independents were doomed for reasons beyond their control no matter who was in charge or which strategy was pursued, I submit that both the sales data and the many examples of success stories soon to come suggest otherwise. As late as 1953 the futures of these companies were still viable. Under Romney, Nash found one path. Packard-Hudson had another. With the right scout leader there were probably a half dozen clear paths out of the woods.