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Hi
After reading the pertinent posting to my questions, here I offer my opinion.

Historical Framework: the Single Six developed into the standard mass-market volume prestige car for the 1920's, brought Packard's prestige to a market segment previously priced out of luxury cars. Single Six and successor Standard Eight accounted for approximately 85% of the yearly production.

The Single Six and Standard Eight enlarged Packard's prestige reputation by directly exposing more of the population to the quality and qualities Packard possessed.

The Depression changed everything, forced Packard to offer cars in the middle price segment to survive.

Tooling cost for all-steel bodies only could be amortized by volume, difficult for small manufacturers.

Selling in volume traded on Packard's prestige name.

Ultimately, the 120 and Six sales volume saved the company financially, allowed it to weather the Depression.

GM production people make the 120 a successful reality, only understood volume production, pushed the 115 six to further their only understanding of how to make Packard a continuing success.

The old-line management, wary from the troubled Depression economy, are comforted by profits of medium priced sales, lose sight of Packard's long-term strength in luxury cars.

Management failed to recognize how the luxury market will eventually revive: not on the same basis as the 1920's, not with the luxury cars then in production.

Depression economics caused major deflation and price realignment for all segments. GM was astute enough to recognize this situation. The mass market volume luxury car segment, which had been priced $2,100 to $3,000 in the 1920's, by 1936 spread from $1,500 to $2,100.

Beginnings of the redefined mass-market volume luxury car: the '36 Cadillac Series 60. An inauspicious beginning, essentially a Buick Century fitted with a Cadillac V8 and trim.

Price is the important point: $1,695, the middle of the nearly $1,300 price gap between the 120 sedan at $1,115 and Eight at $2,385. Sales of 6712 units seem insignificant, but each succeeding year sales mostly move in the right direction.

For '37, influenced by the GM production people, Packard management introduces the 115 six in a further effort to generate sales volume. Concurrently, the specifications of the former Eight become the new Super Eight, dismissing the big straight eight to history.

The boost for the Cadillac Series 60 comes in '38 with the introduction of the 60 Special. More importantly, other than the 120CD and '38 Eight Deluxe price nearer the Series 60, Packard offers no models truly competitive until the '39 Super 8.

When the '39 Super 8 arrives, Packard has clearly based it on the '38 Eight, with larger engine and finer trim. This parallels Cadillac's approach three years prior in creating the Series 60. At the end of that fateful year, the new Super 8 garners 3962 sales versus 11,426 Cadillac 61 and 60 Specials, the first point of loss.

This is the critical point where the senior series seriously needed retooling to remain a contender to dominate this market. But rather than design a new car, with the high style becoming expected, Packard presented just an up-market version of the 120/Eight, now so ubiquitous.

For three model years, Cadillac built a base of customers with the Series 60, next enlarged the series with the stylish 60 Special. That single model sets the style for the next stage of Cadillac's conquest of the volume luxury market, the Series 62 with the GM Torpedo C Body.

Final steps to make the conquest complete for 1941: end the LaSalle nameplate now clearly siphoning sales from Cadillac, reinstitute the Series 61 as the entry level Cadillac, then reduce the base prices of the Series 62 by 12%, just watch the sales explode.

Packard's management, enthralled with the price range crowded with many other good medium priced offering, ignored until it was too late a lucrative market just waiting to be filled.

I look forward to your comments and perspectives now you've read mine.

Steve

I think most of your points are well-taken.

Does anyone know whether the Packard Darrin/Clipper were initially designed/engineered to compete with Cadillac and Lincoln in the so-called high-end market?

Despite his detractors, IMHO Jim Nance was attempting to reposition Packard in the high-end market, but simply didn't have enough time or capital.

Steve, GM was loosing so much money on Cadillac in the depression that they discussed dropping the brand all together. One move that saved the brand was the decision to offer (for the first time) the purchase of Cadillacs through GMAC rather than the Chattel mortgage (which was how luxury cars were financed prior to the war) and making GMAC financing available to middle class and professional African Americans, who were a very small but slowly growing market segment. Prior to this the luxury car makers sort of limited who could buy their offerings by the method of finance; the chattel mortgage was available only to those with the background of financial dealings that identified them as "a person of substance."
After the war the big three were delighted in the unheard-of volume their luxury brands were achieving, and the profits from same. Any thoughts of "qualifying" customers were abandoned and GM and Ford delighted in the success and profits from Cadillac and Lincoln. In a way this led to the "welfare Cadillac" thing, which over time cheapened the image of the brands to those who like owning something exclusive, these days Mercedes and Lexus seems to be meeting that need in mass, more exotic and costly product for those above those brands.
Your analysis of the Cadillac model offerings is spot on to my eyes, it is a case where GM ran a tighter ship for that moment in history and know how to take advantage of an opening when given one. The elimination of the LaSalle and Buick 90 series set Cadillac up for success.

Good points all, and nicely written, no disagreement here. But one thing not to loose sight of is that Packard, to survive, needed to make a profit more-or-less consistently. Only with GM's backing was Cadillac able to continue as a make for about 50 years before it finally turned a cumulative profit, the losses being acceptable for what it's image bestowed on the rest of the line.

As Mr. PB notes, Cadillac was under consideration for elimination just prior to WW II, and how Buick's introduction of the series-custom bodied Brunns on the Series 90 must have set the Cadillac house into a frenzy. Those just-prewar Buick Series 90 were truly superb cars, some say finer than Cadillac at the time.

Steve and Mr Pushbutton, Well written and a good summary of what has been written previous with some new ideas and insights. The question of the purpose of the Clipper model has been raised. My own thoughts is that Packard needed a more updated model by 1940 to compete with the Cadillac 60 Special, the Lincoln Continental and others with lower, wider and more streamlined body styles and in a nutshell the result was the Clipper. Am I right in this assertion?

Clipper47, in essence, yes, but the 41-up Clipper was both a re-naming of the 120, PMCC may have realized that they sold the name a little too far downmarket with the 110-115 and was in the process of making corrections with the branding of the Clipper line. They were spot-on with the styling, which had no sense of stuffy formality. With no true upper series body after the war the prestige line was left open to the competition.
For an interesting study look at the Chrysler Imperial. At times a very fine car, the 1931-33s being about as good a car as money could buy at the time. Chrysler was not able to carry the losses of the Imperial, even after establishing it as a separate brand and not just "the biggest, fattest Chrysler." They waffled in and out of that segment, made some really great cars and some really mediocre cars (that were truly the biggest, fattest Chrysler). My former co-workers said repeatedly that Chrysler NEVER made money on Imperial, and like to fudge their undies when it was announced (and quickly retracted) in 2006 that they were going to again make an Imperial.
One huge difference for me between Cadillac and rivals Lincoln and Imperial is that GM only put (well, for the first 75 years anyhow) Cadillac engines in a Cadillac. Lincoln and Imperial had an engine that could )in its essence be found in a garbage truck, school bus, pickup or low-priced offering.

Hi

Some further comments in response to your fine insights and questions.

First, the situation at Cadillac: It's true Cadillac became a financial liability for GM as the Depression deepened and there were discussions whether to drop the make IF it could not be made a profitably viable contributor again. For GM to drop Cadillac would have violated Sloan's policy of "A Car for Every Purse and Purpose" Certainly, GM management recognized the Depression would abate, demand for luxury cars would revive, and dismissing their established Standard of the World would be a long term mistake.

Toward this objective of profitable viability for Cadillac, Nicholas Dreystadt replaced Lawrence Fisher as General Manager in June 1934. His charge was to reduce to one basic engine and rationalize the body & chassis shared with volume makes from the multiplicity of engines, bodies and chassis then built by Cadillac. He also brought unit cost discipline to a division that had never really had to consider it before. His job was much like that of the production people Packard brought in to make the 120 a reality.
Dreystad's first contribution was the '36 Series 60. He relentlessly rationalized the products all across the lines, as proof; compare the 1933 Cadillac & LaSalle lines to that of 1941. As the results show, their program was one of slow steady development of the 60 Series into a position of dominance in the price segment. He and other Cadillac managers were no doubt heartened in their efforts as they watched Packard ignore the $1,700 to $2,100 price segment in pursue of the Pontiac segment volume with the 115 Six.

The ability of luxury car buyers to use GMAC to finance their purchases was a brilliant move as well. The whole idea of limiting new car ownership to "persons of substance" might have assured only those truly financially able would have such a car, but that world was fading away quickly by the mid-'30's. Call it the democratization of the luxury car market, the old exclusive world of the rich was in disrepute by much of the population for having caused of the economic woes, no longer to be trusted as before. Any prosperous person should be able to enjoy a luxury car, regardless of whether he was "a person of substance".

On Buick 90: Harlow Curtice had revived Buick in general from its 1932-33 low, sought to make Roadmasters and Limiteds as desirable a luxury car as comparable Cadillacs. However fine the resultant cars were, this action violated Sloan's step structure for price and class, would not be allowed long term. GM management understood they needed only one luxury car at the top, not two.
Of those few Brunn customs, fine cars as they were, were still semi-custom modifications of the factory Limited bodies, itself shared with the Cadillac Series 67. The customs added luster to all Buicks, their primary purpose. In truth, a low production custom convertible in the style of the Lincoln Continental or Packard Darrin Victoria would have had more affect.

Motivation to build the Clipper might have come from the analyzing their market position after 1937. Selling 115,000 cars that year, realistic projections for unit sales by 1940 would be in the 150-200K unit range. With '37 as the benchmark, '38 sold at 48%, '39 at 36%, '40 would shape up to be 78%, '41, even after the Clipper introduction, just 59%. Management should have been scrambling to figure why their position in the market was so flat. Compared to major competitors, Buick and Chrysler, their results were just plain dismal.

The Clipper was Packard's hurried response to the GM Torpedo C body that became available with the 1940 models. It was offered from Pontiac through Cadillac, became among their best selling models. The body architecture is based on the Cadillac 60 Special. The C body is basically a four-window club sedan, it greenhouse separated from the lower body mass, with an integrated coupe style trunk with softer, sportier lines.

It was a highly influential style at that time. For 1941, Packard, Hudson and Nash integrated coupe style trunks into their existing six window sedans. Studebaker's new bodies for Commander and President are designed in the Torpedo C body idiom, even included the Land Cruiser four window club sedan, a handsome ringer for the GM C bodies on which it's clearly based. Chrysler added the Town Sedan to Dodge, DeSoto, and Chrysler. Only Ford shows no production response, though a Lincoln Zephyr club sedan would have been a welcome addition to that line.

Pricing the '41 Clipper between the Buick Roadmaster/ Cadillac 61 and the Cadillac 62 reveals where Packard hoped to conquest sales. Trying to do so with the 120 chassis against 320 and 346 cu. in. eights has to be viewed as a real mistake. Why the Clipper didn't arrive with the model 160 mechanicals is a complete mystery.

Of Chrysler: the Imperial, after a strong start as the L-80, CG & CL Custom Imperial, submerged into the Airflow episode, emerged to became just the nicest Chrysler offered, a name to exploit for sales purposes. The Custom and Crown Imperials were their only pretense toward the luxury market from the mid-'30's until 1942. Looking at the miniscule volume, it seems a car created so Walter P. and other Chrysler executives wouldn't have to ride in another make luxury car on their rounds. Examining how it was built, one can see it was rationalized totally with lower volume lines, its major components all shared with lesser models.

Once Packard entered the upper medium price segment, their concern was more with the eight cylinder Chrysler models that competed directly with the 120. In quest of this market, Chrysler too did very well in the late '30's, adding eight cylinder sales for every year from '36 to '42 except '38 and '39. Imperial was a concern only in so far as it competed directly with the 120, the Custom Imperials nothing to worry about.

I look forward to reading your comments and insights. Thanks as well for keeping on the topic.

Steve

Steve, You should write this up as a book! You obviously have a great interest and knowledge of American automobile history of the 1930's-1940's era. I truly enjoy your postings on this subject as I am learning a great deal that I hadn't previously known. Thank you.

Hi Clipper47

Thanks for your kind endorsement. This is what happens when you study a subject for 40 years. The curiousity to find out all I could about the auto industry from the beginning through the 1960's, all the independent companies as well as their competitors hit me in the late '60's.

Now, having read and absorbed lots of good automotive history books, every issue of SIA and thousands of others, I think I have a pretty complete picture of what happened and, more importantly, why

Packard's struggle and demise has been of particular interest, as you can tell.

Steve

Hi

Just a few more thoughts enlarging upon the subject:

With the 1940 One-Sixty, Packard finally got it almost right. The most popular body styles were powered with the great new 356 cu. in engine, competitive in size and horsepower with the Cadillac V8. Each of the popular body styles was priced on target to the Cadillac 62. Although a different type of car, the longer wheelbase models gave those considering a 60 Special an excellent alternative. Customer reasons to purchase a Packard 160 5-7 passenger sedan where somewhat different from the 60 Special where stylishness was a larger consideration than passenger capacity.

Why then did the sales of 160 models not exceed the Cadillac 62 and Special 60 for 1940? One factor is the sales momentum built by Cadillac since introducing the Series 60 in 1936. Just the potential replacement sales of the 13,715 Series 60 models sold in 1936 and 1937, a fifty percent trade-in would carry the base sales effort. Brand loyalty was important to all car makers, Packard had a large loyal customer base to draw from. Those loyal customers ready to trade-in their '36 Eights and '37 Super Eights, though purchasing in a higher price market initially, were no doubt pleased to spend less on their new 160, even if it seemed a less majestic car than the old one.

An additional blow to 160 sales was the appeal of the new GM Torpedo C body, putting Packard at a style disadvantage. As much as we like the Packard styling today, it has to be recognized that it looked out of fashion compared to the Series 62 Sedan. Folks had been seeing versions of that Packard body design since 1938, mostly in the form of Six/110/Eight/120.

If styling similarity to Senior models abetted sales of the Junior line up to this point, the subtle, detailed differences between the lines was lost on much of the public for 1940-41. No matter that Packard gave it updated frontal styling, it was still the same old overall design everyone was used to. The public was receptive to and even expected new styling on a two-three year cycle by this time. The yearly model changes to stimulate sales were having the desired affect. The excitement of seeing the new models every fall was now a cultural phenomenon.

If the sales for 1940 were a holding action, 1941 was a market rout. Packard offered a handsomely restyled 160, incorporating the updated coupe style trunk into the now forth model year old body. The prices were raised a little, still in the competitive range of the '40 Cadillacs, resulted in 3,525 units sold. Wily marketers, the new '41 Cadillacs carried trendsetting new styling and for the Series 62, a 12-14% drop in base price from '40. Even disregarding the LaSalle replacing Series 61, sales of 24,734 Series 62 Cadillacs has to be seen as a coup. Just icing on the cake are the 4,101 60 Specials sold.

Had the Clipper arrived in 1940 as a 160, would this outcome have been different? Interesting to ponder, it might have kept the competitive situation more evenly divided. GM and Cadillac resources certainly pressed Packard extremely hard to match the model and prices it offered. The brand loyal and those whose loyalty was to neither make beforehand voted with their dollars.

I'll be interested to read your reflections and comments on any of the ideas I've presented.

Steve