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I asked George Romney about the proposed merger when a small group of us Air Force members were invited to his home one evening. He told me that all momentum for the merger ended when George Mason died. Without Mr. Mason the plan was not going anywhere.

Packards1: That was something I have heard on numerous occasions and makes sense to me. George Mason succeeded Charlie Nash and one thing is for sure: There were few people ever associated with the auto industry who knew more about cars and people than Mr. Nash. George Mason was a charismatic individual with vision and I think he clearly saw the future for independents and set about to change it. When he unexpectedly died, there was no one to fill the void and the merger of Packard, Hudson, Studebaker and Nash into American Motors fizzled out.

Had Packard not have had to stop automobile production in February 1942, I think the company was on course to prosper with its outstanding Clipper line. If Mason's merger had occurred around 1946, the companies involved might have been able to continue until at least the 1970s when everything went to hell in the car market. They would have had a fighting chance.

The trouble with trying to cobble together four struggling, cash hemoraghing companies into one blanket corporation to compete against a strong, rich corporation like GM was too much to expect.

One last thing: Henry Ford basically lost interest in advancing his automobiles after awhile, expecting unending success with the Model T. It was Edsel Ford who convinced his old man to buy Lincoln, which was the beginning of Ford's entrance into a multi-brand corporation. By 1926 the Model T was so dated that only complete losers were buying them. Chevrolet and other cars were leaving Ford in their dust. Once again Edsel came to the rescue and pushed throuigh the Model A, which was a good stop-gap measure until the company's V-8 came out.

Could you just imagine if Packard had brought out a V-8, automatic transmission, and torsion bar suspension, along with its factory air conditioning, in about 1948? It would have left Cadillac and Lincoln sputtering at the line.

I always thought it would have been interesting if Chrysler and Packard could have done a deal whereby Packard would step in as Chrysler's luxury brand instead of Chrysler trying to upgrade the Imperial to compete with Cadillac and Lincoln. Chrysler was also the only one intersted in Allison's torsion bar suspension system after Packard bit the dust in 1956 (for all practical intents and purposes). Imperial was introduced several times as a separate marque but never quite took hold.

Packard would have had a V-8 available upon merger and/or acquisition and the proximity would have been similar to that with Hudson. The other advantage would be that when Chrysler acquired Briggs in '54, the body business would not have shifted entirely to Packard and the Connor Ave plant would have been in-house.

Since we're wandering down the road of possibilities here, what does the group think about what would have been the result had Packard and Chrysler struck a deal in '54 rather than Packard's disasterious acquisition of Studebaker.

Chrysler had absolutely no reason to pursue that merger, whatsoever. Packard coud not have offered them anything that they did not have already, and in most cases, better.
The Imperial name/brand/model had been in place since the late 20s and was enjoying the fruits of the post-war boom economy, behind Cadillac and Lincoln. Chrysler products did not have the stigma of being "an old man's car" by the mid 50s, as Packard did. Especially after Virgil Exner's "million dollar look" 1955 bodies lowered their roofline considerably.
Chrysler had a great engine, were soon to have one of the strongest, best automatic transmissions ever developed (Torqueflite--mid 1956), chassis and until the end of the 1956 model production, body. They were financially healthy, had a growing and prosperous dealer network and were on their way to having their own finance arm (1961).
Packard had an extremely talented staff, a dedicated work force who knew how to do quality work when managment let them. Aside from that, Chrysler (or Ford) stood to gain nothing from acquiring the Packard name. As for keeping the same body for years at a time "like Rolls-Royce", that would have been suecide by 1955. General Motors was changing bodies almost every year, and in 1957, '58 and '59 did. That became the norm, and to the buying public was the sign of success and progress. To stay with the same old body shell year after year was already a problem for Packard going into 1954. GM almost closed the doors on Pontiac in '53-'54 because of the "old man's car" stigma--which was lethal in the mid-50s. Their V-8, coupled with a massive marketing campaign turned the tides on that decision. Having the Hydramatic trans and a dealer network that could cut prices from list, aided and abetted by GMAC sealed the deal. I love Packard, and I love the cars, all of them, but she was an aging unmarried woman who missed her chance by the mid 50s.

Agree that such a deal would have solved all the problems mentioned. Also agree that striking said deal would have been a challenge for all the reasons stated plus one: Packard would have almost certainly had to give up its independence and let Chrysler run the show. That was not something on the Board's or Nance's mind in 1954. But let's say it happened. The '57 Imperials may well have been Packards instead, with appropriate changes to the front appearance. Perhaps full torsion level would have been offered too. Most certainly Chrysler's '57 quality problems would have come as standard equipment. Ex would have likely dialed in both brilliance and bizarreness to the Packard line over the next 5 years, then Engel would have squared them up, then bloated them out in '69. Seems the history is fairly clear that Chrysler mgmt wasn't up to the task in those years.

Am starting to conclude that Packard might have been able to save itself in early 1956 after all. Not with the expensive "'57 Program" or a Lincoln body shell but with a careful clean-up of the design it already had. Same goes for Studebaker, which also needed to pull out of the tailspin in '57 for the company to survive. I keep going back to two historical facts, the first being what Gordon Buehrig said about good design being largely a matter of proportion and second, Packard selling lots of Seniors in '37 not because they had the most up to date stylig but becausee they were refined. To make a classic saleable luxury car in '57 for the old guard and some new, Packard may have only needed a few things: new front fenders, hood and traditional Packard or Predictor grill with hidden headlamps, a Predictor-style roof but rounded a bit more, and an uplifted and more squared decklid. For luxury car proportions they needed to use the long deck 400/Caribbean for the sedan and move the front axle out probably 7 inches for a new sedan wheelbase of 139 inches. Coupe would sit on 134 inch wheelbase. And the sedan's body insert between front and rear door had to go, instead trimming the coupe's front door to get a longer sedan door outer and working in frameless door windows all around. Meanwhile, Studebaker needed to ditch the tall bodies and make a 4 dr hardtop based on the Hawk and do some other clean-up but leave the front fenders, hood and grill alone. No Clipper, sell loaded Studebakers instead. Hope to survive '57 and '58 then do something big for '59.
Just a thought.

Mr. Pushbutton: You summed up everything perfectly, in my opinion. While Packard in 1955 built what might have been the most innovative cars of any U.S. manufacturer, the body was still basically that of the 1951-54 series with modifications and the public knew it. While everyone seems to like the looks of my '55 Constellation, it was only modestly popular when it came out. It certainly couldn't expect to compete with the new Cadillac Coupe de Ville or the Chrysler 300.

I am sure that the idea of bringing out entirely new bodies almost every year led to the concept of "planned obsolescence," if you look closely, most of the cars produced were not actually "new." The Cadillacs did not change the body style that much from about 1955 to 1958. Neither did Chevrolet and Buick in the same period. The Thunderbird was only slightly altered from 1955 through 1957, and again from 1958 to 1960. Even for the Big 3, changing body styles was more of a chimera than a reality.

That said, I still have to hand it to Packard, Hudson, Studebaker and Nash. While Packard suffered with its 1948-50 line, it did recover with a nice design in 1951. The "Step-down" Hudsons were remarkable cars winning race after race in NASCAR. Studebakers were the most recognizable cars of the early 1950s and I loved their Golden Hawks and Avantis. Nash made good, reliable, albeit rather plain cars, but stuck around a long time.

We should remember that even today cars start up while others bow out. Teslas, Minis, Smart Cars, etc. have appeared while Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Mercury, Saab, and Saturn disappeared. That is the way things are: Survival of the fitest.

Actually Ford bought Lincoln as revenge against Henry Leyland who replaced him at the Ford Company after he was thrown out. That company became Cadillac Motors. Edsel used Lincoln as a refuge.

I agree that the only way Packard could continue would be through merger. However, corporations take on their own culture due to human vanity which would have made for a difficult success. Considering the chrome carnival wagons of the late 1950's maybe it was better that Packard ceased production. Studebaker-Packard never went bankrupt and never screwed their debtholders like Ford, GM, and Chrysler have. Studebaker-Worthington did very well.

The older I get the more I like the postwar Packard cars. Even the maligned 22nd series was not considered ugly and actually sold well. Even Tom McCahill thought they were good looking. In some respects I think they are an improvement over the Clipper.

During the 50's Ford and GM were forcing inventory on dealers and there was no way Packard could compete against that.

Tim:

I hate to disagree with you, but by 1920, Lincoln was bankrupt and on the brink of receivership. Henry Ford may have held a grudge for what happened in 1903, but I kind of doubt it. Ford was immensely rich and the time and Henry Leyland was broke. Edsel Ford was smart enough to see the advantage for the Ford Motor Co. to have a high-end product such as Lincoln to compete against GM's Cadillac, Pierce-Arrow, and, of course, Packard. Henry Ford saw the opportunity to buy a good brand on the cheap.

I loved your comment about the "chrome carnival wagons" of the late 1950s. In that light, I remember reading somewhere that the 1958 Buick Century was the "Brontosaurus of the Chrome Age"!

The one event that signaled who would survive going into the future was the industry-wide adaption of the all-steel body in the late 30s. The tooling and facilities and staff needed to produce these bodies was immense, just the tooling and equipment alone. Prior to that car companies had a lot of money tied up in chassis/engine/transmission but the body building was a 19th century job shop, more labor than equipment. The costs of producing the all-steel body shook out whose pockets were deep enough, and who could spread that costs out more over multiple makes and models, like the big 3 did.

About the Lincoln. Henry Ford was an extremely vindictive individual bordering on insane. He treated Edsel like crap because he apparently wanted him to rise up and give Henry a reason to throw Edsel on the street. Instead Edsel kept a stiff upper lip which drove his father nuts. Henry even called up his henchmen and gave them orders to "go rough up Edsel a bit".

When he bought Lincoln he staged a publicity photo intended to publicly humiliate Henry Leyland. He then emptied the factory in front of Leyland and let it sit empty saying only "I have a definite reason for buying the Lincoln plant." After Leyland quit operation resumed.

I'll give Henry Ford credit for pushing the Model T, which was the best all around car on the road when it came out, and the V-8 which was a complete triumph.

Despite being engineered by "the great" Henry Leyland the Lincoln was a failure on the road and really not even as good the Model T. So it made no financial sense to buy company. Especially when there were so many other quality brands available.

Somewhere around here I have an interview with one of the engineers at Lincoln and he said the car was no darn good.

I wouldn't trade places with Henry Ford or Edsel in exchange for their riches because sanity is more important.