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Very interesting discussion about Lincoln, never knew the back story. Now the brand is once again circling the drain. Hard to watch, no reason for it.

Was thinking about 1958. Some over-chromed cars for sure, also some wonderful designs. Chevy, Caddy Sedan DeVille and Eldorado, T-Bird, Chrysler, Ford and others.

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I agree with this completely. Packard couldn't afford an "all-new" '57, and note that GM didn't bother to do anything with the '56 Chevy in '57 except to gussy it up. "Black Bess" had it come to fruition would have been a last gasp. Also, Packard needed to spend some of the R&D money on better marketing, to dealers and the public, to sell the technology and style they already had.

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Henry held his bitter grudges to the very end. There was no Lincoln hearse available for his funeral, and there was no way the family could let Henry be carted to his final rest in a Cadillac... he went in a Packard.

While I think that it is interesting to speculate about whether or not the Predictor or Panther could have saved Packard, the fact is that by 1956 the company was literally broke. Packard did not have the money for R&D, a decent advertising campaign, or much of anything else. The time for a good advertising campaign should long have preceded the "Let the Ride Decide" slogan. By that time dealers were shuttering the doors and the public moving on down the street to look at the Cadillacs and Buicks. Nance himself complained bitterly in 1954 that Packard's print ads and television/radio ads were lousy and unattractive. Compare ads for Cadillacs in 1955 vs. Packards and you'll see what I mean.

There is also the public perception that when a business is on the verge of going under buyers stay away in droves. An example: Ever walk into a store that is in its final days before closing its doors forever? When I have, I have felt uncomfortable walking down barren aisles depleted of merchandise. I almost feel like I am an invader. Despite the "bargains" to be had, I almost feel like I am taking advantage of someone who is suffering and I can't wait to get out of there. This might have been similar to how the public felt about Packard, despite knowing the quality was excellent.

One thing about the 50's is that was a time when people were being scared into conformity. Joe McCarthy, Nixon, Jay Hoover, etal were all pushing domestic terror for political gain. Not that the USSR was any good, but from a marketing standpoint that kind of poilitcal atmosphere could only help push comfort brands like Chevrolet and Ford.

The investors needed to see a viable plan that cost much less than the $50M Nance wanted. The pitch needed to include full-scale work-ups of the modified Packards and Studebakers, break-even financials at conservatively low volumes and a marketing plan that cut to the chase: Packard would only make a top notch luxury car, Studebaker only a top notch small car. Operatons would have been bare bones in '57 and '58, lots of folks layed off, showroom line-ups cut way back. The key would have been to make those mock-ups stun the investors... "We can't believe you can produce that big an effect for that little money! We'll give you the loan. Prove that you can execute over the next year then we'll talk about 1959."

Maybe Nance should have kept Loewy rather than shelling out $1M to get rid of him. He was the only designer in Packard's world that seemed to understand proportion.

Mahoning63:

Offering top-notch cars is the goal of most auto manufacturers, so the idea of Packard building top-notch luxury cars and Studebaker building top-notch small cars is fine; but no matter what the quality, the writing was on the wall. 1955 was a fantastic year in cars sales overall. Chevrolet and Ford sold 1,704,667 and 1,451,157 units, respectively. Overall, in terms of corporations, General Motors sold 3,721,527; Ford, 1,808,187; Chrysler, 1,262,444; Studebaker-Packard, 171,580; Nash-Hudson-Metropolitan, 147,787.

Individually, Cadillac sold 140,777 cars, while Studebaker sold 116,333; DeSoto (part of Chrysler), 115,485; Nash, 96,156; Packard, 55,247; Hudson, 45,535. Lincoln sold only 27,222 and Imperial sold about 12,000. Here is the BIG difference: Even though as brands Lincoln and Imperial numbers were abysmal, they were divisions of solid, high-volume corporations that could easily absorb the losses. Those of you who thought a Packard-Hudson partnership would have worked out better, consider that that combination would have sold only 100,782 units. Even more distressing would be the fact that Packard, not Hudson, would have been the higher-volume producer!

What these figures don't show is the actual break-even points. While Packard was still profitable in 1954, Studebaker had told Packard reps that its break-even point was 165,000 per annum, when in reality it was 265,000. In 1956, Nash sold 83,420 cars, while Studebaker's numbers fell by more than half to 69,593. Hudson ended the year selling only 22,538 cars and Packard pulled the plug at 10,353 cars in June.

Raymond Loewy/Studebaker may have hit the ball out of the park with the 1950 bullet-nose models, Studebaker was a mere shadow of its prime by 1955. Packard simply did not have the money to bring out high-end new models in 1956. By that time the company was near bankruptcy and was acquired by Curtis-Wright, which decided that Studebaker, with its higher volume, would continue, while Packard was through. Even then, the Packard badge continued on Studebakers until 1958, the same year Hudson went under.

Automobile manufacturing is an expensive, high-risk business these days as well as in the 1950s. To produce a high volume of cars to make a large profit demands very deep pockets up front. By 1950 the battle lines had been drawn and those not attached to the big boys -- GM, Ford and Chrysler -- would have a very tough road ahead. Brands like Kaiser, Willys (the cars, not Jeeps), Hudson, and Packard would not make it to 1960; while others such as Nash would morph into American Motors. Kaiser would continue into the 1960s, but only at Jeep, which was later acquired by AMC. Ford's Edsel had a three-year run. DeSoto survived until 1960 when Chrysler pulled its plug. Studebaker car production ended in 1966. Since 1966 companies have appeared and disappeared, such as DeLorean, Bricklin, Excalibur, Zimmer, and a few others whose names I forget.

Several years ago I read that for a car company to take a car model from concept to production costs about $1 billion. I suppose after adjusting for 1950s currency values, that figure would probably have been less than it is today due to regulations, safety, emissions, etc.; the reality of very high costs remain.

To name a few more disappeared nameplates:

Plymouth, Olds, Pontiac, Mercury, Saturn, MG, Triumph, Saab, Austin, Simca, ...

Loewy was too much of a prima donna. If he was that good he would have been hired away the same way as Bill Walker.

Thanks for pulling those numbers together MrB and great points. It should be said that breakeven is not a static number unless the CEO is flat on his rear. Studebaker's came down after labor costs were reduced. For a recent example of just how much money there is to be lost or made in the auto industry, look at Ford. In 2006 it lost billions, 5 years later in the middle of a recession with fewer sales and static market share it made billions. How? Because mgmt got rid of 50% of the salaried and hourly workforce, sold brands, reduced platforms, vacated dozens of buildings and made those who remained work more hours.

Do I think Packard could have reduced its 1957 breakeven to 25,000 units? Maybe, maybe not. I wouldn't rule it out. Nor would I rule out an 80,000 breakeven for Studebaker. You get to these low numbers by trimming everywhere and selling cars that command good pricing. Ford makes money mostly off its trucks. Packard would have made good money off its luxury models. Share of those vs. rest of Packard line were inching up in mid-50s.

Most of the brands that went away through the years didn't have to, the market could have supported them. They went under because of poor mgmt.

Hudson as volume producer over Packard is exactly the strategy that was needed. Hudson would have taken on the role of the 1920s Packard Six while Packard would have been the Eight. Not in cylinder count but in market coverage.

Boy that sure is a good point about the floating break even point.

Who's to say whether the numbers bandied about as to Studebaker's condition was the proposed result after restructuring?

I used to deal with that stuff all the time. Some high priced consultant comes in and gets paid a bundle for crazy numbers that are supposed to be attainable. 90% percent of the time they aren't.

Studebaker though was really a problem. For example, everybody wanted the Bourke coupe in 53 but they couldn't deliver production. The Avanti was the same story. I think the 56 President was a great looking car, but I would never buy one because of the way they rusted out. And from what I understand that problem resulted from Studebaker storing untreated stampings virtually outside in rain soaked sheds.

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Agreed that Packard had little money for major R&D, but the point I was trying to make was that R&D seemed to be going on full-blast on the new '57 model, with all new chassis and even a second generation torsion level suspension. These were major engineering investments that needed to be amortized over many years-- years that Packard didn't have partly because they were feverishly intent upon a brand new '57, which wouldn't have made much difference in the public mind anyway, IMO.

What would have made a difference was better, but not necessarily more expensive, advertising and marketing. Nance was absolutely on the mark about the lackluster advertising, and I believe Packard changed ad agencies in the midst of all this, but obviously the marketing department in charge of selecting agencies and getting the best work out of them was not hitting on all cylinders. It really is the job of the Big Boss to raise hell with the marketing end of corporate management, and evidently Nance did not raise an effective amount of hell, or maybe did it too late.

The first objective of marketing was probably not to be found in consumer advertising, which had a minimal budget compared to the big 3, and could not possibly cover all the media costs that it needed to in order to sway the minds of the general public. The first objective of marketing, IMO, should have been to reach and serve the dealers. That's where the flagging confidence in Packard was hurting the most in actual sales, I think, and providing more dealer contact, good point of purchase sales tools and perks could have gained more orders and more showroom space at multiple brand dealerships.

The sour experience of walking into a failing store was mentioned, and is a very good point. However, Packard was sold with other makes so showrooms might not have had to be a downer for customers. Packard needed to give dealers more incentives to point shoppers toward these cars, which had remarkable, demonstrable features, particularly the load leveling, and striking looks that set them apart. Sales will follow when dealers are provided with product and promotional items that make it easier for them to sell.

Of course, delivery problems in '56, following close on the quality problems in '55, which had required dealers to do a lot of tweaking just to get the cars out the door, had both shaken confidence. Packard had to provide ample evidence that they had product for '57-- which in no way could be assured for an all-new '57 model, IMO.

The only way I can see that Packard could have, in good faith, assured dealers (and investors) of an adequate volume of '57 cars was if they produced a re-worked '55-'56 model. Packard did not have the money or the time for the tooling and modification of the assembly line that would obviously have been needed to move to production of a "Black Bess" based car. In fact, I'm beginning to think think that "Black Bess" herself was perhaps one of the biggest pipe-dreams and boondoggles of Packard's last days. A failed marketing campaign herself, she was so unbeloved that her prototype was cut up for scrap.

Just thinkin'