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Perhaps many of you already know this, but the early 30s Nash models 490, 990, 1090, 1190, 1290 etc. are recognized by CCCA as Full Classics, and very deserving. It's rare to get a chance to actually see one; if you have the opportunity to do so look at it closely, they are just magnificent cars.

I've been told that the 4.0 liter OHV 6 that Jeep used for so many years in the Cherokee evolved from an older Nash engine. I don't know if that's true, but it surely was one fine engine.

EDIT: That big Nash Eight used in the Full Classic series was 3-3/8 bore x 4-1/2 stroke for 322 cubic inches, and 9 main bearings.

If the merger would have gone through combining Hudson, Packard and Nash, this would have been the pecking order of the leadership.

1. Mason President and Chairman of the Board
2. Romney as Executive Vice President
3. Nance as Vice president and Manager of the Packard
Division.
4. Abraham from Hudson would have had a seat on the new
Board of Directors.

Studebaker was never considered part of the equation in the merger talks that took place between the three auto firms.

The reason the merger failed to take place is because Nance wasn't going to place second fiddle to either Mason or Romney. Nance upon learning that he wouldn't be head of the new company, convinced Packard's Board to back out of the deal.

John F. Shireman

Owen: When I start a new thread I realy don't care in which direction that it goes. Everyone including you always seems to come up with some interesting information.


John F. Shireman

John, do you happen to recall what the source was for the executive hierarchy of the three-way merged firm? I thought that Nance had maintained in his interviews that Studebaker was always part of the master merger plan, because otherwise he never would have had anything to do with Studebaker.

When you mention Abraham from Hudson in the list, I assume you're referring to A. E. Barit (i.e. Abraham Edward Barit)?

I wonder if Packard could have made a business case for a body change for 1957 without sharing some of the cost with the Studebaker line? I guess that would be a question for the Forum thread "Had They NOT Merged!"

Kevin

The source on what the the hierarchy would have Benn in the three way merger came from an article in the October edition of Automobile Collectible.

The articles under personality Profile by Patrick Foster. The article feature was about John Conde. Conde was employed by AMC for over 30 years and reited as assistant director of of public relations. In the article Conde recounts the happening of a possible merger between the three.

If you would like a copy of the article please send me a pm.

From three different sources that I have in my library. I can safely say that Nance is the one responsible for any type of merger not going through with Nash and Hudson. From these same reference sources in all three no mention is made of Studebaker as being consider as being part of the merger.

John F. Shireman

"From these same reference sources in all three no mention is made of Studebaker as being consider as being part of the merger."


The key statement being "from those reference sources".


while the "official" word is one thing the behinds the closed doors converstions may have been different.

Also I don't have in front of me, the exact issue, but I would love to read the interview that the PAC editor had with Jim Nance just before Nance died in the 80's. I have been told that was mention of the whole merger idea in that article. Of course this is from 1 side of the coin only since there seems to be very little from Mason and/or Romney on the subject. I would like to think that they are both in the same place in the afterlife still discussing the merger and what might have been.

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the following is from a Wikipedia article on George W. Mason.



Mason eventually banded together Nash and the Hudson Motor Car Company to benefit from the varieties of strength that each brought to the table. While formal and informal merger talks were held between Nash and the various independents, the only merger that Mason actually entered into was with the aforementioned Hudson, which occurred in the early months of 1954 to form American Motors Corporation (AMC). Similar mergers between Willys and Kaiser, Studebaker and Packard also happened between 1953 and 1954.

Within months of the closure of the deal, George Mason died at age 63 of acute pancreatitis and pneumonia in Detroit, Michigan. Mason's prot?g?, AMC Vice President George W. Romney, succeeded Mason as Chairman and CEO. One of Romney's first acts was to stop rumors that there were additional merger talks between AMC and Studebaker-Packard Corporation or any automakers. According to Mason's obituary in Time Magazine, had AMC and Studebaker-Packard joined, it would have resulted in the second largest automaker in the world, behind General Motors.
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As AL correctly points out it's only one opinion, but to pursue this further perhaps it would be best to go back and re-read the Nance Papers and interviews, one of which was specific to the merger. For those who don't have an index handy, they are found in volumes 27, 29, 31, 33, 42, 43 and 45 of The Packard Cormorant.

AL: If you re-read one of my prior post I already named one of the reference sources that I obtained my information from. Like I stated before anyone wishing a copy of the article I will gladly mail a copy of it to them. When I say that I have three different reference sources to confirm what I have printed I don't joke around on such matters.

My reference sources that I have aren't PAC publications
or an online source such as Wikipedia. The information that I base my facts are from publications and books that I have purchased over the last thirty years. One of the other sources I got my information from was a Car & Parts Magazine that had the history of Nash published in it from some 25 years ago.

I have also read what Nance put forth about a possible merger between the four parties. Which I used to believe in very highly. Now however I say that since Nance learned in early 1954 that he wasn't going to be running things under a merger of any type, Nance's side of the story to put it bluntly was that he was NOT TELLING THE TRUTH.

John F. Shireman

Hi

The Collectible Automobile article "Personal Profile of John Conde" explained in detail the meager of Nash with Packard, shortly including Hudson. After considering the results, the following is my email letter to Editor Biel.

RE: "Planning a Merger: The Packard-Nash Connection"

Dear Editor Biel

This sidebar was the first time I've read the details of a merger that has been mentioned by other sources. The complete Personality Profile is a fine piece with his insider insights.

As one of those who analyzes possible scenarios for ways that Packard could have survived, this option did not hold long term promise. The detailed descriptions of the Clippers/Statesmans and Patrician/Ambassadors can be seen as simply Packard models substituted for the Wasp/Statesman and Hornet/Ambassadors the market received in '55-'57. A good indication of the resulting market acceptance of the Nash-bodies Packards can be seen in Hudson sales for it's last three years.

The shortness of time throughout '54 would preclude creating appropriate-sized '55 cars with Packard specific styling. The idea of a 114" wheelbased Nash-bodied Clipper powered with a Ambassador SIX is more cuddling than what came later from South Bend. As for the Patrician, does one built on an Ambassador 121" wheelbase with Packard V-8 engine and transmission, but without the innovation of Torsion-Level suspension sound like a formula for a Packard to truly compete in the luxury market? I shutter to think of the '56-'57 Packard styling if it had been completed with the aesthetics of the '56-'57 Hudsons!

The only real salvation for Packard was the financing to build the all-new cars they had designed and engineered for 1957; built in their own Detriot facilities. Details of the program point to a product line as revolutionary as the '57 Chrysler Forward Look cars. Finally, both Packard and Studebaker would have been able to market cars that were truly competitive with the Big Three. When the financing was turned down, that was the signing of Packard's death certificate immediately. And ultimately for Studebaker, as they were condemned to rework poorly accepted cars repeatedly in an effort to compete.

Steve

The evidence is strong that Nance scuttled the Nash-Packard merger when he found he would not be in charge. One source quoted Nance as saying, "Mason will come back to the table, he hasn't anywhere else to go." Apparently the Nash-Hudson merger took him by surprise. I think that Mason realized that Studebaker was the "sick puppy" among the independents and I doubt he ever wanted them included. Studebaker had an obsolete factory, spoiled workforce and a very unfavorable contract with the UAW, not to mention a somewhat out of touch management. I have never understood why Nance went to an outside consulting firm to survey Studebaker. I cannot believe that a team of Packard engineers and cost accountants would not have recognized Studebaker's fatal weaknesses very quickly. I have always thought that Studebaker bribed the consulting firm to produce such a glowing report. Packard probably could not have survived over the long term without some form of merger, but tying themselves to an anchor like Studebaker (who built some great cars) was fatal.