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I'm no expert when it comes to Packard history. However, it sounds to me like Ferry was a man of vision, but felt - perhaps rightfully - that he didn't have the necessary resources - internally or externally - to turn his vision into reality - except through someone like Nance. Things like the V8 and T-L didn't become a reality until a few years into the Nance era.

The merger with Studebaker is a bitter sweet pill. It took prospects of that merger to keep financing coming to continue production and R&D. Seems like it took the prospect of being able to achieve some economies of scale with Studebaker through shared parts to achieve the required projected break-even to move projects like the V8 forward. I'm sure that Nance spent a bundle on the 55th-56th Series, as a stopgap until the proposed 57/58 line was ready, but he banked on financial figures provided by Studebaker, which later proved to be less-than-accurate. I don't know enough about Ferry to say that he could have avoided that mess. I blame the accountants charged with that.

Yet, I feel the move to Conner Ave. was inevitable. Had the merger with Nash taken place, was there an AM facility in close proximity to take on all the work previously done by Briggs? Has anyone ever analyzed the square footage required for all the stamping and fabrication equipment and the teardown, transportation and set-up costs to determine if it was better to move it all to East Grand? I suspect that relocating the vehicle assembly line to Conner seemed more cost effective at the time. Blame the industrial engineers, as well as the accountants charged with that.

As evidenced by the ads and brochures of the time, Packard was doing a nice job of advertising, but a greater problem was development of its distributor-dealer network. Then, while many of the basic concepts of service marketing and customer satisfaction that the industry promotes today were being used by Packard 60+ year ago, Packard seemed to be falling behind in both quantity and quality of individudal retail stores - in spite of those afforded by the merger with Studebaker. I'm not saying there weren't any good Packard dealers, just not enough of them and in all the right places and at the right level of expertise. Not sure who to blame for that.

Still, I would agree things might have faired much better with Ferry and Nance managing in concert.

Brian, you brought up some good points.

As to the Connor move lots of back seat quarterbacking but IIRC, One of the Packard books ( maybe Kimes) mentioned ongoing thinking and insistence by some of Nance's people that multistory plants were inefficient and old fashioned-- hence one of the big pushes for the move. Maybe that's what they mean by cost effective. Guess it does cost money and time for elevators to continue an assy line between floors. Whether that is true or not I sure couldn't say but since they did build cars at Grand successfully lots of years, seems like it could still have been done. Have often wondered why they just didn't buy Connor or another plant and start their own body line and truck them across town. Believe it was that same book that mentioned the Conner move cost 29 million and co-incidentally that was also the amount Packard lost that year.

There was also a mention that AMC didn't keep their promise to buy certain components in quantity after Packard had geared up to produce them. Believe it said there were no contracts-just gentlemens agreements as was the Packard fashion so Romney only bought as a matter of convenience until the minute his own product was in production. Maybe that's true--the prices quoted seems that Packard was a bit high but again wasn't there, but might have been an interesting side question for those that were.

Yes, one-story plants were the next great thing in manufacturing.

The GM assembly plant built in rural Lordstown, OH and opened in 1966 was primarily one-story - paint dept. was rightfully isolated on a second floor. I also toured Chrysler's Pillette Road Truck Plant in Windsor, Ontario about 20 years ago (built in 1974, IIRC), when they assembled the old B-body vans -again, primarily one-story, but for the paint dept. on a second floor.

I also had the privilege of touring a Chrysler stamping plant in Twinsburg, OH. The presses were huge and deafening - the kind of equipment that could only be on the first floor (and it better be a strong one). Also, undertand that a single panel is produced through a series of dies over the course of several presses.

I can't say about the size/weight of the metal forming and trimming dies, but when I worked at Avanti in Youngstown, OH we received the original fiberglass panel tooling from MFG in Ashtabula - later sold to a collector in MI. Those panels were formed by laying glass mat between one set of two mated dies, then injecting the resin through the sandwiched mat; know that cranes had to be rented to load/unload all but the smallest of dies.

Imagine what it would take to relocate all the tooling and equipment for sheetmetal stamping and fabrication.

In contrast, it takes a lot less 3-D space for vehicle assembly, and I wonder if some problems were beginning to crop up with the East Grand infrastructure. Leasing was probably a lot cheaper than buying any existing facility. Seems like Chrysler forced Packard's hand on leasing the Briggs plant.

I can see how one year's loss equalling the cost of the move might cast a shadow on the Conner decision, but we have to be careful not to confuse correlation with cause-and-effect.

I think there's more to decision behind the Conner move than what may have been written.

Under Ferry Packard got into the defense contracting business. Ferry did that to try and secure Packards future but the gamble never really paid off.

This to me is one thing that is often over looked in the 50's about Packard. Packard tried to be a defense contractor and builder of autos at the same time. She neither had the money or resources to do both and make enough profit to support both ventures. That is part of the reason Packard is no longer in business.


John F. Shireman

You can read about the profit/loss of the marine and industrial engine and defense businesses in the annual stockholder reports, and if I remember right, Bob Neal's book on the mnarine engine business also gives some of that information. Can't say I've ever had the occasion or interest to delve into it.

Wasn't part of the reason Packard lost money on defense contracts was they had been awarded contracts, spent to acquire or equip facilities to produce them and then had some or all of them canceled or not renewed because the politicians of the day desired to have them placed with "preferred" providers. Seem to remember reading that had happened in 54 or 55 and most of Packards contracts were canceled and mostly re-awarded to GM because Sec of Defense wanted to consolidate suppliers.

My report Card:
George Christopher D
Hugh Ferry B
James Nance A- (except for Connor Avenue call) with Connor Avenue call: B-, this mistake was the knife in the heart for Packard.....

The 1955 quality problems were the final blow... The 56's were much improved but it was too late

the 51-54's were darn fine cars

the 48's through 50- well engineered but styling issues, however they are so ugly they are NOW beautiful

just my opinions only

also, the Ike administation was NOT very Packard friendly, they had some insiders with deep GM ties...... this was the cause of much loss of defense work, remember what car Ike road in the the 1953 Inaguration, It was not a Caribbean, however a std. convertible followed closley as a camera car

mostly re-awarded to GM because Sec of Defense wanted to consolidate suppliers.

HH56, let's not ignore that the Sec. of Defense, Charlie Wilson, was an ex-GM senior exec. Nowadays such an award of contracts wouldn't be permitted.

Caribbeandude, I think your grading to George Christopher is too kind.

by the way all, great forum topic!!! thanks for posting all opinions on this!!!!