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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Just can't stay away
 
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True, but, you can buy a 1956 400 and buy from the parts counter a Caribbean hood, quad carb set up, trim, nameplates, etc. bolt them on and have a car that is very little different from a Caribbean hardtop for a lot less money. In fact many dealerships did just that. There is no way you can go to the parts counter at Lincoln and come up with a Mark II.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 20:57
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Home away from home
 
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A couple of observations. While Packard relied on the pre-war Clipper styling until 1948, Buick kept their same basic body design from 1942-48. Also, Buick had a straight eight (albeit with overhead valves)until 1954. I don't think the Dynaflow auto trans came out until '49.
Lincoln styling was pretty much the same from 1940-48. It being powered by the anemic V12 they had since the 30's. Packard's coffers should have been pretty full after the war from lucrative government contracts. They had $33 million in cash in 1945. What did they do with that money from a development standpoint? What about marketing? According to the Kimes book they spent a lot of money winding down war production, reconverting East Grand Blvd and resurfacing the test track. George Christopher also scaled up for 200,000 unit production but 1946 production was only 42,102. Material shortages and labor unrest surely had a lot to do with this but the result was the company posted an operating loss in '46 and '47. Still there should have been some cash left over. It seems to me senior management really didn't know who their customer was. The old monied "400" of years past were gone. The company needed to create some sizzle with marketing and advertising to the middle and upper middle class. While the 22nd and 23rd series design was controversial, it won awards and earned the company $15 million in 1948. I think they could have used this momentum to create some real excitement over new innovations (V8, automatic transmission, leading edge design)for 1951. However the marketing and styling for 1951 are a bit underwhelming IMHO. Bottomline - I think they were trying to be all things to all people and did not focus on a target market. Consequently pleasing no one.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 21:12
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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The fact of the matter is that any profits Packard made from defense work during WWII were limited to 2%. On that 2% profit they still had to pay taxes
John F. Shireman
Posted on: 2010/2/16 21:25
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REMEMBERING BRAD BERRY MY PACKARD TEACHER
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Just can't stay away
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This is not true. Lincoln and Cadillac did offer cheaper cars prewar. However, they did not move down in price to Buicks range as Packard did postwar. Chrysler is a different story. For 25 years it was the Chrysler Imperial. Then all of the sudden, it was Imperial as a seperate division, meant to compete with Cadillac and Lincoln. You can sell an expensive nameplate on a cheaper model, and people will rush to get that prestigious name at a lower price. But then eventually, it will lose the prestige if lower price offerings keep getting sold under that name (this is what happened with Packard). It is much more difficult to convince people to pay more for a car with a less prestigious name. So even though Chrysler dropped the Chrysler name from the Imperial in 1955, after 25 years, people still thought of it as a Chrysler, and were not going to pay more for a Chrysler than for a Cadillac or Lincoln. With Packard, the lower end cars sold very well postwar. But it was hard to convince someone to pay over $1000 more for a senior car which had different tailights, slightly different grill, and very little else to distinguish it as a senior Packard to the casual observer. As far as offering the same as their competitors, well they really didn't. A couple I know has a 1953 Clipper. Manual steering, manual brakes, manual seats, crank windows, str8 instead of V-8. Your average Buick would be better optioned than this. In looking for a 1956 400, I thought that that most would have full power being comparably priced to a Cadillac. Only about half have power windows and seats, and a very rare few have a/c.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 21:35
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Forum Ambassador
 
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I will never understand why the 1957 Packardbakers were ever made. I hear they were made to keep the name alive while Packard hoped to get financing to eventually get new Packards built. I seem to recall reading articles that in addition to the above reason, there was also a contractual problem with many dealers. Packard would have had to completely buy them out if there was not a Packard product to sell prior to their contract expiring or being relinquished. Guess they couldn't pull a GM or Chrysler for some reason and just tell the dealers to send back the tools and close. I also seem to remember an author mentioning that there was talk and even a halfhearted attempt of trying another facelift on the 56 very early on. That went nowhere since the decision had been made that production would move to South Bend. Conclusion was there would be no way the large chassis could be accommodated by the small width Studebaker production line without a total tearout and rebuild.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 21:35
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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A statistic I've always found fascinating is that between 1917 and 1956, 39.2% of Packard's gross sales were from non-automotive businesses. Quite astounding, really. Source: Robert Neal's book on Packard's non-automotive engine businesses. Details are both in that book, and in a related article by Bob in The Packard Cormorant, #89, Winter 1997/1998.
Apologies for going off-topic.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 21:37
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Home away from home
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"... I think they were trying to be all things to all people and did not focus on a target market."
I think this is a very important statement that needs to be considered in the Packard story, as well as the other independents. If Packard would have merged with, Studebaker, Hudson, & Nash immediately postwar, when all were stronger, the whole thing would have played out differently. GM had its products in strict hierarchy that started with Chevy on the bottom Caddy on top. This diversity across the entire market kept the company as a whole strong. Packard and the other independents didn't have this ability. So Packard tried to be up-market and middle-market at the same time, and by doing so diluted their prestige. With a strong postwar merger Packard could focus on their target luxury market, Studebaker could fight Chevy, Nash Vs. Olds, etc.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 22:06
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Home away from home
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" ...sales were from non-automotive businesses..."
I'm not sure what the means. Does that mean businesses SOLD Packards TO customers from places like hardware stores, Sears and Roebuck, Kresge, A&P Western Auto or or other such "non-automotive businesses" ??? Give an example???
Posted on: 2010/2/16 22:23
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VAPOR LOCK demystified: See paragraph SEVEN of PMCC documentaion as listed in post #11 of the following thread:f
packardinfo.com/xoops/html/modules/newbb/viewtopic.php?topic_id=7245 |
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Re: 2nd Round: How the Luxury Market Dominance was Lost
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Just can't stay away
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Actually the best merger would have been Nash and Packard, Both were financially healthy immediately after the war, whereas Studebaker and Hudson were not. Merging with Studebaker and Hudson just dragged Packard and Nash down. However I understand the presidents of Nash and Packard hated each other, making a merger impossible. Packard probably would have been better off forgetting about Studebaker and producing their own line of less expensive Clippers and significantly different from the Clippers senior Packards.
Posted on: 2010/2/16 22:30
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