Packard Forum Index » V-8 (1955-56)

As I was driving my 56 Patrician I thought, over the lifter clatter, that these cars represented some of the most innovative Packards ever made. I believe they rank right up there with the classics of the 30 and 40s.If they had been one of "the big three",they would still be around today.I know this sounds like sacrilege.Any Thoughts?

I don't disagree at all but I often think about the times. Often wonder if Packard perhaps was a bit too innovative for their customer base.

Aside from the teething problems, then financial problems which didn't help and were reported ad-nauseum by various publications of the day scaring buyers into second thoughts, as is happening today, the look just wasn't conservative Packard.

My father had driven them for lots of years, but one I remember in particular was a 56 he brought home on approval. I was in lust, he was for it even though a new one would have been a stretch at the time, but when mom saw it, she had a fit. Aside from the cost, it was too "flashy" and everyone would be staring at her.

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Yep! That was a very accurate description on 1956 model cars. Packard was right there in the "flashiest" of them all!
Three-tone paint schemes?
Don't you wish you had it now?

DanL

Sitting in Forum member Russpackaus's '56 400 today with it's electric seat, electric windows, pushbutton and torsion level, to mention a few features really impressed me for a 50 year old car.

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None of the teething problems for the 55th and 56th Series were anything more serious than other manufacturers dealt with in new models except, perhaps, the oiling problem but then one could look at the early big-block 396 and find similar faults, fairly quickly dealt with. Packard hadn't the money/time left to deal with them.

It is regrettable that PMCC saw fit to sit on their laurels in the years directly following the war and spend their vast cash reserves on endeavours other than R&D and quality control while concentrating upon competing with down-market models of their competitors. Had they done just a few things differently they might have survived up to a point at which a favourable merger/acquisition with a more suitable partner would've been possible. I think that Christopher was so focused on the conditions prevailing in 1935 when he initiated the junior cars that he failed to accurately assess the immediate postwar market. I don't believe that the junior cars killed Packard, per se, but rather that they failed to promote their excellent up-market product. Pre-war, they sold the junior cars on the reputation of the senior ones, even though there were far fewer of them built and actually sold. Post-war, they hardly mentioned the Supers and Customs while concentrating all of their marketing efforts on the lower priced cars. Too, by the time management began to see the light, the product was too outdated and they didn't have the money (buys time) to turn it around.

As far as the 55th and 56th Series styling was concerned, a great many long-time Packard customers saw them as gaudy and over decorated.

I do agree however that, had they had the money to buy the time to offset the bad rep that the constant publication of their problems had generated and managed to stay in business long enough for the positive aspects of the engineering of the cars to become well-known and some of the minor glitches to be forgotten, they'd be regarded today in a much more favourable light. There was no more wrong with them than with most first production efforts at new technology. I suspect that, had they gotten the V8 off the drawing board and into testing soon enough to discover that it needed the oiling system tweaked, a real oil pump, adjustable rocker arms and strengthened crankshaft support, the engine would still be in use, in some form, today.

IMHO 2 things did in PMCC, at the end...

1. That dreadful merger with Studebaker. I realize each company was desperately SEEKING a merger at the time, but if Packard had stayed away, they would have had more $$ to fix ongoing issues.

2. They were trying to be all things to all people (see point #1). Had Packard gone back to (as Nance initially wanted, from what I've read) producing high-end luxury automobiles, they might have stuck it out. But they couldn't compete with the Big 3 re model changes and offerings(and neither could any of the other independents).


Personally, I think the 55'-56' style is CONSERVATIVE, and the design holds up better than Cadillacs and Lincolns for those years. Nor do I think they were too innovative (after all, Chrysler adopted both torsion-bar suspension and PB transmissions!).

The merger with Studebaker must looked at in the light of not only what happened after, but what happened before and what did not happen before. If you remember Nance of Packard and Mason of Nash, were on a path to make AMC a 5 member corporation. Nance merging Studebaker/Packard and Mason merging Nash/Hudson/Rambler. Then the two mergered firms merging together to form American Motors. Had that happened they all may have staved off the end. But Mason died and George Romney wanted no part of playing second fiddle to Nance. So Nance was left holding the merger bag with no way out to complete the full plan. Although I don't doubt that Studebaker was in trouble I find it hard to believe that they could hide all of the finacial problems from Packards lawyers. I think rather they did not see them as totally dreadfull when held in the light of the merger coming down the road which was deep sixed with the death of Mason. Then they saw the 4 horsemen coming and held out as long as they could. I know some people say it was all quality and nothing more. Sorry that don't float. GM/Ford/Chrysler all had quality issues over the ensuing years and it did not end up putting them in oblivion because they had other makes to pick up the slack. Packard did not.

For the most part I agree with you, AL...

But IIRC, Ward's book states that Packard's people DID NOT EXAMINE Studebaker's books! As a result, Studebaker was able to hide just how much money they were bleeding until AFTER the merger was complete.

AL: Most of all your statement about the possible merger between Nash, Hudson, Packard, and Studebaker has no merit to it. If you keep up on automotive history you will find that the things were a lot different than what you have stated..

I know that with our prior history you are going to be less than pleased with me, with my above statement. If you look at a past post I made recently you will read, that Nance and Mason had an agreement to merger Nash and Packard. The truth is that Romney wasn't worried about playing second fiddle to Nance in a possible merger. Nance upon learning that he wasn't going to be head of the new possible corporation, talked the Packard board out of going forward with a merger with Nash.

In the talks between Nance and Mason, Studebaker was never considered to be part of the merger.

The reason any merger with Hudson, Nash, and Packard failed was because of Nance.

John F. Shireman

Al-

I read a great article on the '50's mergers in Hemming Classic Car (11/08) written by Patrick Foster.

He runs through the Kaiser-Willys-Overland merger, Nash-Hudson merger. He also pays special detail to the Studebaker-Packard Merger.

"The last of the "Small-Six" to merge were Packard & Studebaker. Their case may be the most controversial of all, because I believe they both approached it with less than shining motives.

Studebaker was hit hard by 1954's Chevy-Ford sales battle. By mid-year, the company was hemorrhaging money and its only hope seemed to be to merge with another company with enough cash to sustain them both until the market turned around.

Packard sales were also down, and the company had burned through a lot of its cash restyling its cars for 1955, introducing a new V-8 engine and a revised Automatic Transmission along with new plants. But Packard's biggest problem was its image: The company and its cars were viewed as stodgy, and most of its sales volume was in the lower-priced Clipper series, not the luxury Packard line. Cadillac had a firm grip on the title of America's top luxury car and Packard was slowly drifting toward ruin. It's management viewed Studebaker dealers as volume-oriented big-timers and hoped that many of them would add the Packard line, which would give Packard sales a solid boost.

Both Packard & Studebaker were in worse shape than they let on and neither wanted to have their books scrutinized too closely, so each agreed to accept the other's word regarding costs and break even points. Since both were in bad shape, the result was heavy losses and loss of public confidence. The only positive result was that Studebaker was able to hold on until the 1959 Lark compact sparked turn around. Seems Ironic: Packard's money helped keep Studebaker alive even as Packard expired. But that's the way it happened".

I like what he said, and think it makes the most sense. Both Packard & Studebaker were not the most honest with each other leaving one to suffer demise, and the other only life support to get it to the late 60's.

It is simplistic, and there are alot of smaller factors ('55 quality control, Re-tooling costs, body plant problems, V-8 oiling problems etc.) but I like Foster's take on it because he loves independents and gets alot of guff for telling it like it is.